Written by Timothy S. Rich and Miriam Dawson.
Image credit: Taiwan F-16 Debate by Al Jazeera English/ Flickr, license: CC BY-SA 2.0.
With a delicate security situation due to its complex relationship with China, Taiwan must reevaluate its defensive capabilities, including military spending. However, such policies would not be without controversy, as public opinion plays a crucial role in shaping the trajectory of Taiwan’s defence policies.
After decades of empty threats, it is not difficult to understand why the average Taiwanese would not see Chinese threats as indications that war is imminent. However, in January of 2023, though the Council on Foreign Relations judged conflict between China and Taiwan to be only moderately likely to occur, it was still listed as a “high priority” to watch due to the potential to involve multiple major powers and cause severe damage. While the U.S. government maintains its “strategic ambiguity” policy about whether it will defend Taiwan, actions such as participating in the upcoming war games with Japan simulating war over Taiwan demonstrate that policymakers take this possibility seriously.
The U.S. public is also concerned, as shown by Pew Research in March of 2023, where 47% of U.S. adults see tensions between Taiwan and China as a “very serious” problem for the U.S. Likewise, a 2022 survey of Americans through the International Public Opinion Lab (IPOL) found that 61.23% supported America defending Taiwan from China, similar to previous surveys elsewhere.
A country’s military defence budget can also be interpreted as estimating the likelihood of war and its will to defend itself. A Taiwan Foundation for Democracy poll in 2021 indicated that 72.5% of Taiwanese would be willing to fight if China attempted to achieve unification by force, with broadly similar results in the Taiwan National Security Studies (TNSS) surveys.
However, abstract commitments to defence must confront the logistical challenges of defence spending. Taiwan cannot expect to outspend China but can increase its deterrence capabilities with select upgrades via purchases from the U.S. and domestic production. Focusing on the latter would, if not reducing its reliance on the U.S., signal its seriousness in its defence and thus strengthen American willingness to aid Taiwan. Moreover, an increased focus on nontraditional defensive measures, from cybersecurity to unmanned drones, better prepares Taiwan for challenges short of a traditional invasion.
Increasing spending also comes with risks. Despite China’s actions and rhetoric as the cause of Taiwan’s security challenges, increased spending may be perceived in Beijing as a provocation. Increasing military spending also requires raising taxes or diverting funds from other public service areas, such as education or healthcare. A public not seeing military conflict as imminent would likely not support either option. Nor how to win over a sceptical public without exacerbating tensions with China, especially as Taiwan leads into national elections, is still being determined. While investment in defence-oriented infrastructure may spur domestic industries, military spending often remains economically inefficient.
To capture public opinion, we surveyed 1,105 Taiwanese via a web survey conducted via Macromill Embrain on May 25-June 5, using quota sampling for region, gender, and age. We asked respondents, “Taiwan approved a national defence spending budget of roughly 560 Billion NTD this year, which was a 13.9% increase from the previous year. Do you think Taiwan spends too much, too little, or about the right amount on its defense?”
Overall, a plurality (44.62%) see defence spending as about right, with most DPP supporters stating the same (59.14%). Meanwhile, most KMT supporters (59.38%) state Taiwan is spending too much on defence, with a plurality of TPP supporters (43.07%) stating the same.
Further analysis shows controlling for demographic factors, DPP supporters still corresponded with a greater belief that Taiwan spends too little. In contrast, KMT supporters corresponded with beliefs that Taiwan spends too much. The assumption would be that views partially respond to beliefs about Taiwan’s insecurity. However, the results find that concern about China starting a war does not correspond with defence spending views unless framed considering the war in Ukraine. Of those who said they were not at all worried about China starting a war, 54.55% thought Taiwan was spending too much, and 16.36% thought Taiwan was spending too little, but rates change only marginally when moving to those extremely concerned (51.22% and 19.51%). But if the war in Ukraine was mentioned, we find that the percentage stating Taiwan was not spending enough increased by 10.96% among the least concerned and by 28.95% among the most concerned. In other words, those more concerned about a Chinese invasion in light of Russia’s invasion were more likely to think Taiwan was spending too little on defence.
In addition, those most confident that the U.S. would defend Taiwan if China started a war believed Taiwan, rather than thinking defence spending was sufficient, needed to be spending more. Among those not at all or not very confident that the U.S. would defend, 45.72% thought Taiwan was spending too much and only 16.41% too little. However, among those fairly or very confident, only 16.84% think Taiwan spends too much, and 26.28% think it spends too little. This is a need to signal to the U.S. Taiwan’s own commitment to its defence, a point often reiterated in broader discussions about U.S.-Taiwan security relations.
In our same survey, only 35.47% of respondents were “fairly confident“ or “very confident” that the U.S. would defend Taiwan. However, internal documents leaked earlier this year revealed that in the U.S.’s own assessment, Taiwan’s current preparations would not be enough if China attacked. Though the Taiwanese public has low confidence that the U.S. will get involved, it would be to their benefit to ensure the U.S. does. However, if Taiwan wishes to convince the U.S. public to support its cause, it cannot afford to be perceived as unwilling or uninterested in defending itself.
The Taiwanese government seeks to balance its own internal economic concerns with expectations and requirements from the U.S. It also must weigh the potential impacts of its choices on cross-strait relations. As the Chinese economy and the internal political climate worsen, “Wolf Warrior“ spokesmen take any opportunity to make strident threats. Increasing defence spending would likely draw criticism from China, but it may also serve as a deterrent, a sign that Taiwan would be able to fight back should there be a military conflict. However, the Taiwanese public currently seems conflicted or disinterested in taking this chance, and politicians preparing for the 2024 national elections are unlikely to deviate from the preferences of their partisan bases.
Timothy S. Rich is a Professor of Political Science and Director of the International Public Opinion Lab at Western Kentucky University. His research focuses on public opinion and electoral politics, emphasizing Taiwan and South Korea.
Miriam Dawson is an alumna of Western Kentucky University, where she was a double major in Chinese and Anthropology.
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