Written by Alessandro Albana and Antonio Fiori.
Jessica Davies is the guest editor of the Taiwan Insight: International Journal of Taiwan Studies Special Issue for March 2024
Image credit: 07.26 總統接見「歐洲議會外交委員會代表團」 by 總統府/ Flickr, license: CC BY 2.0 DEED.
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)’s victory in the last presidential election in Taiwan – with President-elect Lai Ching-te set to take office in May this year – is expected to bring about no significant changes compared to the incumbent leadership of Tsai Ing-wen. The election portrays the consolidation of Taipei’s political regime as a mature and full-fledged democracy that shares many (and by no means necessarily positive) characteristics with other democratic countries. The rise and spread of populism in the political arena, issues related to discrimination and racism, and the delicate and ever-changing compromise between public security and citizens’ privacy – particularly after the outbreak of COVID-19 – are but a few examples. They are also the key topics included in the topical section of the International Taiwan Journal of Taiwan Studies titled “Taiwan: A Frontline of Democracy under Threat?” which the authors of this article are honoured to be guest editors of and whose publication is expected in the summer this year.
Political continuity in Taiwan after the recent election is expected to be manifest in many respects. Lai’s approach regarding relations with Beijing, for instance, is likely not to mark any detour to Taipei’s posture under Tsai. President-elect Lai is likely to maintain a significant commitment to building up Taiwan’s army, avert military and political crises with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and strengthen relations with like-minded partners in the Western hemisphere, particularly in Europe. On several occasions during the electoral campaign, Lai emphasised the importance of Taiwan-Europe relations, stating interest in reinforcing ties and expanding the areas of cooperation. Lai expressed his gratitude towards European countries for their “opposition to changes to Taiwan Strait status quo through military means by authoritarian countries” – of course referring to the PRC – but also suggesting a more intimate relationship between Taipei and Europe “on peace in the Indo-Pacific region”. Other areas of cooperation mentioned during the electoral campaign include climate change and post-pandemic economic recovery.
While bringing about positive implications per se, from Lai’s perspective, increasing engagement with European countries is pivotal in order to diversify economic partners and markets away from the PRC, as Beijing’s pressure on Taipei has grown significantly in the past few years. In fact, part of that strategy is anything but new. Last year, for instance, Taiwan and the United Kingdom set off talks on the “Enhanced Trade Partnership”, a framework aimed at bolstering bilateral commerce and investment, particularly in the areas of digital trade and renewable energy.
On their part, the European Union (EU) and some of its member states seem to see positively the prospects of growing cooperation with Taiwan. In the wake of this year’s presidential election in Taipei, authorities in the EU, France, Germany and Italy sent congratulatory messages to their Taiwanese counterpart that reveal growing support compared to the past, especially as regards security issues (against the PRC assertiveness) and economic relations. Against this backdrop, two factors appear as key sources of interest from the European perspective. Firstly, growing engagement with Taiwan may provide the EU and its member states with more stable and reliable relations with the world leader in semiconductor design, engineering and manufacturing, as European countries heavily rely on third-party suppliers in this industry. Secondly, strengthening ties with Taipei may be conducive to gaining a competitive edge vis-à-vis Beijingin the context of growing unease for Europe-China relations.
The EU’s consideration of China as an “economic competitor” and “systemic rival” has brought to the process of ‘de-risking’ relations with Beijing. In the past years, several issues contributed to complicating the relationship between Europe and China: the controversies over Beijing’s violation of human rights in Xinjiang, which spurred mutual sanctions; the introduction of the National Security Law in Hong Kong; the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic; the intensification in the Taiwan Strait crises; the signature of the ‘no-limit partnership’ between Beijing and Moscow and the consequent lack of condemnation of Putin’s “special operation” against Ukraine. These frictions have convinced European institutions and member states to recalibrate the relationship with Beijing, despite the PRC Ambassador in Brussels, Fu Cong’s attempts to convince the Europeans of Beijing’s neutrality in the Ukraine crisis and to revive the buried Comprehensive Agreement on Investments, which the President of the EU Commission rebuked, Ursula von der Leyen.
Against this backdrop, cooperation between Taiwan and Europe intensified, also due to the historic European Parliament’s resolution, adopted in October 2021, aimed at strengthening bilateral political relations between “like-minded partners that share common values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law”, and pursue a comprehensive partnership under the guidance of the EU’s ’One China policy’, which gives the EU the right to engage relations with Taiwan that do not amount to recognition of statehood. The following month, a delegation of the European Parliament – members of the Special Committee on Foreign Interference and Disinformation – embarked on its first official visit to Taiwan in order to establish connections on common threats, such as disinformation and cyberattacks. In the wake of such events, mutual relations further consolidated, culminating in the European Parliament’s approval, in mid-December 2023, of the “EU-Taiwan trade and investment relation” resolution, which calls for the upgrading of the “EU-Taiwan Trade and Investment Dialogue” into a formal bilateral agreement, committing to peace and stability across the strait and supporting Taipei’s presence into international forums.
Provided the mutual benefit that Europe and Taiwan are expected to gain from the enforcement of a closer relationship and the inclusion of a growing number of areas of bilateral cooperation, constraints and hurdles in this process can hardly be ignored. From Taiwan’s perspective, a shift from sectorial cooperation to wide-ranging interconnections implies significant diplomatic efforts that require either political collaboration and unity within domestic institutions or a government enjoying large consensus. Or both. On the contrary, President-elect Lai received a narrow mandate, with the DPP losing over two million votes since the 2020 presidential election. In addition, the DPP did not obtain the majority in the legislative Yuan, where the Kuomintang represents the largest party with 52 members (one more than the DPP). Under such circumstances, Lai and the DPP are expected to deal with an uncooperative Parliament. Secondly, Europe’s interest in strengthening ties with Taipei is genuine but limited and uneven. For instance, whereas the European Parliament has been vocal in promoting increasing cooperation and economic relations – as the recent “EU-Taiwan trade and investment relation” resolution demonstrates – other institutions in the EU appear more sceptical, at the very least. The EU Commission is reluctant to negotiate a trade or investment deal with Taipei. Europe strives to pursue its relations with Taiwan positively but carefully.
Doubtlessly, European policymakers would avoid angering Beijing for fear of economic retaliation, diplomatic setbacks, and even security deterioration in the Indo-Pacific and the Taiwan Strait. For these reasons, pursuing sustainable but profitable relations with Taiwan is a dilemma for Europe. So is for Taipei, as it has to engage a constrained and fragmented Europe. From the European perspective, however, engaging Taiwan more decisively should not be felt as a repudiation of the ‘One China policy’ but as an economic and political opportunity worth exploring.
Alessandro Albana is an adjunct professor at the Department of Asian and North African Studies of the Ca’ Foscari University of Venice. He earned his Ph.D. in “Global and International Studies” from the University of Bologna. He collaborates with the Asia Institute in Bologna, and the Fudan Development Institute at Fudan University in Shanghai. His research interests span the domestic politics and foreign policy, the political development, and the social movements of China and East Asia.
Antonio Fiori is an associate professor of History and Institutions of Asia at the University of Bologna, where he teaches International Relations of East Asia. He is also the President of the Asia Institute (https://site.unibo.it/asiainstitute/en). He was a visiting fellow at the United International College in Zhuhai (China), the East-West Center in Honolulu (USA) and the Kyujanggak Institute of the Seoul National University (South Korea). He is an adjunct professor at Korea University and UPES (Dehradun, India).
Alessandro and Antonio are the guest editors of the International Journal of Taiwan Studies forthcoming topical section titled “Taiwan: A Frontline of Democracy under Threat?”.
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