The Promise of a Return to Taiwan in Recent Election Campaigns: Federated States of Micronesia, Solomon Islands, and Honduras 

Written by Jess Marinaccio. 

Image credit: Former President of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) David Panuelo (Center) urged the FSM Congress to restore ties with Taiwan after losing his congressional seat. Photo courtesy of Jess Marinaccio.

Since the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) surged to power in 2016 (and even before that), an ongoing saga for Taiwan has been its dwindling diplomatic allies. Although a diplomatic truce held Taiwan’s number of official allies relatively steady under KMT president Ma Ying-jeou, Tsai Ing-wen’s inauguration brought an independence-minded government into office, and the PRC has focused on dismantling Taiwan’s diplomatic network since that time in direct opposition to the DPP. From 2016 to the present, Taiwan has lost ten diplomatic allies and is currently left with only 12. 

Much analysis has focused on whether Taiwan really needs official allies, given its successful campaign to build unofficial ties with countries with which it does not have diplomatic relations. Analysts have also considered whether and when Taiwan’s remaining allies will break ties, leaving Taiwan at “diplomatic zero.” However, less analysis has highlighted countries or political parties that have publicly signalled a wish to repair official diplomatic relations with Taiwan, especially those in the Pacific.  

While switching relations from the PRC to Taiwan was a common enough trend in the 2000s and earlier, the practice largely stopped during Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency from 2008 to 2016. After this period, it appeared that once a country dropped Taiwan for the PRC, there was no going back. For example, Nauru switched from Taiwan to the PRC and back to Taiwan between 2002 and 2005 before remaining with Taiwan for almost 20 years and then establishing ties with the PRC in early 2024. Yet, in the past 2 years, Taiwan has become a talking point in election campaigns in the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and Solomon Islands, which are both in the Pacific, as well as Honduras in Central America. For Taiwan to become a campaign topic in these countries is significant because it signals that political parties feel the Taiwan-PRC issue is divisive enough and approval for Taiwan sufficiently widespread that it can potentially rally political support among the electorate even after a country has broken ties with Taiwan in favour of the PRC. Given Taiwan’s rapidly decreasing number of official allies, it may seem to some that Taiwan dropping to “diplomatic zero” is simply a matter of time, but the PRC’s hold on its diplomatic partners clearly is not unshakable. 

When we look at the cases of Honduras, Solomon Islands, and FSM collectively, some similarities emerge. First, for Honduras and the Solomon Islands, in the run-up to elections in 2024 and 2025, opposition candidates (i.e., Peter Kenilorea Jr [son of former prime minister Peter Kenilorea] for the Solomon Islands and former vice president Salvador Nasralla for Honduras) both declared that if they were able to gain positions of power in their countries, they would restore ties and/or improve relations with Taiwan. Nasralla specifically criticized the government of Honduras for cutting off profitable shrimp exports to Taiwan and negotiating unfavourable trade deals with the PRC. At the same time, Kenilorea Jr noted that a security agreement signed between the Solomon Islands and the PRC had created tension in the country and the Pacific region. 

For FSM after then president David Panuelo lost his seat in the FSM Congress in 2023, he issued a 13-page letter to the congress urging them to re-establish ties with Taiwan. Panuelo cited the PRC’s attempts to bribe politicians and subvert FSM’s sovereignty as his reasons for suggesting a switch. 

In all cases, voices critical of the PRC and hoping for a shift in diplomatic relations came from politicians who were either not in government but were vying for powerful official positions or who were in powerful official positions but had just lost their chance to continue in these roles. This indicates that there may be a level of popular dissatisfaction with the PRC from the perspectives of economics and good governance that candidates hope to capitalize on to make them a more appealing choice to local constituencies (an example of popular dissatisfaction can be seen as part of protests in the Solomon Islands in 2021 over the government’s 2019 decision to break relations with Taiwan and form ties with the PRC). It also signals real concern with the influence the PRC has over the governance of these countries and the hope that returning to or improving relations with Taiwan might make for a better partnership. 

Yet, whether using the promise of strengthened ties or a renewed diplomatic relationship with Taiwan is a successful campaign strategy is debatable. Interestingly, Peter Kenilorea Jr’s party from the Solomon Islands won six seats in the country’s parliament after campaigning on the promise of improved relations with Taiwan but was not successful in gaining a leadership role, and Panuelo from FSM had criticized the PRC before losing his seat in the FSM Congress. This may suggest that supporting Taiwan is not a winning issue in a campaign. If Nasralla loses in the Honduran elections (which are scheduled for 2025), this will further indicate that standing with Taiwan may not be a successful campaign strategy for countries that have already switched affiliation to the PRC. Nevertheless, politicians are emphasizing dissatisfaction with the PRC and positing Taiwan as a potential solution. Despite anxiety that Taiwan may soon have no official allies, this indicates that, for Taiwan’s recently departed allies, restoring relations with Taiwan is by no means out of the question. The door is still very much open for a potential restoration of broken diplomatic ties. 

Dr Jess Marinaccio is an Assistant Professor of Asian Pacific Studies at California State University, Dominguez Hills. She was recently employed in Tuvalu’s Foreign Affairs Department as well as its Embassy in Taiwan. Dr Marinaccio researches Pacific understandings of diplomacy and Taiwan’s Pacific fisheries and has published in journals including The Contemporary Pacific, International Journal of Taiwan Studies, and The Journal of Pacific History. 

One comment

  1. Excellent analysis indeed. Would a country be possible to recognize both PRC and Taiwan? How to make this possible? Maybe Taiwan should try this dual recognition mode from a large country.

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