Written by Dr Madhukar Shyam and Manya Singhal.
Image credit: 08.05 總統出席「凱達格蘭論壇：2025印太安全對話」開幕式 by 總統府/ Flickr, license: CC BY 4.0.
Taiwan, also known as the Republic of China (ROC), is an independent democracy in East Asia. However, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), i.e., mainland China, refuses to accept the notion of Taiwanese independence. For the PRC, Taiwan is an integral part; both populations across the Taiwan Strait have a “connection of blood and kinship,” as mentioned by their president, Xi Jinping. He further went on to mention that “the reunification of our homeland… is unstoppable.” Taiwan, however, refuses the PRC’s claim and is also threatened by its reunification notion. It regards itself as an independent nation-state. Taiwan tries to sustain the status quo as well as ensure its own security by sustaining its democracy and sovereignty against the “One China” and “One Country, Two Systems” policies of China. Moreover, the PRC is asserting its power by claiming sovereignty over the South China Sea (SCS). Does Taiwan also claim the SCS as a part of its own territory? Does the ROC believe in creating hindrances in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)? Is there any difference between their claim and their way of asserting sovereignty over the SCS? At present, PRC’s claim is creating a hindrance to freedom of navigation. In this background, let us understand how Taiwan views FOIP.
Nevertheless, the foreign policy of Taiwan towards the Indo-Pacific should be analysed in the framework of the New Southbound Policy (NSP) and NSP+. The NSP is a major foreign and economic strategy launched by the Taiwanese government designed to deepen and expand Taiwan’s relationships with 18 partner countries across Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Australasia. The NSP began with the “Go South policy,” followed by the relaunching of the same policy in 2002 after the Asian financial crisis. Finally, it was renamed as the NSP in 2016 to build a ‘sense of economic community’. In the meantime, President Tsai Ing-wen adopted the three core principles of FOIP in 2019, namely democracy, peace, and prosperity, and assumed the role of a stabilising factor in the Indo-Pacific region. The core principles synchronised with the like-minded countries of FOIP visions (which emphasise a rules-based order, freedom of navigation, democratic values, and countering coercion).
However, President Lai Ching-te, in 2024, came up with the notion of the Southbound Policy Plus (NSP+) strategy with an aim to improve Taiwan’s connection with countries via channels that range from empowering the youth to innovation and collaboration on the semiconductor supply chain, making connections between democratic nations and improving Taiwan’s international standing. President Lai, at the Ketagalan Forum 2024 Indo-Pacific Security Dialogue, further reiterated Taiwan’s commitment to FOIP and added one more pillar, making it three to four and elaborated, i.e., an action plan encompassing strengthened national defence, economic security, deepened partnerships with democratic countries, and stable cross-strait management and expressed intent to help build a “democratic umbrella” in defence of shared values.
President Lai described Taiwan as a “keystone of Indo-Pacific peace and stability” and called on democracies to build resilient supply chains together. Taipei implements the goals of FOIP through its NSP. The NSP+ strategy seeks semiconductor supply chain cooperation, democratic alliances, and increased international presence, resulting in concrete achievements. For instance, Taiwan’s NSP+ enabled it to diversify its economic ties. This shift contributed to a sharp decline in outbound investment to China – from 83.8% of Taiwan’s total outbound investment in 2010 to just 3.75% last year. During the same period, the US became Taiwan’s largest export market (with exports to the US rising 78% since 2025), while exports to New Southbound partner countries increased by 30.5 %.
Simultaneously, Taiwan is carefully studying the Indo-Pacific strategies of many countries that have expressed strong support for Taiwan. The US Indo-Pacific Strategy commits to working with partners to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, including by supporting Taiwan’s self-defence capabilities, while reaffirming its historical commitment through arms sales and other measures. Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy also pledges to push back against unilateral actions that threaten the status quo – consistent with its One China Policy – while advancing multifaceted engagement with Taiwan on trade, technology, health, democratic governance, and countering disinformation. The Republic of Korea reiterates its position on the relevance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait for the security and prosperity of the Korean Peninsula and the wider region of the Indo-Pacific. The National Defence Strategy of Japan underlines increased coercive military actions by China near Taiwan and the associated worries about regional and international stability. It represents their common stance on the threat from China and commitment to rejecting any unilateral changes while strengthening their economic and cultural relations with Taiwan. The Indo-Pacific strategy of Taiwan and like-minded countries brings them closer to the QUAD’s aim and objective, as QUAD members are also developing their framework to decouple from China, especially with semiconductors and critical minerals, which are the core demands of Industry 4.0.
However, the ROC is not only facing a threat from the PRC, but their conflict can be seen as historical and ideological in nature. Historically, as it began with the rise of the Chinese civil war in 1945, which itself was based on the ideology of the Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Communist Party, the KMT had to leave mainland China and was forcefully settled in Taiwan (Formosa Island). This was further turned into a conflict over who is representing China. Until 1971, the ROC were able to maintain its recognition in the United Nations as a permanent member, but the scenario changed when the USA recognised the Government of the PRC as the sole legal Government of China. Now only 12 countries in the world recognise Taiwan as China and maintain diplomatic relations with it. Therefore, as mentioned at the beginning of the article, President Xi wants the reunification of China by bringing Taiwan into mainland China. This shows how the PRC is overpowering the ROC diplomatically.
In addition, the PRC’s diplomatic strategy to overpower Taiwan is also visible in the maritime domain. China officially claims approximately 90% of the SCS. Based on their historical claim, as in 1947, Chinese geographer Yang Huairen worked on the map introducing the 11-dash line, officially naming 286 bits of rock and turf in the SCS as the “South China Sea Islands”. Chairman Mao Zedong in 1952 removed two of the dashes in the Gulf of Tonkin – reducing the line from eleven to nine. However, the claim was upgraded to a ten-dash line in August 2023, when China’s Ministry of Natural Resources published its updated Standard Map, repeating the nine-dash line claims and adding a tenth dash around Taiwan. However, Taiwan never recognised any changes, questions China’s ten-dash line and continues to claim the eleven-dash line. Why? China’s 2023 “Standard Map” instead added a brand-new tenth dash to the east of Taiwan. Its placement effectively folds Taiwan itself into the PRC’s claimed core territory, which is a sovereignty claim over Taiwan, not an SCS boundary dispute. Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) maintains that the Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, Macclesfield Bank, and Pratas Islands, along with their surrounding waters, are “an inherent part of ROC territory and waters.” Taiwan does not recognise any other country’s claim over these areas, “irrespective of the reasons put forward or methods used.” Taipei has explicitly rejected the PRC’s expansive nine-dash line, particularly because China uses it to also claim sovereignty over Taiwan itself. Taiwan’s MOFA stated that Taiwan’s sovereignty claim in the South China Sea” will not be affected by the PRC’s unilateral decision”, calling China’s moves a display of “Hegemonic mentality” that is “detrimental to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific.” Apart from the condemnation of China, what other steps should Taiwan take to protect its own sovereignty?
To protect its sovereignty, Taiwan must take practical steps beyond condemning China. It should adopt the “porcupine strategy” to strengthen their position in the Taiwan Strait. It should also invest more in mobile anti-ship missiles, sea mines, drones, and dispersed defences to make any Chinese invasion extremely difficult and costly. At the same time, Taiwan needs to build whole-of-society resilience through stockpiling supplies, hardening infrastructure, civil defence training, and reducing economic dependence on China. It should also accelerate domestic arms production and raise defence spending, which they have done in the recent budget, as Taiwan’s defence budget reached NT$949.5 billion (US$31.27 billion), or 3.32% of GDP, crossing the 3% threshold for the first time since 2009.
In short, it can be said that Taiwan perceives the FOIP strategy as an approach that will ensure its sovereignty. Simultaneously, Taiwan is on the path to becoming more independent by increasing its defence budget; and it may follow the porcupine strategy, which may give Taiwan more strength over China. In addition, Taiwan may develop alliances with like-minded countries to protect its sovereignty and stability.
Dr Madhukar Shyam is an Assistant Professor in the Department of International Studies and Political Science, School of Social Sciences, and a Fellow at the Centre for Social and Policy Research, CHRIST (Deemed to be University), Delhi NCR Campus. His research interests include maritime security, the Indo-Pacific, and strategic affairs.
Manya Singhal is an independent researcher with interests in Taiwan–China relations, Indo-Pacific affairs, maritime security, and information warfare. She holds a bachelor’s degree in Economics and Political Science and has contributed to research on strategic and geopolitical issues in the Indo-Pacific region.