Written by Jeremiah Reyes.
Image credit: 08.13 副總統接見「美國聯邦眾議員史崔珂蘭」訪問團 by 總統府/Flickr, license: CC BY 2.0.
As Lai Ching-Te of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) acceded to Taiwan’s presidency, China launched military drills surrounding the island and reprimanded countries who sent him congratulations. This reaction highlights the contentious nature of Taiwan’s existence as a political entity. Despite its high degree of internal sovereignty, China continues to see it as a renegade province that deserves no external recognition. Beijing’s insistence on the “One China” policy prevents countries from recognising Taiwan as sovereign. Given its economic and political influence, states have also become unwilling to court China’s displeasure by attempting to recognise Taiwan. The island nation thus experiences what is referred to as a “recognition deficit”. Nevertheless, Taiwan continues to assert itself in the international community by employing strategies to gain formal diplomatic recognition.
Total Diplomacy
These strategies stem from Chiang Ching-Kuo’s “total diplomacy”, in which Taiwan provides its partners with various assets in return for pseudo-diplomatic relations. For instance, it helped develop medical services and industries in Asia, Central America, and Africa in exchange for business sector linkages. Taiwan formed functional relationships with the Western states and Japan through trade associations and cultural institutes that function similarly to embassies and consulates. These institutions allow Taiwan to practice diplomatic mimicry and promote semi-official ties with other states. Total diplomacy reflects Taiwan’s intense need for recognition and willingness to establish any relationship with external partners. But Taipei learned that in diplomacy, money often talked louder.
Dollar Diplomacy and Economic Influence
Taiwan found success with the so-called “dollar diplomacy,” a method of securing recognition in exchange for aid. This strategy involves ‘buying’ recognition from states-in-need who would recognise it over China. As a result, most of Taiwan’s diplomatic partners are small island states with the highest per capita rates of foreign aid. Dollar diplomacy also comes in political bribes, with Taiwan reportedly maintaining US$7 million as funding. This may have been used in the Solomon Islands, where legislators were allegedly paid US$5,000 to vote for Taipei-aligned leaders, and Kiribati, where a presidential candidate admitted to receiving US$140,000 in exchange for recognising Taiwan.
China’s growth has allowed it to counter these efforts, having successfully paid countries such as The Gambia and Nauru to shift recognition from Taipei to Beijing. This has led Taiwan to rely less on this strategy and focus more on peddling its massive economic influence.
Despite lacking diplomatic recognition, Taiwan’s economy is substantial, ranking higher than some fully recognised states. This prosperity is vital to Taiwan’s survival, without which it cannot exercise its de facto independence and integrate into the international economy. At its heart is the semiconductor industry, in which Taiwan is a recognised leader and possesses a near-monopoly. Being this crucial in the global supply chain gives Taiwan immense geo-economic influence. It also grants leverage with major economies (especially the USA and China, to whom Taiwan is the primary semiconductor supplier), which it uses to secure economic partnerships, such as when the USA and Germany sought Taiwan’s help to alleviate manufacturing bottlenecks during the COVID-19 pandemic. This geo-economic weight has made Taiwan indispensable to the global economy, and the wealth it generates helps expand its diplomatic space.
Taiwan also uses free trade agreements (FTAs) following the ‘recognition for survival strategy’. These are seen not just as instruments of economic partnership but also as tools for political survival. In addition to benefitting Taiwanese trade, they signify tacit “support of Taiwan’s ‘political self’”. Taiwan sees FTAs as a proxy, if not a conduit, for diplomatic recognition. This is most apparent in the New Southbound Policy (NSP) with ASEAN. While ASEAN adheres to the One China policy, the NSP facilitated the “reciprocal recognition of prestige and dignity” between Taiwan and the ASEAN countries by assuring diplomatic privileges and immunities for Taipei’s representative offices. While these FTAs fall short of substantive diplomatic recognition, they provide procedural recognition based on economic relations.
Participation in International Organisations
Like FTAs, participating in international organisations (IOs) provides Taiwan with some external legitimacy. It is a full member of 45 intergovernmental organisations and a quasi-member in 28 others, most notably in the World Trade Organisation (WTO), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the International Olympic Committee. These memberships demonstrate Taiwan’s compliance with international norms and give it diplomatic space.
But even in these organisations, China’s influence prevents Taiwan from being recognised as a ‘state.’ Rather, it is labelled as an ‘economy’ in APEC and a ‘separate customs territory’ in the WTO. It is also referred to as ‘Chinese Taipei’ in these organisations. These are China’s attempts at preventing Taiwan from exercising any sovereignty when dealing with the organisation, denying it opportunities to be seen as China’s equal. Regardless, Taiwan sees its participation as legitimate recognition and an implicit acknowledgement of its external sovereignty by the other members.
Values-based Diplomacy
Taiwan is known for using values as a central point of its diplomacy, with “cat-warrior” diplomacy being an example. Coined by former representative to the USA and now Vice President Hsiao Bi-Khim she describes a “cat warrior” as one who is “agile, flexible, and comfortable”, whose intelligence and independence counter the aggressiveness of the “wolf warrior,” China. This links to the DPP’s political brand, highlighting its democracy. Taiwan wants to be associated with democratic values that differentiate it from authoritarian China. It affirms morality and responsibility in the international community, traits which China lacks.
This strategy emphasises Taiwan’s commitment to liberal values. It distinguishes itself from China and its record of human rights abuses, oppression of Indigenous communities, and great power discourse by relying on a discourse of democratisation, highlighting Taiwan’s policies of equality, diversity, and promotion of marginalised groups. Taiwan also brands itself as a supporter of the international normative order by adhering to international regimes. An example is the development of its own Sustainable Development Goals in line with the United Nations. This effort to align itself with the rest of the world despite having no obligation illustrates this intention. Taiwan wants the world to recognise it as a proactive member of the global democratic order.
Given these strategies, values-based diplomacy seems to be the most impactful. This branding as the democratic alternative to China resonates strongly with its partners, and Taiwan successfully maintains its gains here. While it enjoys acknowledgement of its political existence through IOs, China’s undue influence prevents it from gaining full membership and, thus, full recognition. Furthermore, China’s wealth today means that Beijing can and has outspent Taipei in dollar diplomacy, a case the Taiwanese government has admitted. But it argues that where money has lost weight, values become more effective. This is why it continues to follow international norms despite having no obligation; these are attempts to associate itself with the status quo powers and brand itself as ‘one of the good guys’. These are signals to its allies and potential partners that they are less aggressive and more cooperative than its mainland rival. Especially as China becomes more hawkish, Taiwan’s emphasis on a common set of values and a progressive morality will become more valuable in courting other states to ditch Beijing in favour of Taipei.
Taiwan’s Lessons for Other Contested Entities
Taiwan’s status as a contested political entity is unique in two ways. Firstly, it has a precedent for being diplomatically recognised. Taiwan was considered by many as the legitimate China before its ejection from the UN. Thus, Taiwanese diplomats are well-versed in diplomatic culture, its institutions are familiar with external linkages, and the groundwork for recognition already exists in formerly recognising countries. Secondly, Taiwan is the most prosperous contested entity, allowing it to fund expensive diplomatic strategies.
Nevertheless, other entities can learn from Taiwan’s experience. Taiwan is geographically small, making it relatable to similar states that are threatened by bigger powers. Taiwan frames itself as dominated by a larger power, making its claims of solidarity more effective. Contested states could likewise appeal to smaller states to gain diplomatic recognition. Distance from a rival state also benefits Taiwan. The farther a country is from China, the less powerful China appears and the less concerned it becomes about the ramifications of recognising Taiwan. Contested entities may similarly find success in courting recognition from countries beyond their rival’s influence. And finally, values-based diplomacy can go a long way. Despite Taiwan’s economic stature, it argues for recognition by appealing to common values. States with limited recognition may benefit from similarly engaging the international normative order. In this way, the international community could perceive them as dedicated participants and thus recognise and include them.
Conclusion
Taiwan is far from achieving the level of recognition to which it aspires. Currently, only 11 UN member states plus the Holy See recognise it as the legitimate Republic of China, well behind the People’s Republic of China, which is recognised by 180 countries. China’s increasing geopolitical and economic relevance has caused more states to stand behind Beijing and its One China policy, causing Taiwan to lose diplomatic allies over the years. But these strategies indicate its continuous effort to (re)gain its diplomatic space. While China may have dampened its efforts, Taiwan seems ready to continue in its cat-like manner until it emerges and is recognised as the tiger it deems itself to be. And in doing this, it seems the best course of action would be to highlight its commitment to democracy and anchor its diplomacy on morality and common values.
Jeremiah Nathaniel Reyes is a Master’s student of Politics and International Relations (Global Security) at Keele University. His research interests focus on tensions in the South China Sea, including Philippines-China relations, cross-strait relations between Taiwan and China, and increasing Western involvement in the region.
Taiwan Insight 