Written by Dr Chieh-chi HSIEH.
Image credit: 05.20 第16任總統伉儷及副總統陪送第15任總統離府 by 總統府/ Flickr, license: CC BY 2.0.
Based on President Lai Ching-Te’s inaugural speech, this paper argues that Lai is likely to adopt a ‘passive responsiveness’ approach in engaging with the Chinese government over the next four years. Merely a few days after President Lai was sworn in as the 16th President of the Republic of China (ROC), Taiwan (herein Taiwan), China conducted a third round of large-scale military exercises around Taiwan. Without a doubt, China was furious and for obvious reasons. The purpose of conducting the Joint Sword-2024A military drill around Taiwan is the response to the Chinese Government’s distaste for President Lai’s inaugural address stating that ‘Taiwan’s official name [is the ROC and that Taiwan] and the [People’s Republic of China] are not subordinate to each other’. What are the political implications of President Lai’s inaugural address? On cross-strait relations, was President Lai’s statement too bold? These are some of the inquiries this paper will investigate.
Lai: The Pragmatic Worker for Taiwan Independence
President Lai has been widely regarded as upholding a more hawkish stance on Taiwan’s future as an independent country. Much of this is attributed to Lai’s long history of expressing his aspiration for an independent Taiwan. For instance, prior to identifying himself as ‘a pragmatic worker for Taiwan independence’ in 2017 as the Premier, when Lai served as Tainan mayor from 2010 to 2017, he has on many occasions expressed his aim for an independent Taiwan.
As a result, this has created no incentives for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to engage in any dialogues with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), especially after Lai became the party chairman in 2022. To a certain extent, Lai’s open statement concerning his stance on Taiwan’s independence in the past has also raised concerns for the US government. After all, it is evident that any unilateral decision by either Taiwan or China to change the status quo would be a definite red line for the US government. With a more ‘explicit’ stance on Taiwan’s future, this begs the question of whether one could expect drastic changes in Lai’s approach to cross-strait relations in the next four years.
Lai’s Inaugural Speech: Continuation or Deviation from Tsai’s Approach on Cross-Strait Relation?
Two main reasons discourage Lai from deviating from Tsai’s approach to cross-strait policy. First and foremost, although the DPP government did successfully secure another four years as the ruling party for Taiwan, they failed to obtain a majority in the legislature. Compared to the 2016 and 2020 legislative elections in which DPP respectively secured 68 and 61 seats, their total seats were further reduced to 51 seats in this year’s campaign. Moreover, given that Taiwan’s People Party (TPP), led by former Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-Je, managed to secure eight seats, this resulted in no party securing an absolute majority in the legislature. This indicates that the DPP government would have to devote substantial effort to counteracting not only the Kuomintang (KMT) but also the KMT-TPP coalition. In fact, the chaotic verbal attacks and physical scuffles between the DPP and the KMT-TPP coalition in the Legislative Yuan, which unfolded on 17 May, an example of the type of challenge the DPP will be constantly facing in the next four years. To make things worse for the DPP, the KMT-TPP-controlled legislature has successfully passed a new ‘reform bill for the legislature’ that would significantly increase its power of its per se vis-à-vis the Executive power of the President in aspects of controlling budgets (e.g. military defence spending) and investigating officials, military figures, and citizens at will.
Understanding the political struggles, it is not surprising that Lai underscored the importance of ‘coordination and cooperation between the executive and legislative branches’ at the very beginning of his inaugural address. This differs greatly from Tsai’s emphasis on social and economic reforms in 2016, as well as enhancing industrial and economic development in 2020.
Does this indicate that cross-strait relations will lose its importance in the political agenda of Taiwan? Clearly not. In fact, many of the protestors gathering outside of the Legislative Yuan since 17 May have considered the passing of the new legislature reform bill as the CCP’s attempt to destroy Taiwan’s democracy via the KMT-TPP coalition in parliament. Yet, the importance is how the ruling DPP government approaches China at the state level.
Silence is Gold: When saying less is actually achieving more.
The second reason that discourages Lai from deviating from Tsai’s approach to cross-strait relations is that being bold and vocal when engaging with China may turn out to be the most counterproductive way of achieving de facto independence for Taiwan. For many, Lai’s statement that Taiwan and China ‘are not subordinate to each other’ may raise concerns about whether he was pushing the CPP’s boundaries. Yet, Lai’s address was merely a reiteration of Tsai’s 2021 National Day speech when she first put forward her Four Commitments. Furthermore, seeing that most international press outlets (e.g. Japan Times, Reuters, Financial Times) reported positively on Lai’s speech, it is clear that Lai’s speech was within the limit of Washington.
The work of Mahoney and Thelen provides an insightful analytical framework for elaborating on these dynamics. Rooted in historical institutionalism, Mahoney and Thelen denote how different types of agents could induce institutional changes that break free from path dependency trajectories. If one considers the existing institutional arrangement of cross-strait relations mainly based on the CCP’s One China Policy, then Taiwan would be an agent of change. As an agent of change, the President of Taiwan would have a number of approaches it can choose to adopt. This includes becoming insurrectionaries, which are vocal about their desire to change, or subversives which hide their intent but await the moment to actively pursue their goals.
To clarify the analytical framework in the context of Taiwanese politics, former DPP President Chen Shui-Bian’s proactive ‘Torching Diplomacy’ (烽火外交) is a clear example of insurrectionary tactics aimed at inducing changes in international institutional arrangements. In contrast, President Tsai’s approach would resemble the latter. Notably, Tsai’s strategy on cross-strait relations can be referred to as ‘passive-responsiveness’, that is, responding firmly only when the circumstances are pertinent. This is exemplified in Tsai’s strong refute to China’s President Xi’s 2019 New Year speech. Hence, given Chen’s approach was broadly regarded as ineffective and largely detrimental to Taiwan, whereas Tsai’s approach of passive-responsiveness was able to mobilise support for her leadership, it is unlikely for Lai to adopt an approach similar to Chen’s.
In addition, Lai would benefit immensely from adopting the passive-responsiveness approach given it would provide greater flexibility for Taiwan and US cooperation. Predictability and accountability are two important aspects when it comes to international cooperation, given they reduce problems arising from the provision of asymmetrical information in foreign policymaking. The passive responses indicate a set of planned actions that are thoroughly communicated between important stakeholders. Arriving only days after President Lai was sworn in, the bipartisan delegation of six House members from the US Congress spoke of their strong support of Taiwan after China’s two-day military drills. This shows that the US government was fully aware of the content of Lai’s inaugural speech, making Lai a reliable counterpart vis-à-vis China as an assertive counterpart.
Conclusion
In summary, President Lai’s inaugural address and the recent political dynamics in the Legislative Yuan indicate that the DPP government will primarily focus on political struggles as a minority government over the next four years. This indicates that Lai’s cross-strait policy would not deviate from his predecessor’s approach of ‘passive-responsiveness’. As shown, if one were to consider cross-strait relations as an institutional arrangement in international politics, Tsai and Lai’s approaches, resembling subversive agents of change, would not jeopardise Taiwan’s en route to eventually becoming a de facto independent state.
Chieh-chi Hsieh received his PhD from the Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick (UK). He also holds an MSc degree in International Political Economy from the Department of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science. You can follow him on Twitter @DrHsiehCC.
This article was published as part of a special issue on ‘Presidential Inauguration‘.
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