Written by Dr Kristina Kironska.
Image credit: US-Taiwan-European Next Generation Working Group.
Being selected as one of the ten participants in the third cohort of the US-Taiwan-European Next Generation Working Group was both a privilege and a unique professional opportunity. Organised by the Institute of East Asian Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, the three-year programme brings together a small group of early- and mid-career scholars and policy professionals from the United States (US) and Europe whose work focuses on Taiwan. The cohort meets annually in Taiwan, Europe, and the US to engage directly with policymakers, academics, business leaders, and civil society representatives. The first year of the programme brought the cohort to Taipei, from 31 May to 6 June 2026.
What the week in Taipei offered was a panoramic view. As a scholar focusing on Taiwan, especially international relations and human rights, my engagement with Taiwan tends to be concentrated on particular policy domains and interlocutors. This programme was much broader; over the course of a week, the cohort moved between defence research institutions, senior diplomatic officials, legislators from both major parties, business associations, civil society organisations, a former premier, and a sitting Vice President. That breadth was, for me, one of the week’s most valuable qualities. Observing how certain themes surfaced across such varied institutional settings produced a more textured understanding of Taiwan’s current situation than any single-track engagement could have yielded.
Before turning to the substantive themes that emerged across the week, one moment warrants particular mention. The visit to the Jing-Mei White Terror Memorial Park, and the opportunity to hear Former Premier Su Tseng-chang speak to the cohort in the very courtroom where, in 1979, he had served as defence counsel for the defendants of the Kaohsiung Incident, was the highlight of the week for me. Standing in that room and hearing him recount one of the defining moments of Taiwan’s democratic struggle made vivid what can otherwise remain abstract: that the liberal and prosperous Taiwan we engaged with throughout the week did not arrive at its current condition without contestation, sacrifice, and the personal courage of many individuals fighting for democracy.
Resilience as Taiwan’s organising principle
The most striking observation from the meetings was the centrality of resilience. While the concept has become increasingly prominent in discussions on Taiwan in recent years, what stood out was its breadth. Across conversations on security, energy, technology, economic policy, democratic governance, business, and civil society, resilience emerged as an overarching framework rather than a sector-specific policy objective.
This whole-of-society approach to resilience has gained particular prominence under President Lai Ching-te, whose administration has institutionalised it as a central element of Taiwan’s national security strategy. The discussions throughout the week reinforced the impression that deterrence, as it is currently understood in Taipei, extends well beyond military capabilities. It encompasses civil defence, energy security, supply-chain resilience, technological competitiveness, media literacy, and the capacity of democratic institutions and society to withstand external pressure.
Equally notable was the extent to which preparedness for potential conflict initiated by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) formed the backdrop to discussions across otherwise unrelated policy areas. The meetings were neither alarmist nor exclusively focused on military affairs. Rather, the possibility of future instability stemming from growing cross-Strait tensions and the risk of military coercion by the PRC provided a common frame through which diverse issues were understood. Energy policy was discussed in terms of security of supply, semiconductor production as a pillar of strategic resilience, artificial intelligence as both an economic opportunity and a source of technological competitiveness, and media literacy as part of safeguarding democratic institutions.
Perhaps most interestingly, this perspective was shared by institutions with very different mandates. Whether discussing foreign policy, economic development, technology, democratic governance, or business, speakers consistently returned to similar concepts of preparedness, adaptability, and societal capacity. The repetition of these ideas across such varied institutional settings suggested that resilience has become one of the defining organising principles through which Taiwan increasingly understands its future.
Taiwan’s self-perception and the power of smaller states
A second theme proved more surprising. Across a number of settings, Taiwanese interlocutors described their country as small—not merely in geographic terms, but also in terms of its international standing and leverage. The context for such a framing is easy to understand. Measured against its neighbour, the PRC, almost any comparison appears unfavourable.
Yet Taiwan is not, by any meaningful economic or technological measure, a marginal actor. Its nominal GDP is comparable to that of Poland or Switzerland, while its GDP per capita (PPP) is on par with Denmark or the Netherlands. Its semiconductor industry occupies a position in global supply chains that no European economy of comparable geographic size can claim. Taiwan’s economy also grew by 8% in 2025, outperforming most advanced economies. Against this backdrop, the recurring language of smallness seemed, at times, to understate Taiwan’s objective sources of international influence.
The repeated references to Czechia made this tension especially visible. Czechia is itself a relatively small European state, yet it appeared throughout the week as a meaningful reference point in Taiwan’s external engagement. References to political support and high-level exchanges surfaced spontaneously across multiple institutional settings. During our visit, Senate President Miloš Vystrčil happened to be leading a Czech parliamentary delegation to Taiwan, making Czechia particularly visible. Yet the significance attached to Czechia did not seem to be only a matter of timing. It also pointed to a broader feature of Taiwan’s diplomacy: in a constrained international environment, the political value of partners is not measured only by size. Smaller democratic states can also play an important role.
This made Taiwan’s own language of smallness all the more interesting. Taiwan may be small in comparison with the PRC and constrained in formal diplomatic terms, but it is far from marginal. Like Czechia in the European context, Taiwan demonstrates that relatively small states can exercise influence disproportionate to their size when they occupy strategic positions and build credible partnerships.
AI beyond the semiconductor story
Given Taiwan’s central position in global semiconductor supply chains, it was hardly surprising that the topic of AI featured prominently throughout the week’s meetings. What was more striking, however, was the extent to which AI had become a cross-cutting theme rather than simply a topic of technology or industrial policy. Discussions of AI surfaced across diverse settings—not only in conversations on semiconductors and innovation, but also in discussions of energy policy, foreign investment, democratic resilience, and national competitiveness. Much like resilience, AI seemed to function as an overarching framework through which policymakers increasingly viewed Taiwan’s future.
What I found particularly notable was the predominance of opportunity-oriented narratives. Discussions naturally emphasised Taiwan’s comparative advantages and future prospects, while also acknowledging some of the practical challenges associated with AI-driven growth, particularly rising energy demand, pressure on water resources, and the need to expand supporting infrastructure. These conversations reflected an awareness that maintaining Taiwan’s technological leadership will require substantial investment beyond the semiconductor sector itself.
The academic forum at National Taiwan University later in the week provided a useful complement by placing AI within broader political, economic, and institutional contexts. Rather than focusing primarily on Taiwan’s competitive advantages, the discussions explored how AI is likely to reshape governance, labour markets, and public policy. This broader perspective underscored that AI is not merely another high-growth industry, but a transformative force with implications reaching well beyond the technology sector.
In this sense, the AI discussions also complicated the earlier language of smallness. While Taiwan was sometimes described as small in diplomatic or geopolitical terms, the conversations on AI repeatedly positioned it as structurally central to one of the most consequential technological transformations currently underway.
Concluding thoughts
Although the Taipei meetings covered an exceptionally broad range of issues, three themes consistently emerged across discussions. First, resilience appeared as an organising principle through which Taiwan increasingly understands its future. Second, the meetings highlighted a revealing contrast between Taiwan’s objective international importance and the recurring language of smallness with which it is sometimes described. Finally, the prominence of AI across policy domains illustrated how technological change is reshaping almost every discussion about Taiwan’s future.
Taken together, the Taipei meetings provided something that individual research visits rarely can: the opportunity to observe Taiwan through multiple institutional lenses in a compressed period of time. The resulting picture was necessarily complex, but it was precisely through the repetition of certain ideas across very different conversations that some of the week’s most valuable insights emerged.
Kristina Kironska is an interdisciplinary academic working at the intersection of international relations, human rights, and Asian studies. She has extensive experience in research, election observation, and human rights advocacy. She spent several years in Taiwan, combining academic work, public-facing human rights activities with Amnesty International Taiwan, and lecturing at the University of Taipei. She is now an Assistant Professor at Palacký University in Olomouc in Czechia and Co-Director of the Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS), heading its EU–Taiwan Tracker, and sits on the board of the European Association of Taiwan Studies (EATS). Her research focuses on East and Southeast Asia, IR, and human rights. Her latest book, Contemporary Taiwan: More than a Flashpoint (Routledge, 2025), reflects her commitment to strengthening global understanding of the region.
This article was published as part of the special issue on U.S.-Taiwan-European Next Generation Working Group.