Written by Jacques deLisle. This article argues that though Taiwan avoided the worst imagined outcomes from the Trump-Xi summit, the uncertainty and, in turn, the fears yielded by the meeting reflect, and are likely to worsen, the challenges Taiwan faces in cross-Strait and international relations. For Taiwan, all of this means deepening challenges in evaluating risks and making difficult policy choices.
Written by Brian Hioe. This article suggests that the state of play for cross-strait relations has taken an unexpected turn in the past months. In a relatively short time, Cheng Li-wun was not only able to secure a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, but indirectly caused US President Donald Trump to echo her language on cross-strait relations through Xi.
Written by Percy Yixuanchen Yu. This article argues that the Beijing summit between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump revealed a harder and more unprecedented form of great-power coexistence with multiple areas operating at once. Taiwan is becoming one of the key battlegrounds on which Beijing and Washington seek long-term advantage amid risk management.
Written by Gunter Schubert. This article contends that the KMT’s China Policy, as articulated by Cheng Li-wun, appears largely devoid of concrete policy content. Instead, it is heavily ideological, shaped by deep mistrust of the ruling party and by a risky belief in China’s goodwill once Taiwan accepts Beijing’s interpretation of the “1992 Consensus” and the “one China principle.”
Written by Meng Kit Tang. This article argues that Cheng Li-wun promotes a distinct formulation, Chinese identity with Kuomintang characteristics, anchored in the ROC constitution and civilizational heritage, while rejecting the sovereignty of the Chinese Communist Party. Such reclamation may reinforce the very trend it seeks to counter, and the reactions to the Cheng-Xi summit reflect this paradox.
Written by Sadia Rahman. This article argues that the strategic timing of Cheng’s visit to China will bear fruit only if the changes appear in the terms under which cross-Strait engagement is understood by Taiwanese voters. Given the public opinion, especially the younger generation, the KMT-CPC’s substantial visibility can backfire.
