Written by Baosheng Guo.
Image credit: Public domain.
On February 17, 2026, Trump said aboard Air Force One when asked about Xi’s opposition to the arms sales to Taiwan, “I’m talking to him about it. We had a good conversation, and we’ll make a determination pretty soon.” Trump’s comments have stirred a debate among some experts and politicians about whether Trump’s behaviour violated the Six Assurances. Both sides of the debate have their strong arguments. From this debate and the incident, people could draw some conclusions about the logic of Trump’s second-term arms sales policy toward Taiwan.
Background
The legal basis of the American arms sales to Taiwan is the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which Congress passed and President Carter signed into law in 1979. According to the TRA’s provisions, “It is the policy of the United States to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character and to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardise the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan.”
The additional policy on arms sales to Taiwan is known as the Six Assurances. It is not a law but a policy commitment for Taiwan. The Reagan administration conveyed it orally and by cable on August 17, 1982, to Taiwan’s President Chiang Ching-kuo through the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), amid Taiwan’s concerns over the U.S.-PRC Third Joint Communiqué on arms sales (signed the same day). On August 31, 2020, the first Trump administration declassified the original Six Assurances cables. The provisions regarding arms sales contained within the cable read as follows: “It is their understanding that the U.S. side has not agreed to consult with the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan.” Which is the second article of the Six Assurances.
Current situation
On December 17, 2025, President Trump’s administration announced the largest single package of weapons sales to Taiwan worth more than $11 billion in U.S. history. Many of the systems mirror those the U.S. has supplied to Ukraine. A well-known Taiwan specialist, Bonnie Glaser, said that, “These are weapons that will really prevent the PLA or maybe even prevent Xi Jinping from making a decision to send the PLA across the strait, because they will impose a very high cost on an invading PLA.”
On the contrary, China attacked the move. On February 4, 2026, Chinese President Xi Jinping raised concerns about U.S. arms sales to Taiwan during a phone call with Trump. According to the official Chinese readout, Xi urged the U.S. to handle arms sales to Taiwan with “prudence,” “utmost caution,” and emphasised that China would never allow Taiwan to be separated from it.
Hence, the American media wants to know Trump’s reaction to Xi’s opposition to the arms sales. Then Trump said that he was talking to Xi about it and would decide soon. After 10 days, on February 27, the New York Times reported that Taiwan’s arms sale, approved by Congress, is delayed as Trump plans a visit to Beijing.
Debate
Regarding this incident, oppositions think Trump’s behaviour, discussing with Xi Jinping, violates the Six Assurances and has made a negative impact on American foreign policy. Still, supporters assert Trump was only pragmatic, flexible in dealing with the affairs between visiting Beijing and arms sales to Taiwan, and the literal meaning of the Six Assurances could not restrict discussion with China in the present.
Representative Ro Khanna (CA-17) issued a statement in response to this incident: “Trump’s admission that he is discussing future U.S. arms sales to Taiwan with Xi is alarming and a blatant violation of U.S. policy and the Six Assurances. His statement shows just how Trump treats Taiwan as a ‘bargaining chip’ in trade negotiations with China… I urge the President to reaffirm our commitment to the Six Assurances and clarify that our policy on Taiwan has not changed.”
U.S. Senator Andy Kim (D-N.J.) said, “This isn’t just an admission, it’s a disturbing abandonment of our Taiwan policy, which has been key to stability for decades… Even if he decides to move forward with these sales, we’re in dangerous territory now.”
Ryan Hass, director of the Brookings Institution’s John L. Thornton China Centre, said Beijing has long sought to require Washington to consult on Taiwan arms sales, a demand consistently rejected by previous administrations in line with the Six Assurances.”Regardless of what Trump decides, Trump has gifted Xi a win by setting a new precedent.”
However, some experts expressed support for Trump’s behaviour. Steve Yates, senior research fellow for China at the Heritage Foundation, said that Taiwan’s arms packages do not have a fixed time for processing. “Packages deemed ready for Presidential sign-off have always been subject to the competition with other matters before the President… Delaying an announcement until after a near-term political or diplomatic priority is common and does not jeopardise the transaction.”
Richard Bush, former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan, said that there remains “some ambiguity” over the second of the six assurances. He observed that the 1982 formulation, “has not agreed to consult with the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan,” technically leaves open the possibility of future consultation.
Rush Doshi, the director of the China Strategy Initiative at the Council on Foreign Relations, argued that a literal reading of the “has not” language is too narrow, asserting that 40 years of bipartisan consensus and congressional actions have effectively solidified the assurance as a firm “will not” mandate.
Bonnie Glaser argued that from a wide and traditional view, Reagan’s true intention was to proscribe any U.S. negotiations with Beijing over arms sales to Taiwan, despite all three versions in official records using the past-tense “has not” rather than “would not.” Indeed, according to customary law tradition, once a former president establishes a provision, and no new provision overturns it, the previous provisions must be followed.
The patterns in Trump’s arms sales policy towards Taiwan
In sum, based on the opinions and viewpoints of U.S. lawmakers and Taiwanese experts above, from both a literal and a principled perspective, Trump’s actions violated the principle and tradition of the second article of the Six Assurances at least. Also, this incident reveals some patterns in Trump’s arms sales policy towards Taiwan during his second term.
First, due to the TRA being the law, the Trump administration obeys the TRA constantly and insists on arms sales to Taiwan consistently. But because the Six Assurances is not a law, the Trump administration will not implement it as the TRA would, and his disobedience won’t make him legally responsible. In this sense, on May 15, 2025, Rep. Krishnamoorthi, Raja [D-IL-8], introduced the new bill, the Six Assurances to Taiwan Act (H.R. 3452 & S.3208), in the 119th Congress (2025-2026), which aims to codify the 1982 Six Assurances into law, formalising policies on arms sales, sovereignty, and negotiations with Beijing. It establishes congressional oversight to prevent the executive branch from altering these promises. The bill is in process. If it becomes law, a violation of this law could result in legal consequences.
Secondly, Trump’s foreign policy priority issue could be above the Six Assurances. Since Trump started his second term, he wants to improve relations with China and sees visiting Beijing as the primary foreign policy. To maintain a good relationship with China, he could postpone actions that provoke anger in China, such as arms sales to Taiwan. Either Beijing’s pressure or his own monitoring could prompt Trump to do this kind thing. On the other hand, like the U.S. cutting off official relations with ROC Taiwan to establish official relations with PRC China, the American relationship with Taiwan has the opposite relationship to the American relationship with China. If the U.S. wants to improve its relationship with China, some of Taiwan’s policies could be restricted. For instance, since last Summer, the U.S. State Department has refused to allow Taiwanese President Lai to transit through New York on his way to visit diplomatic allies in South America—contrary to the custom that had been developed under previous U.S. administrations.
Finally, Trump’s Taiwan policy has a significant impact on his arms sales policy toward Taiwan. According to Taiwan experts, Dr Ghulam Ali’s article on the Global Taiwan Institute, ” Trump’s policy towards Taiwan during this second term amplifies long-standing ‘strategic ambiguity,’ … These contrasting policies … have heightened uncertainty in Beijing and Taipei about Washington’s ultimate intentions in a cross-Strait crisis.” Additionally, Professor Gerrit van der Wees asserts on Taiwan Insight, “The turbulence in U.S.–Taiwan relations in 2025 stemmed from contrasting policy signals, institutional dynamics, and proactive defence measures. … while strategic documents and domestic Taiwanese policy choices added layers of complexity to the bilateral relationship.” Hence, in the policy context of “ambiguity”, “uncertainty”, “turbulence”, and “complexity”, it is not surprising that the policy of arms sales to Taiwan emerged as messy and non-normal.
As the Chinese idiom goes, “a single falling leaf foretells the arrival of autumn.” (一葉知秋) Analysing Trump’s comment about speaking with Xi Jinping about arms sales to Taiwan, it is evident that—precisely because he does not strictly adhere to the policies and protocols of previous administrations—his foreign policy is rife with unpredictability and uncertainty. Nevertheless, Trump does demonstrate a willingness to abide by laws enacted by Congress; this offers a sense of certainty amid prevailing uncertainty—specifically, it provides a measure of assurance regarding Taiwan’s security guarantees and the issue of arms sales.
Baosheng Guo is an M.A. Asia Study student at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. Many of his pieces were published in various media and academic journals, including The Diplomat, Global Taiwan Institute (GTI), Taiwan Insight (University of Nottingham), Taiwan International Studies Quarterly, and other Taiwan academic journals.