Written by Baosheng Guo.
Image credit: Public domain.
Background
Since President Trump started his second term in the U.S., his uncertainty and unpredictability have made all U.S. partners more nervous. In particular, Trump’s Taiwan policy significantly destroyed the confidence and trust of the Taiwan government.
During the Biden administration, Biden prioritised the promotion of democracy in its foreign policy, framing the global context as a conflict between democracy and autocracy. And the fundamental reason for protecting Taiwan is its democratic values. In this sense, Biden has declared six times to deploy troops to Taiwan. Unlike Biden, Trump wiped out the democratic values and only focused on economic profit. He declined to commit to Taiwan’s defence if China invaded, and even threatened to charge protection fees for protecting Taiwan. Taiwan is becoming a chip in the transaction between China and America.
Trump also reversed Biden’s policy towards Ukraine and weakened support for Ukraine, which shocked Taiwan, which feared that it would suffer the same fate. Since Russia invaded Ukraine, Taiwan has constantly promoted the narrative that Taiwan has the same geopolitical status and interconnected fate with Ukraine. Joseph Wu, the Foreign Minister of Taiwan, emphasised the importance of “defending Taiwan by defending Ukraine” However, Taiwan’s anxiety was compounded when the U.S., in the words of Oxford Professor Macmillan, “sided against its own democratic allies and with Russia and other authoritarian states, such as North Korea and Belarus, in voting against a UN resolution that condemned Russia’s aggression”.
Additionally, the Trump administration has constantly requested Taiwan to significantly increase defence spending and more Burden-Sharing. Elbridge Colby, the undersecretary of defence for policy, asserts that Taiwan should spend 10% of its GDP on defence.
Meanwhile, Trump’s tariffs on Taiwan, the cancellation of President Lai Ching-te’s transit, and immense pressure on semiconductor factories to invest in America have undermined the feeling of trust between the two nations and negatively impacted Taiwan’s interests. Trump has imposed a 20 per cent reciprocal tariff on goods imported from Taiwan, which is higher than the 15 per cent rate applied to Japan and South Korea. At the same time, Trump has repeatedly threatened to impose high tariffs on imported semiconductors, potentially as high as 100 per cent, to push chip manufacturers to build factories in the U.S.
All of the above reflect the uncertainty surrounding Trump’s Taiwan policy. To deal with the uncertainty, Taiwan should pursue diplomatic, economic, and military approaches to address this challenge.
Recommendations in diplomacy, economy, and military
Diplomacy
Amid Trump’s strategic ambiguity of Taiwan policy, the Taiwan government should diplomatically urge the U.S. to provide strategic clarity and learn lessons from the Korean War. As the Taiwan president Lai said recently, if Trump persuades China to abandon force against Taiwan, he deserves a Nobel Peace Prize; Taiwan should urge Trump to send a clear signal to China that the U.S. disagrees that China unifies Taiwan by force, and the U.S.could deploy troops if China attacks Taiwan.
In the Scholars’ Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke book, Deterrence and Foreign Policy, they assert that the primary reason for the failure to prevent the outbreak of the Korean War was the U.S. sending many ambiguous signals to North Korea and the Soviet Union, including NSC-48 in 1949, Truman’s statement in 1950, and Acheson’s speech in 1950.
In December 1949, NSC-48, the American strategic strategy for East Asia, was adopted by the Truman administration. In this new policy, the U.S committed itself to the defence of Japan and the Philippines, but South Korea and Taiwan, which lay outside the new defence perimeter. On January 5, 1950, Truman released a statement indicating the U.S. would abandon Taiwan and would not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Taiwan. On January 12, 1950, Secretary of State Acheson outlined the U.S. military defence line of containment of the Soviet Union in the West Pacific; conspicuously absent on his list were South Korea and Taiwan. The above signals led to misjudgments of Kim and Stalin and enhanced their confidence to launch an attack on South Korea. History will repeat itself if the U.S. continues to practice the Strategy Ambiguous. Hence, Taiwan could urge Trump to practice Strategy Clarity through the lessons of the Korean War.
Also, Taiwan should strengthen its relationship with Europe, especially in areas of democratic values, defence cooperation, and security guarantees. On May 8, 2025, the Taiwan government held a commemoration ceremony for Victory in Europe Day (VE Day) for the first time in the history of the Republic of China (ROC), marking the anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe. This unprecedented ceremony indicates the Lai Administration’s desire to begin a new chapter of cooperation with Europe. On June 4, Joseph Wu, the Secretary General of Taiwan’s National Security Council (TWNSC), spoke at the Taiwan Trilateral Forum in Berlin and emphasised the increasing significance of Taiwan’s geopolitical position to Europe. On November 7, 2025, Taiwan’s Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim made history in Brussels — becoming the first sitting Taiwanese vice president to speak at the European Parliament. “Taiwan is not alone,” She delivered a remarkable speech at the 2025 summit of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, and Europe supported her in achieving an incredible diplomatic triumph.
From the Cold War to the present, European countries have consistently emphasised the importance of democracy, multilateralism, humanitarianism, and international cooperation. Thus, Europe has a demonstrated interest in the democratic values shared by Taiwan. The Czech Republic and the three Baltic countries have been especially enthusiastic about strengthening cooperation on democratic values with Taiwan.
Moreover, the EU and the UK have already outlined Indo-Pacific strategies that aim to reinforce stability, security, and shared prosperity in the Indo-Pacific, including in Taiwan. Additionally, Europe plays an important role—second only to the United States—in the United Nations, NATO, and other international organisations. In the event of a Taiwan Strait conflict, European nations may play a significant role among third-party countries advocating for intervention on behalf of Taiwan.
Economy
In terms of economy, in addition to investment in the U.S., Taiwan should weaponise the interdependence of its economy and semiconductor industry with the U.S. According to the distinguished theory, Weaponised Interdependence, since the U.S. weaponised interdependence to coerce Taiwan, Taiwan can also weaponise its semiconductor industry. As the authors of Weaponised Interdependence assert, “Asymmetric network structures create the potential for ‘weaponised interdependence,’ in which some states are able to leverage interdependent relations to coerce others… states began to understand that they could exploit network properties to weaponise interdependence”. Although the U.S. has a superior network, Taiwan has a remarkable advantage in global chip supplies.
Taiwan controls 95% of the chip supply in the world, while American production accounts for only 2%. Taiwan must seize the initiative through weaponising chips in trade negotiations. Under the overall strategic goal of “remaining rooted in Taiwan, expanding globally“. Taiwan will not relocate TSMC’s Taiwan base to the U.S. Instead, it will convey to the U.S. that, if it wants to promote the formation of industrial clusters, it must provide infrastructure, legal, and other high-level support from the U.S. Weaponising the semiconductor industry could allow Taiwan to dominate trade negotiations and achieve a final result favourable to Taiwan.
Military
Except for heightening Taiwan’s defence spending and expanding weapons purchases from the U.S., Taiwan should prepare to restart research and development of Nuclear weapons. As the deputy editor at Foreign Policy asserts, “if Taiwan can’t trust the United States as a security partner, then it might begin real discussions about restarting its own nuclear weapons programme—abandoned in the 1980s under U.S. pressure”.
On January 11, 2023, former President Yoon of South Korea stated, “Of course, if problems become more serious, the Republic of Korea (ROK) could deploy tactical nuclear weapons here, or we could acquire our own nuke as well”. Although Yoon soon retook his statement, the White House was already shocked by his words. As a result, when Yoon visited the White House after his nuclear statement, he received extraordinary achievement in enhancing defence cooperation with the U.S. His nuclear statement became a bargaining chip in negotiations. President. Lai could simulate Yoon, release a nuclear statement to pressure the White House, and warn Beijing.
As scholar Victor D. Cha concluded, “The same broad-based ambivalence toward a nuclear option among South Korean strategic elites could shift dramatically to support if confidence in the patron ally wanes… it is far from a remote possibility in a second Trump presidency”. Taiwan’s strategic elites, whose situation is similar to South Korea’s, could support the nuclear option if the uncertainty of Trump’s Taiwan policy increases.
Fortunately, the Under Secretary of Defence for Policy, Elbridge Colby, expressed his openness to South Korea acquiring nuclear weapons in 2024. So, developing nuclear weapons is not only a bargaining chip, but it is also a possible deterrence tool for Taiwan.
Conclusion
Under the uncertainty and unpredictability of Trump’s Taiwan policy, the Taiwan government should pursue diplomatic, economic, and military approaches to address this imminent yet long-term challenge. From now until next April, when Trump plans to visit Beijing, he could further deepen the uncertainty around his Taiwan policy. Facing and solving the not-optimistic situation is a significant challenge for the Taiwanese government.
Baosheng Guo is an MA student in Asian Studies at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. He has published articles in The Diplomat, Global Taiwan Institute(GTI), Taiwan International Studies Quarterly, and other Taiwan academic journals.
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