Written by Eason Leung.
Image credit: 01.25 總統接見「立陶宛國會友好訪問團」 by 總統府/Flickr, license: CC BY 2.0.
With the Olympics in full swing in Paris at the time of writing, the issue of Taiwan’s global participation has come under renewed attention, as athletes from the nation could only compete under a ‘Chinese Taipei’ name. Spectators are forbidden (in some cases, forcefully attacked) from using any banners or flags to cheer on their nation, an appalling treatment not offered to any other nation or territory competing in the games. It is quite indicative of the complicated diplomatic situation faced by the island nation, in which despite significant economic contribution and democratic values, is unable to form formal relations with most countries in the world, under pressure from its much larger neighbour across the strait. Economic, political and sometimes outright physical measures have been employed in an attempt to squeeze the island nation’s diplomatic space.
Since the shift of diplomatic recognition to the PRC by North Macedonia in 2001, the sole remaining European nation with formal ties with the Republic of China (Taiwan) is the Holy See. The European Union is Taiwan’s largest foreign investor and 4th largest trade partner by volume. Yet, establishing diplomatic connections has been difficult. While diplomatic presence is maintained in an unofficial capacity through various ‘Taipei Representative Offices’, with one here in the United Kingdom in London, they often face additional challenges and questions to legitimacy compared with diplomatic missions of other nations. In order to adhere to Chinese demands to their interpretation of the ‘One China Policy’, such offices are often framed in the context of ‘economic’ and ‘cultural’ exchanges rather than political or official, despite them fulfilling much the same role as another embassy such as issuing visas and representing national interests.
Nonetheless, Taiwan has been taking a flexible approach. It has been making significant progress in fostering ties through ‘unofficial relationships’, with extensive interactions in trade, technology, education and human rights, despite the lack of formal embassies. It has been accelerated during the Tsai Ing-Wen presidency, a period of tumultuous change in the international diplomatic environment that sees the Covid pandemic, the rise of ultra-nationalism, and increasing efforts by China to assert itself and isolate Taiwan on the global stage. Following the progress made with the New Southbound policy and its work with traditional allies such as Japan and the United States, the Tsai administration has seen significant work conducted in Eastern Europe, a region with a common historical memory of the threat of authoritarianism, revisionist imperialism and communism, once as subjugates under the Warsaw Pact, and share concerns regarding revisionism of the Russo-Chinese alliance, particularly since the escalation of hostilities between Russia and Ukraine. Being in closer proximity to Russia and the battlefield in Ukraine, they generally have a stronger sense of threat and compelling need for action than their Western European counterparts. Now under NATO, the Eastern European nations have taken steps to find allies of shared democratic values around the world, cooperating on issues such as arms supply, technology and economic interaction as part of a wider plan to pursue strategic autonomy and reduce reliance. For their part, East Asian nations seek to use this opening to foster economic and technological exchange, seeking opportunities for market entrance. For example, the recent South Korean arms sales to Poland, a comprehensive package involving several air and land weapons such as the K9 self-propelled howitzer and K2 main battle tank, also involves technology transfer and localised production in Poland and may lead to further sales into the EU market. Each side also seeks to use this interaction to further their market and diplomatic reach in their respective regions, for Taiwan into the EU and vice versa into the Asia Pacific, as well as cultural and, particularly for Taiwan, recognition by politicians and the people.
The relationship status between different Eastern European nations and Taiwan is rather varied, reflecting the diverse stance governments have taken over de-risking and Chinese relations in the region. Nonetheless, Taiwan has managed to make inroads into the markets of these nations through a flexible, ‘unofficial’ diplomatic strategy. On the one hand, nations such as Lithuania, Poland and the Czech Republic have been active in deepening ties, with visits from legislators, economic agreements and cooperation in a wide variety of issues, from public health to technology. One of the most significant examples of this is Lithuania, which not only strongly advocated for closer ties between Europe and Taiwan but allowed the newly opened de facto embassy to be named the ‘Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania’, the first such case in the world and considered a major upgrade in diplomatic status. There have also been significant exchanges in academic fields and technology, particularly in processing chips and laser technology, where each nation has a competitive advantage. Manufacturing and design facilities have been opened in respective nations, exchanging technology and expertise, with implications for market entrance and national security. Despite much pressure from Beijing, as well as concern about escalating tensions and effectiveness from some politicians, the Taiwan Representative Office carries on. It may inspire other nations in the region to do the same.
For countries with closer ties with China, meanwhile, Taiwan continues to seek opportunities to engage through unofficial means, such as trade and investments. One clear example is Hungary under Viktor Orbán, which has pursued closer ties with China in defiance of NATO and EU allies as part of his hedging diplomatic strategy. Becoming their sixth ‘all-weather partner’ alongside Belarus and Venezuela, with heightened cooperation in various issues, including national security. The Orbán administration rejected Taiwan’s attempt at accession to the WHO in 2020 and allowed major Chinese investments to be a major participant in their Belt-and-Road Initiative. An example of this is a Budapest-Belgrade higher-speed railway project, mostly funded and built by China. Despite all this, unofficial relations and economic interaction between Taiwan and Hungary have been pragmatic and stable, with the inland state being the second largest destination of Taiwanese foreign direct investment in the EU by dollar value. Cultural interactions in art, music and media have increased in the past decade, with some effect on popular opinion and perception. The recent plan to build a campus for the Shanghai Fudan University in Budapest using Chinese loans and companies, for example, was met with significant protest, citing concerns about excessive Chinese influence and debt traps. Unofficial diplomacy and interaction have also helped convince politicians, primarily in opposition, of the prospects of Taiwan as an alternative strategic partner.
With the transition to the Lai administration, the model of unofficial diplomacy and interactions between Taiwan and Eastern Europe will likely continue and intensify to include official visits. The March visit by then vice-president-elect Hsiao Bi-khim to the Czech Republic, Poland and Lithuania, as well as legislators from those nations visiting Taiwan, demonstrates increasing interaction on an official level. At the same time, it is expected that China would ramp up economic and political pressure on each nation involved, as well as an ongoing campaign of hybrid warfare and disinformation. Any attempt to improve relations with Taiwan is likely to be challenged and threatened. Given the high level of economic integration and supply chain reliance in Europe with China, it is expected that actions to pursue improved relations with Taiwan will face more economic difficulties and cooperate pushback, as business leaders may persuade the government against deeper ties for fear of angering Beijing, losing a potentially lucrative Chinese market and part of the supply chain, as Elon Musk did in 2023. The responsibility, then, falls upon the will of the governments and voters of Taiwan and the European nations to remain steadfast and pursue ties between democratic nations in the backdrop of an increasingly unstable world. It will require a concentrated effort to gain support from multinational organisations such as the EU, combat disinformation, as well as establish a series of bilateral agreements in trade, research and further interaction between the governments in order to maintain the positive trend of further pursuing unofficial diplomacy.
Eason Leung is an MA in International Studies and Diplomacy student at The School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London. He is also a student of the Centre of Taiwan Studies at SOAS and is researching Taiwanese diplomatic policy in Eastern Europe as part of his degree dissertation.
This article was published as part of a special issue on ‘SOAS Taiwan Studies Summer School’.