Written by Jagannath Panda.
The reported decision by the United States to recalibrate the strategic language surrounding its Indo-Pacific Command has reignited an important debate about the future of the Indo-Pacific. Whether the move reflects a symbolic adjustment or a broader reassessment of American strategic priorities remains open to interpretation. Yet the larger question is not what Washington chooses to call the region. The more consequential question is whether the Indo-Pacific has matured sufficiently to be sustained by the strategic agency of regional democracies themselves.
Few partnerships illustrate that challenge more clearly than the evolving relationship between India and Taiwan. For much of the past three decades, Taiwan has been viewed primarily through the prism of the Taiwan Strait. Strategic discussions centred on military deterrence, Cross-Strait stability and the possibility of conflict between China and the United States. While those concerns remain valid, they no longer adequately explain Taiwan’s growing significance in Asia’s strategic landscape.
Taiwan today is far more than a geopolitical flashpoint. It has emerged as one of the Indo-Pacific’s most consequential economic and technological actors. Its leadership in semiconductor manufacturing, advanced electronics, artificial intelligence hardware and high-end precision engineering has transformed it into an indispensable node in the global economy. As economic security increasingly merges with national security, Taiwan’s strategic value now extends well beyond its geography.
The Indo-Pacific has never been solely a maritime construct. It has always been a political idea that links democracies, connectivity, technological resilience, and the defence of a rules-based order. Within that framework, Taiwan emerged not merely as a security concern but as a democratic partner whose technological capabilities and economic centrality reinforced the credibility of the Indo-Pacific vision itself. As the strategic vocabulary surrounding the Indo-Pacific evolves, preserving that wider democratic and economic logic becomes as important as preserving its military dimension.
This transformation mirrors a broader evolution in the Indo-Pacific itself. When the concept first gained prominence, it was largely associated with maritime security, freedom of navigation, and the balancing of China’s growing influence. Those objectives remain important. However, the Indo-Pacific has since evolved into a wider framework encompassing resilient supply chains, critical technologies, digital governance, economic connectivity and trusted industrial partnerships. In this expanded vision, Taiwan is no longer a peripheral player. It sits close to the centre of the region’s technological architecture. That shift should matter profoundly to India.
For New Delhi, the Indo-Pacific has never been solely about naval strategy or geopolitical competition. It has also been about building an open, rules-based and economically connected region where strategic autonomy can coexist with deeper partnerships among like-minded democracies. Taiwan fits naturally within that vision. Its democratic institutions, technological strengths and expanding economic engagement across Asia make it a partner whose relevance is increasing rather than diminishing.
The changing strategic landscape therefore requires India to rethink not simply how it views Taiwan, but how it incorporates Taiwan into its broader Indo-Pacific strategy. The relationship should no longer be seen as an extension of cross-Strait politics or as a diplomatic variable shaped entirely by developments in Beijing or Washington. Instead, it should be understood as a partnership with intrinsic strategic value. In many respects, Taiwan has evolved from being the Indo-Pacific’s most vulnerable flashpoint into one of its most valuable strategic assets. That transformation demands a corresponding evolution in India’s strategic thinking.
India’s Taiwan Moment
India’s engagement with Taiwan has long been characterised by ‘quiet pragmatism.’ Without altering its formal diplomatic position, New Delhi has steadily expanded cooperation with Taipei in trade, education, investment, science and technology, cultural exchanges and industrial collaboration. Unlike many geopolitical relationships that fluctuate with changing political winds, India-Taiwan ties have advanced through patient institutional engagement rather than dramatic diplomatic gestures. This gradualism has often been mistaken for caution. In reality, it reflects a deeper strategic calculation. India increasingly recognises that the defining competition of the twenty-first century will not be determined solely by military capabilities. It will also be shaped by technological leadership, industrial resilience and the ability to secure trusted supply chains. In each of these areas, Taiwan possesses capabilities that complement India’s long-term economic ambitions.
Semiconductors provide the clearest example. As countries seek to reduce excessive dependence on concentrated production networks, Taiwan has become central to global efforts to build more resilient and diversified semiconductor ecosystems. India, meanwhile, has launched an ambitious effort to establish itself as a global manufacturing and innovation hub. Bringing together Taiwan’s technological expertise and India’s scale, engineering talent and expanding industrial base offers a partnership whose strategic significance extends far beyond commercial investment. Yet reducing India-Taiwan relations to semiconductors alone would underestimate the breadth of the opportunity. Artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, cybersecurity, advanced manufacturing, telecommunications, clean energy technologies, digital infrastructure and healthcare innovation all present promising avenues for deeper collaboration. These sectors are no longer peripheral to national development; they increasingly define economic power and strategic influence.
This is where India’s Taiwan policy is undergoing a subtle but important transformation. The relationship is evolving from one primarily concerned with diplomatic management to one increasingly driven by economic statecraft. Taiwan is becoming relevant not simply because of China’s rise, but because it contributes directly to India’s own national objectives such as technological self-reliance, supply-chain diversification and long-term economic resilience. Such a shift also reflects the changing nature of the Indo-Pacific. The region’s future will be shaped less by traditional alliance politics than by networks of trusted technological and industrial cooperation. Countries capable of co-developing advanced technologies, securing critical supply chains and fostering innovation will increasingly define the strategic balance in Asia. India and Taiwan are well positioned to become partners in that emerging order. Their relationship is no longer one of convenience or quiet diplomacy. It is gradually acquiring the characteristics of a strategic partnership rooted in shared interests, complementary strengths and a common stake in preserving a free, open and resilient Indo-Pacific.
Beyond China
A stronger India–Taiwan partnership should not be interpreted simply as a response to China’s rise. Such an interpretation would not only underestimate the intrinsic value of the relationship but also overlook the broader transformation taking place across the Indo-Pacific. While China will inevitably remain an important strategic variable, India’s engagement with Taiwan is increasingly being shaped by considerations that extend beyond Beijing. That said, China cannot be ignored.
Despite recent diplomatic efforts to stabilise bilateral relations, India and China continue to inhabit a relationship defined by structural competition rather than enduring strategic trust. Progress on border management, high-level political engagement and expanding cooperation in multilateral institutions have undoubtedly reduced immediate tensions. Yet these developments have not fundamentally altered the underlying realities that shape the relationship. The unresolved boundary dispute, China’s growing military capabilities, its expanding naval presence in the Indian Ocean, its strategic alignment with Pakistan, and intensifying competition in emerging technologies continue to influence New Delhi’s long-term strategic outlook. Periods of diplomatic accommodation are therefore likely to remain tactical rather than transformational. They may improve the atmosphere, but they are unlikely to eliminate the structural factors driving strategic rivalry. It is precisely this reality that gives Taiwan growing relevance in India’s strategic calculus.
Closer engagement with Taiwan should not be viewed as balancing China in the traditional geopolitical sense. Rather, it should be understood as part of India’s broader strategy of reducing strategic vulnerabilities. Diversifying technology partnerships, strengthening trusted industrial ecosystems and expanding access to advanced manufacturing capabilities enhance India’s resilience irrespective of the state of India–China relations. This distinction is important. For too long, discussions on India–Taiwan relations have tended to fluctuate according to developments in Sino-Indian ties. Border crises generate renewed interest in Taiwan; diplomatic engagement with Beijing produces speculation that India may become more cautious. Such cyclical interpretations underestimate the maturity that the bilateral relationship has gradually acquired.
India’s Taiwan policy is no longer merely reactive. It is increasingly proactive. New Delhi’s evolving diplomatic language illustrates this subtle shift. While India continues to respect its long-standing position on the One China policy, it has also become noticeably more careful about publicly reiterating the formulation without reciprocal recognition of India’s own sovereignty concerns. This is not a rejection of established policy. Rather, it reflects a more sophisticated understanding that strategic flexibility is itself an instrument of statecraft. Maintaining stronger practical relations with Taiwan therefore complements, rather than contradicts, India’s broader foreign policy objectives. It enhances India’s strategic autonomy, expands its economic options and reinforces its ability to navigate an increasingly uncertain regional order without becoming dependent on any single external partner.
Reimagining the Indo-Pacific
The evolving partnership between India and Taiwan also speaks to a larger transformation taking place across the Indo-Pacific itself. The first phase of the Indo-Pacific was largely defined by geopolitics. It focused on maritime security, freedom of navigation, strategic balancing and preserving a rules-based order in response to China’s growing military and maritime assertiveness. These objectives remain essential, but they no longer capture the full character of regional competition. A second phase is emerging.
Increasingly, the Indo-Pacific is being shaped by competition over technology, industrial capacity, supply-chain resilience, critical minerals, digital infrastructure and innovation. Economic security has become inseparable from national security. Countries that lead in semiconductor production, artificial intelligence, advanced manufacturing and trusted digital ecosystems will exercise influence that extends well beyond conventional military power. In this emerging landscape, Taiwan occupies a uniquely important position. Its strengths in semiconductor manufacturing, advanced technologies and innovation ecosystems make it indispensable to the future economic architecture of the Indo-Pacific. India, meanwhile, offers scale, market depth, engineering talent, manufacturing ambition and growing geopolitical influence. Together, they possess the potential to shape new forms of regional cooperation that are driven not by military alliances but by technological interdependence.
Japan naturally completes this picture.
An India-Taiwan-Japan partnership need not be conceived as a formal strategic alliance. Indeed, its greatest strength would lie in its flexibility. Cooperation in semiconductor ecosystems, critical minerals, resilient supply chains, cyber security, artificial intelligence, clean technologies, maritime logistics, start-up ecosystems and research collaboration would generate practical outcomes while reinforcing the broader objectives of a free and open Indo-Pacific. Such minilateral partnerships are likely to become increasingly important as regional powers assume greater responsibility for shaping the Indo-Pacific’s future. Regardless of changes in political leadership or strategic terminology in Washington, the durability of the Indo-Pacific will ultimately depend on whether its principal stakeholders are prepared to invest in one another’s long-term resilience. For India, Taiwan should therefore no longer be viewed merely as a diplomatic issue requiring careful management. It should be recognised as one of the Indo-Pacific’s important strategic partners.
Dr. Jagannath Panda is the Head of the Stockholm Center for South Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs at the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Sweden; and a Senior Fellow at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, The Netherlands. Dr. Panda is also the Series Editor for Routledge Studies on Think Asia.
This article was published as part of the special issue on ‘More Than Chips: Education, Innovation and Strategic Ties between India and Taiwan’.