Written by Yachi Chiang.
Image credit: 160706-N-GO855-227 by U.S. Pacific Fleet/ Flickr, license: CC BY-NC 2.0.
Currently, there are around 300 submarine cables that carry 99% of global internet data traffic. In other words, if these cables are damaged, the global internet could come to a halt. This is especially true for Taiwan, an island that heavily relies on maritime trade and communication. It is fair to say these submarine cables serve as Taiwan’s lifeline to the world. Despite their significance, little attention is paid to them while they silently work at the bottom of the ocean. Often, people overlook the inherent vulnerability and the constant risks faced by these undersea cables until their daily routine is disrupted.
In 2023, while the people of Taiwan continued to enjoy the convenience of various online services, several incidents of external damage to submarine cables occurred near its offshore islands. For instance, in February 2023, a Chinese fishing vessel claimed that it accidentally severed a cable connecting Taiwan and Matsu Island, leaving Matsu without stable internet access for nearly two months. Imagine this scenario: sending a straightforward text message might take several minutes and still fail, let alone sending data-heavy video content. Payment and service systems reliant on electronic connections would be rendered unusable, forcing a return to cash and face-to-face transactions. Information flow would be severely disrupted, leaving residents unaware of external events and the outside world unable to monitor local conditions.
Consider the chaos and panic we might experience if, having grown accustomed to constant, unlimited internet access, one day we find ourselves completely disconnected, living on a “digitally isolated island” cut off from the rest of the world.
Although relevant authorities eventually restored the submarine cable between Taiwan and Matsu, it was not long before another cable near Dongyin was inadvertently severed by another fishing vessel. Based on prior experience, the authorities swiftly activated contingency plans to maintain digital connectivity following the breakage. However, the recurring incidents of cable disruptions to offshore islands serve as a repeated reminder of the critical role these undersea cables play as key infrastructure today, where digital technologies are deeply integrated into every facet of life.
The history of global submarine cables reveals that their construction and maintenance often involve complex political and economic negotiations among nations and technology companies, making this an overly sensitive issue. In recent years, with the United States advocating for the establishment of a “clean network” among democratic countries, Taiwan has emerged as a preferred hub for submarine cable connections due to its strengths in information and communications technology, its strategic geographic location, and its holding of democratic values.
Thus, whether viewed from the micro perspective of individual digital lives or the macro perspective of Taiwan’s role as a crucial node in the global internet network, submarine cables represent a significant test of Taiwan’s digital resilience.
The question then arises: how can Taiwan ensure the security of its undersea cables, given its unique geopolitical situation? From a legal perspective, this question involves at least two dimensions: international law and domestic law.
From the perspective of international law, two key treaties pertain to submarine cables. The first is the Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables (1884 Cable Convention), which, although relatively brief, focuses on the protection of submarine cables. For example, Article II of this convention criminalizes intentional or negligent damage to submarine cables that could disrupt telegraphic communication. It states: “It is a punishable offence to break or injure a submarine cable, wilfully or by culpable negligence, in such manner as might interrupt or obstruct telegraphic communication, either wholly or partially, such punishment being without prejudice to any civil action for damage.”
The 1884 Cable Convention also addresses the issue of the investigation process over submarine cable protection. Notably, Article X permits any signatory nation’s warship to inspect vessels suspected of damaging submarine cables in violation of the convention. If an officer aboard a warship or a ship designated for such purposes has reasonable grounds to believe that a non-military vessel has violated the convention, they may request the vessel’s captain to produce official documentation proving the vessel’s nationality. Noted in 1959, the United States invoked Article X to board and investigate the Soviet trawler, Novorossiisk, for damaging five transatlantic cables.
The second treaty is the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which largely incorporates the provisions of the 1884 Cable Convention concerning undersea cable protection. UNCLOS grants countries the freedom to lay submarine cables and obligates coastal states to protect them. In addition, the UNCLOS covers related topics such as cable installation, the rights of coastal states, and legal liability for damage to submarine cables. These provisions are applied across various maritime zones, including territorial seas, exclusive economic zones, continental shelves, and the high seas.
For instance, Article 21 of the UNCLOS addresses how coastal countries can regulate their territorial waters. It states that a coastal country may create lows about “innocent passage” through these waters, including rules for “the safety of navigation,” “the protection of navigational aids,” and “the protection of cables and pipelines.” This Article does not directly mandate the protection of cables within territorial waters but rather encourages coastal states to implement laws and regulations to ensure innocent passage.
Although the two international treaties establish a legal framework for the protection of submarine cables, there are apparent limitations. First, international treaties often lack mandatory power to enforce the said legal framework. Second, given the increasing importance of digital technology applications, the level of protection envisioned at the time these treaties were drafted is no longer sufficient. Third, Taiwan’s unique geopolitical situation raises questions about how effectively the principles and provisions of these international treaties can be applied.
From the perspective of Taiwan’s domestic legal system, in response to the Matsu cable incident, the Taiwan government proposed to revise Article 72 and add Article 72-1 of the Telecommunications Management Act, which the Legislative Yuan approved in June 2023.
Prior to this revision, Article 72 limited the subject of protection to cable landing stations. As a result, incidents like the Matsu cable disruption in February 2023 could only be addressed under Article 354 of the Criminal Code, which deals with general property damage. To activate the judicial procedure requires a complaint to be filed, and it does not apply to negligence or attempted crimes. Therefore, if the victims, such as the telecom companies, do not file a complaint, prosecutors may find it difficult to intervene effectively.
The new Article 72 introduces strict penalties for those who interfere with submarine cable infrastructure. It states that “those who endanger the normal functioning of the submarine cable landing station and cables extending from the submarine cable landing station, the transmission and switching sites of a domestic sea cable system and cables extending from the transmission and switching sites, international gateway sites or satellite communications centre by means of theft, destruction, or other illegal means, shall be subject to imprisonment term and may also be fined a maximum of NT$10 million.”
Article 72-1 goes further by addressing threats to critical information and communication systems. It declares that those who endanger the normal functioning of the core information and communications system of the submarine cable landing station, the transmission and switching sites of the domestic sea cable system, international gateway sites or satellite communications centre shall be subject to imprisonment term and may also be fined.
It is worth attention that the amended Articles 72 and 72-1 of the Telecommunications Management Act extend to extraterritorial offences. However, the judicial authority of Taiwan over foreign vessels would be another challenge. According to the words from local judicial practitioners, the investigation of submarine cable crimes is best handled through the immediate arrest of perpetrators caught in the act. The focus should be on collecting evidence at the scene, such as identifying the location of the incident, confirming the identity of the offending vessel and its crew, and recording audio and video during the pursuit process.
As a maritime nation, Taiwan relies heavily on the security of undersea cables to maintain its global connectivity. The importance of these submarine cables to Taiwan is undeniable and continues to increase over time. Although there are clear limitations for Taiwan to apply international law or domestic law to protect undersea cables, a carefully designed legal framework and skilled legal practice could help in many ways. To strengthen the digital resilience of Taiwan, it is time to check existing legal options domestically, regionally, and internationally.
Yachi Chiang, Professor at National Taiwan Ocean University, is one of the authors and editors of the “Maritime Nation: Digital Resilience” booklet series. This article is retrieved from the short paper submitted to the 9th International Conference on Ocean Law and Policy, 2024.
This article was published as part of a special issue on ‘Digital Governance in Taiwan’.
Taiwan Insight 