Why are the 2024 elections seemingly less competitive than the 2020 elections?

Written by Brian Hioe. Compared to the 2020 elections, it has often been remarked that the 2024 elections have been decidedly less competitive. Certainly, this does seem to be true, in that for most of the election cycle, DPP presidential candidate Lai Ching-te has been ahead. Nevertheless, what are the structural factors at work here, which differentiate the 2024 elections from the 2020 elections? We might take a look.

Taiwan’s Presidential Elections in Full Swing

Written by Gerrit van der Wees. Mid-November has thus fundamentally changed the picture of the campaign. The addition of Hsiao Bi-khim as VP candidate has reinvigorated Lai Ching-te’s campaign, while on the Blue-White side, the move to attempt a merger of the tickets had backfired and set bad blood. With Hou Yu-ih and Ko Wen-je running separate campaigns, the differences are now becoming increasingly clear.

Taiwan and Europe – Partners of choice, not obligation

Written by Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy. In January 2024, Taiwan will elect a new president. Facing an existential threat from China, for Taiwan cooperation with the EU as a partner is essential to strengthen its democratic resilience. To expand the partnership however, a better understanding of the complex nature of the EU and developing a greater sense of clarity about what Taiwan wants will be indispensable. 

Why is there so little policy debate in Taiwan’s presidential campaigns?

Written by Gunter Schubert. Taiwan is gearing up for another round of national elections, scheduled for next January. As always, media coverage of election campaigns focuses on the presidential aspect of the national ballot, as this is where elections become most personalized. This is the essence of Taiwanese political culture. All politics becomes personal, involving interactions between candidates and voters, particularly at the local level.

The difficulty of being Hou

Written by Jonathan Sullivan. The KMT’s stellar showing in local elections last November had many in the party dreaming of a return to power in the January 2024 national elections. As has happened in every previous election following a two-term president in Taiwan, a change of party in power (政黨輪替) looked a likely outcome as the DPP haemorrhaged city mayorships and town council seats. In hypothetical polling match-ups at the time, re-elected Xinbei Mayor Hou You-yi handily beat VP Lai Ching-te. Those two and former Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je have now been formally nominated by their parties to compete for the ROC presidency.

The Fluidity of the Presidential Field

Written by Jonathan Sullivan. Although the main parties have nominated their Presidential candidates, the composition of the field remains fluid and unsettled. On the DPP side, current VP Lai Ching-te long ago locked down the nomination unopposed, and as a continuity candidate enjoying the benefits of incumbency, his campaigning thus far has been relatively smooth. However, Lai’s responsibility for answering any gripes with government policy over the last eight years and the stubborn ceiling to his poll numbers over the last few months suggest substantial challenges to come. But for now, the main uncertainties and drama are on the opposing side of the fence.

Taiwan’s 2024 presidential election candidates: What will Hou or Lai’s election mean for tensions across the Taiwan Strait?

Written by Corey Lee Bell. Taiwan’s main opposition party, the Beijing-friendly Kuomintang (KMT), recently selected its candidate for the 2024 presidential election. With the main competitors for Taiwan’s top job essentially locked in, each has been interrogated on their policies on cross-strait relations in recent weeks. With tensions high across the Taiwan Strait, and between Beijing and Washington, what each candidate stands for could have profound ramifications for, and perhaps even beyond, the Indo-Pacific region.

KMT’s Lost Opportunity to Reinvent Itself Again for Survival

Written by Chieh-Ting Yeh. If—and it’s a big if—the KMT could reinvent itself again, it could find a way to shed the old rifts between the ideological and the opportunistic camps. It could present a platform that is clear in its stance on major social issues. It could take the lead in reviewing its own past as a perpetrator of human rights abuses, even if just to get the issue off its back. It could convince Taiwan’s voters that its China policy is no longer motivated by the older generation’s national identity crisis but based on a pragmatic approach to protecting Taiwan’s sovereignty and security. It could be hopeful. But looking at how the KMT finally settles on its presidential candidate, the KMT still has a very long way to go—and not very much time.

1 2