Cheng Li-wun: The Second Coming of Hung Hsiu-chu?

Written by Brian Hioe.

Image credit: 鄭麗文/ Facebook.

Cheng Li-wun’s tenure as KMT party chair has already been remarkable. In less than two weeks in office, Cheng had already created several national controversies.

Indeed, Cheng’s rise from obscurity to superstardom has been a spectacular one. Cheng is not a political newcomer, having served in public office for more than twenty years and having once served in the National Assembly as a member of the DPP. This is not unlike Han Kuo-yu or Hung Hsiu-chu, who also rose out of obscurity when they became presidential candidates of the KMT but were not exactly new to the political scene.

It has been relatively common for Cheng’s career to date to be compared to that of Hung Hsiu-chu, in that both have made waves precisely on the basis of their deep blue political leanings and hardline stance on advocating for unification. Hung was also the first female chair of the KMT, while Cheng is the second.

Yet like Han Kuo-yu, Cheng has seen allegations that China backed her rise to superstardom. Pan-blue media commentator Jaw Shaw-kong, who served as the KMT’s vice-presidential candidate in the 2024 campaign cycle, was among the first to allege that China backed Cheng. Jaw called on China to halt interference in the KMT chair election, and in the course of the chair race, other candidates questioned Cheng’s sources of funding and the wave of social media activity originating outside of Taiwan that seemed to support Cheng. This proves similar with Han, with suspicions raised in the course of his rise as Kaohsiung mayor about his sudden surge in Google ratings.

But if Cheng’s rise can in this way be compared to Hung and Han, it is to be seen if Cheng, too, will eventually fall from grace. Hung was, after all, so unpopular as a presidential candidate in 2016 that she was swapped out with Eric Chu late in the race, though she later became KMT party chair. Similarly, after his defeat in the 2020 presidential elections, Han was recalled by large margins from his position as Kaohsiung mayor.

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At present, Cheng commands headlines in a way that KMT party chairs normally do not. Cheng’s level of fame is now such that there is even talk of whether she will eventually develop presidential ambitions and seek to challenge Taichung mayor Lu Shiow-yen for the KMT’s 2028 presidential nomination.

Indeed, Lu was called on by outgoing KMT party chair Eric Chu to become his successor. However, Lu demurred, probably not wanting to open herself up to attacks if she took up the position. If the KMT suffered losses in the 2026 local elections, Lu might be made to resign to take responsibility, which would weaken her chances of becoming the KMT’s 2028 presidential nominee. Lu was probably instead counting on Hau Lung-bin or another relatively weaker KMT political figure to become chair and hold onto the position, while backing her bid for presidential candidate.

Few would have expected Cheng to throw her hat into the race and unexpectedly win it. This repeats the pattern in which KMT politicians rise to become national-level figures when they enter races with power vacuums and unexpectedly win, as seen with Hung and Han as well.

Still, Cheng has already become a controversial figure. From the start of her campaign for party chair, Cheng drew controversy over the fact that she hoped to see Taiwanese “proud to be Chinese” and that “Taiwan and the mainland should join forces to reach new heights in human civilisation.”

It was thought that Cheng might moderate her stances once she became party chair, perhaps having appealed to deep Blues in the course of campaigning in order to strengthen the odds of winning party chair, but shifting to a more moderate stance in order to appeal to the general public after victory. This has not occurred.

As it turns out, Cheng may be a true ideologue. In her first week as party chair, Cheng was drawn into two controversies. The first involved Cheng stating in an interview with German public broadcaster Deutsche Welle that she viewed Russian president Vladimir Putin as a democratically elected leader, while she viewed the cause of the Russia-Ukraine War as being NATO’s eastward expansion. These comments seemed to show that Cheng primarily viewed Russia as fighting a defensive war, while Ukraine was at fault for the outbreak of the conflict.

The second involved Cheng attending a White Terror memorial ceremony that memorialised Wu Shi, a high-ranking military official who was executed by the KMT in 1950 for spying for the CCP. Wu Shi has featured heavily in CCP depictions of the Chinese Civil War in past years, invariably in a positive light. Cheng denied that the event was to memorialise Wu Shi or that her invitation letter to the event included any reference to him, but Wu Shi was referred to in the event as a “martyred hero” and featured in promotional images for it.

The memorial ceremony for Wu Shi drew criticisms from other members of the KMT, including Alex Tsai, Apollo Chen, and Chiang Wan-an. Tsai commented that the KMT could change its name to “Chinese Nationalist Surrender Party”, intimating that Cheng’s participation in the event would add to the public perception that the KMT wishes to immediately surrender to China. Chen suggested that the public would still remember Cheng’s actions by the time the 2026 local elections happen next November. Chiang stated that it would be more appropriate to commemorate figures who sought to defend the ROC and Taiwan.

It is unusual for KMT heavyweights to turn on a newly inaugurated party chair so quickly. But Cheng’s political trajectory has been, if anything, unorthodox. It is yet to be seen whether Lu Shiow-yen eventually also goes after Cheng, perhaps to try and stamp out a possible competitor. Lu’s election odds are helped by the public perception of her as a moderate on cross-strait relations, but Cheng would likely attack Lu over a lack of clarity as having led to this perception, and could potentially force Lu to make concessions to her more hardline stances.

It seems probable that if Cheng continues with her current political trajectory, there would eventually be some attempt to push her out, as occurred with Hung Hsiu-chu’s removal as the KMT’s 2016 presidential candidate. But there are few precedents for forcing a party chair out of office, and Cheng’s tenacity to date has suggested that she may be willing to take on a broader coalition of other KMT party members.

To this extent, as chair, Cheng has power over resource distribution for the party, and Cheng could throw a wrench into the election ambitions of candidates that otherwise bank on support from the central party if they turn against her. As such, it may not be surprising that it is former legislators such as Tsai and Chen who first voiced criticisms of her. The future of the KMT seems uncertain, then.

Brian Hioe is one of the founding editors of New Bloom. He is a freelance journalist, as well as a translator. A New York native and Taiwanese-American, he has an MA in East Asian Languages and Cultures from Columbia University. He graduated from New York University with majors in History, East Asian Studies, and English Literature. He was a Democracy and Human Rights Service Fellow at the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy from 2017 to 2018. He is currently a non-resident fellow at the University of Nottingham’s Taiwan Research Hub.

This article was published as part of a special issue on ‘KMT leadership election: Can Cheng Li-wun save the party?‘.