Written by Alexandra Whitehead.
Image credit: Palace of Westminster and Elizabeth Tower 20250522 by Domob/ Wikimedia Commons, license: CC BY-SA 4.0.
In the Autumn of 2023, a significant political scandal emerged in the United Kingdom. News broke that earlier in March, parliamentary researcher Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry, a teacher-turned-academic whom Cash had befriended during his time abroad in China, had been arrested on charges of espionage. The allegations received extensive media attention at the time, and what ensued was a lengthy counterterrorism investigation that revealed how, allegedly, between December 2021 and February 2023, both men compiled politically sensitive information into detailed reports before handing them over to an undisclosed Chinese intelligence officer. At least 34 in total. Now, two years later in 2025, the scandal has resurfaced in the British press after it was revealed that prosecutors were forced to drop the case, citing insufficient evidence to proceed.
Director of Parliament’s Beijing-sceptic China Research Group, Cash used his friendships with the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Alicia Kearns, who described the man as “very capable,” and the then Security Minister, Tom Tugendhat, to secure ‘off the record’ information. Less politically connected, Berry’s primary role was analytical, and he even solicited Cash on what information to look for. Both men were officially charged under Section 1 of the Official Secrets Act (OSA) (“prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State”) in April 2024, appearing at Westminster Magistrates Court later that month for their first hearing.
Things should have been simple. It appeared a full trial would be reached and both men would be charged under “penalty for spying,” however, in September 2025, all charges against the two were dropped, and the case imploded in on itself. The reason: evidence problems, diplomatic sensitivities and a legal Achilles heel.
Much of the evidence allegedly passed came from thinktanks, policy briefings and general political chatter, meaning the prosecution struggled to prove whether the information intercepted by Cash and Berry was actually classified and damaging to UK interests. Prosecutors hit a second brick wall when it emerged the government resisted labelling China an outright “threat” or “enemy” for fears of diplomatic souring and loss of economic interest, meaning the two men’s charges under Section 1 of the OSA were essentially null and void. Given that China was never a formally designated “threat” during the time the alleged offences took place, the two men could never have jeopardised the “interests of the State.”
The case’s collapse has caused major ructions within Parliament, with Labour, the UK’s current ruling party, and the Conservatives, the ruling party at the time of the alleged offences, engaged in a political blame game over who bears the most responsibility. The information was stolen under a Conservative government, but the case collapsed under a Labour one, and their refusal to officially designate China a hostile power has potentially given the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) elaborate insights into the inner workings of the British State.
While the British press picks apart the legal and diplomatic technicalities of the case, this article seeks to answer a different question: what does this mean for Taiwan? Britain has been steadily increasing strategic alignment with Taiwan since the announcement of the Indo-Pacific “tilt” in 2021, so what does a case like this, one which has opened the doors to heightened concerns over China and its influence within UK governance, mean for the relationship between the two? Do these heightened concerns over Chinese assertiveness mean the UK will engage Taiwan even more, albeit unofficially? Or has the ultimate collapse of charges against Cash and Berry discredited Britain’s role as a security guarantor, leaving Taiwan vulnerable to China’s aggressive foreign policy?
Positive Implications
If the scandal has told us anything, it is that there is a significant gap between the rhetoric, labelling China a “threat” for example, and the legislature. Given Cash and Berry’s inability to stand trial over the lack of official definition concerning China’s status, there may now be ample pressure to clarify just exactly how the UK classifies China and what constitutes “enemy” status. This gap is far more than a technical flaw; it undermines Britain’s strategic credibility and weakens any decisive action against espionage or political interference. This newfound need for clarity could shape a more robust policy towards Taiwan and prompt policymakers to reassess Taiwan within the UK’s Indo-Pacific strategy, clarifying the nation’s stance on China, upholding the message that democratic partnerships remain central to Britain’s Indo-Pacific vision, and therefore empowering the UK to pursue a more credible and consistent policy towards Taiwan.
Given how Britain adheres to the One-China framework, it is unlikely the UK will explicitly offer military ties to Taiwan (such a move is far too risky and will surely cross Beijing’s red lines), but the scandal may prompt the UK to consider strengthening ties with Taiwan in the non-military domain. The UK continually looks towards Taiwan as a valuable trading partner, especially where renewables and semiconductors are concerned, and the UK might now be encouraged to take this cooperation further. Technological, economic or even academic cooperation is much lower risk, but it carries high benefits for both sides. For the UK, in light of China’s infiltration into the British state, working with Taiwan helps reduce any overdependency on China while supporting the economic security objectives outlined in the Integrated Review (2021) and more recent Strategic Defence Review (2025). For Taiwan, this diversification could benefit its de factointernational presence and increase its visibility in multilateral arenas. Not only does the spy scandal imply an increased UK-Taiwan trade agreement, but it could potentially grant Taiwan its long-sought-after global legitimacy.
Despite the case’s collapse, Parliamentary backlash against China’s influence has been steadily growing, and this scandal only intensifies concerns over unwarranted Chinese attention. In the case of Taiwan, Parliament passed a motion on UN Resolution 2758 in November 2024, rejecting China’s sovereign claims over ROC territory (ROC is an abbreviation of the Republic of China, Taiwan’s legal name). “This is not pedantry from Beijing, this is predation,” Labour MP Blair McDougall said at the time, and now Beijing is sticking its hands into Britain’s sensitivities; such predation has arrived at Westminster’s doorstep. Taking this into account, along with considering China’s increased interference in British affairs, we see that this has only intensified the need for the UK to tap into their values-based foreign policy. There is now more opportunity than ever for the UK to align itself more closely with Taiwan and provide valuable diplomatic backing in international organisations, along with a clearer line of condemnation against Chinese assertiveness in the Strait.
The Risks
Taiwan might see the collapse of the spy trial as evidence that the UK is unwilling, or simply unable, to aggressively confront China, especially when the stakes are political or economic. Britain’s unwillingness to express an opinion over China’s threat level means Taiwan may worry that, in the event of a potential military or cyber crisis, Britain may favour hesitation or mediation over intervention. In a relationship built upon symbolic gestures, unofficial mutual trust risks being eroded if policymakers in Taipei fear the UK is insincere in its commitment to support “peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.”
If Beijing perceives that UK legal or prosecutorial action can be blunted by the government’s classification, or de-classification in this case, of China as a “threat,” this sets a precedent and may empower the Chinese to further pursue pressure tactics. There is already controversy around the construction of a new Chinese “mega” embassy down by Tower Bridge, and if China feels they can now exert greater pressure, diplomatic or otherwise, the UK may be more withdrawn in their dealings with Taiwan, and the relationship between the two will wither into obscurity. This would be a major blow to the UK-Taiwan relationship as Taipei, who look for credibility and consistency in its partners to help defend its precarious international status, would once again come to view London as unreliable.
The case reveals that UK law demands certain formal classifications that may not match political rhetoric. While there are positive implications for this (a heightened need for a more robust Taiwan policy as mentioned earlier), if the government is slow on delivering these classifications, prosecutors may still find their hands are tied, and Britain’s capacity to defend democratic partners and deter coercion would be undermined. To avoid this breaking down UK-Taiwan relations and leading Taipei to view London as unreliable once again, Britain should fully reform the OSA beyond Cold War-era thinking and harmonise it with the National Security Act (2023) (NSA), which first accounted for 21st Century espionage offences, in a way that adequately defines hostile state-activity in clearer, more modern terms. Doing so signals moral support to Taiwan and grants them clarity that UK risk management is institutionalised, not reactive.
So, What Does The Case Actually Mean For UK-Taiwan Relations?
When we put the opportunities and the risks together, the Chinese spy trial is unlikely to drastically change the course of UK-Taiwan relations. While uncertainties remain as to what the government’s plan is moving forward, we can expect a UK this is clearer in law about Chinese threats, less tolerant of covert influence at home and more assertive in its rhetoric about Taiwan’s importance. Likewise, it would seem unusual, even illogical, if Taiwan were to turn away Britain’s assurances completely. Taiwan may become slightly wary of Britain’s reliability, with potential quiet doubts circulating round Taipei concerning the UK’s institutional readiness to withstand Chinese coercion and whether London could sustain its Taiwan-friendly policies under pressure, but Taiwanese policymakers would continue to engage the UK, and the relationship between the two would continue to function informally and pragmatically.
The Key Takeaway
Britain must be tough on Chinese coercion if they wish to signal reliability to partners and reinforce global influence. The collapse of the spy trial projects a weakness that adversaries may take as an opportunity to further infiltrate the British state. A strong international player is one that can identify threats immediately and act decisively in flushing them out. If Britain wishes to retain this image and help protect nations like Taiwan who risk falling under foreign influence, let this scandal be a valuable lesson in the importance of determining threats and defending national interests.
Having completed her Masters in Taiwan Studies from SOAS University of London, Alexandra is an intelligence analyst and occasional archival transcriber. A member of the Young Fabians International Network, she comments on British foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific and explores her wider interests in military history and defence studies.
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