Written by Sana Hashmi.
Image credit: PL15E air-to-air missile by Z3144228. / Wikimedia, license: public domain.
The year 2025 is fast becoming a theatre of escalating geopolitical tension. In just six months, major conflicts have erupted across Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia. Among these, the India–Pakistan confrontation warrants close attention, not only for its regional implications but for the strategic signals it sends across the Indo-Pacific.
For Taiwan, already on heightened alert amid growing fears of a Chinese military invasion, this conflict is far from peripheral. It offers a revealing case study and lessons. China, though not a direct combatant, played a quiet yet deliberate and calculated role: backing Pakistan as a proxy to test limited war scenarios, refine grey-zone tactics, and sharpen cognitive warfare strategies, all in a setting that closely resembles Taiwan’s own strategic environment.
This marked the first recent instance of Chinese military systems being used in a live conflict. The involvement was far from symbolic. Chinese platforms were integrated into operational planning, and strategic commentators explicitly referenced Taiwan. Some drew direct parallels, framing the conflict as a cautionary tale for Taipei and Washington. One particularly stark comment likened reliance on foreign military support to “quenching thirst with poison.”
For Beijing, the conflict served as a proving ground to evaluate its exports and next-generation platforms. The deployment of systems such as the J-10C multirole fighter, PL-15E long-range air-to-air missile, and HQ-9 surface-to-air missile provided valuable operational data. Chinese commentators contrasted the performance of Chinese-made systems, particularly the J-10CE and JF-17 Thunder, with India’s Western-oriented force structure, drawing parallels to Taiwan’s predominantly US-sourced arsenal. The argument was not just about hardware, but about systems integration, doctrinal cohesion, and operational speed. According to this narrative, Taiwan’s challenge is as much organisational as it is technological. For Taiwan, analysing how these systems were employed, coordinated, and perceived offers key insights into China’s evolving military capabilities.
Chinese discourse framed the conflict as a contest between Chinese systems and a Western-aligned defence architecture. Taiwan, heavily reliant on US platforms, must consider the implications of facing an adversary designing its forces specifically to exploit the vulnerabilities of such systems.
A related concern is Taiwan’s dependence on the United States. This relationship, once viewed as a strategic asset, increasingly appears as a potential constraint. Overreliance on a single security partner may limit Taiwan’s autonomy and responsiveness during a crisis. In contrast to India’s diversified procurement strategy, Taiwan remains heavily reliant on US defence systems. This asymmetry, though historically understandable, now appears strategically brittle, and the structural risk remains credible. Diversifying suppliers and building regional security partnerships would enhance Taiwan’s resilience and complicate China’s planning.
Drones featured prominently. Low-cost Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) were deployed to test air defences and exhaust high-value interceptors. Meanwhile, India’s use of standoff precision weapons such as the BrahMos cruise missile, a joint India-Russia platform, demonstrated how high-impact, limited strikes can shift battlefield dynamics without provoking full-scale escalation. These tactical choices carry relevance for Taiwan, which must think beyond conventional warfare to embrace adaptable, high-leverage responses.
Beijing’s use of the conflict to trial military technologies and doctrines also reflects a broader strategic pattern: the increasing reliance on proxy engagements as instruments of statecraft. Supporting Pakistan has allowed China to test concepts without incurring the risks of direct confrontation. Taiwan must watch for similar dynamics, particularly in the South China Sea and cyberspace, where China may apply indirect pressure under the cover of plausible deniability.
The role of the United States and its policy of strategic ambiguity also requires careful scrutiny. During the India–Pakistan tensions, President Donald J. Trump offered to mediate, signalling a preference for crisis management over clear alignment with India. In a future Taiwan Strait scenario under similarly inclined US leadership, Taipei must be prepared for a restrained or equivocal American response.
Perhaps one of the most decisive theatres, however, was informational. China and Pakistan executed coordinated disinformation campaigns, shaping global narratives before official responses could coalesce. These efforts were not ancillary; they were central to the strategy. Designed to demoralise opponents and project Chinese power, they illustrated how cognitive warfare now underpins conventional force. Taiwan, already a frequent target of such operations, must act with urgency. This includes investing further in proactive information operations, strengthening civil society media literacy, and partnering with trusted national and international outlets. In any future crisis, maintaining public trust and narrative control will be as crucial as battlefield performance, as was seen during Operation Sindoor and its aftermath.
Another lesson lies in the evolving character of conflict itself. The India–Pakistan confrontation did not escalate into full-scale war, yet it transformed the strategic environment. For Taiwan, the takeaway is unambiguous: preparation must centre on short, sharp, high-intensity contingencies, crises unfolding in days, not months. This demands rapid mobilisation, decentralised command-and-control, and the ability to operate under conditions of information degradation and system disruption. It also reinforces the need for early coordination with like-minded partners to secure timely external support.
Taiwan’s response to these challenges must be measured but decisive. China is actively experimenting with kinetic and non-kinetic strategies across multiple theatres. This is not a moment for alarmism, but for clear-eyed preparation. Deeper cooperation with regional partners is no longer optional. Taiwan’s diplomatic limitations must not become strategic liabilities. As the regional order grows more brittle, Taiwan’s security will depend on its ability to adapt and integrate.
Taiwan must learn, diversify, and build resilience. Its defence posture should prioritise asymmetric warfare, agility, and layered partnerships. While deterrence remains the guiding principle, it must be grounded in indigenous capacity and doctrinal clarity.
Above all, Taiwan’s diplomacy towards like-minded countries must evolve. Strategic clarity, narrative coherence, and pre-crisis coordination with key partners, including Japan, Australia, the Philippines, and India, are essential. Closer ties with India, in particular, may offer valuable lessons on force integration, procurement diversification, and managing sustained pressure from Beijing.
The strategic lesson for Taiwan from the India–Pakistan conflict is clear: Beijing is actively rehearsing, adapting, and signalling its intent, both to intimidate Taiwan and to refine its operational playbook. Taiwan must respond by cultivating agility, composure, and strategic depth in its preparations and partnerships.
Sana Hashmi, Ph.D., is a Fellow at Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation. She is a non-resident scholar with the Research Institute for Indo-Pacific Affairs and Taiwan’s NextGen Foundation. She was Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Fellow at the Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University in 2020. She is a former Consultant in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Government of India (2016-19). In 2017, she was named the United Kingdom’s next-gen foreign and security policy scholar. She is the author of the book, China’s Approach towards Territorial Disputes: Lessons and Prospects. She tweets at @sanahashmi1. Views are personal.
This article was published as part of a special issue on ‘India-Pakistan Conflict: Strategic Insights for Taiwan‘.
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