Written by Carissa Cheng.
Image credit: Democratic Progressive Party chairman Lai Ching-te with party members of the 11th Legislative Yuan by Legislative Yuan.
From a bird’s-eye view, Taiwan is thriving like never before. A recent study predicted that Taiwan’s GDP per capita will surpass South Korea’s this year for the first time in over 20 years. However, Taiwan’s young adults feel increasingly left behind: impacted by wage stagnation and increased cost of living, many are simply choosing to leave Taiwan.
In 2024, a majority of Taiwanese aged 20-29 shocked the country by voting for the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), an obscure third party which “vocalise [d] frustrations about Taiwan’s economy”, over Taiwan’s two mainstream political parties.
As Taiwan enters its third term under the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), this article seeks to understand why many former DPP young voters decided to switch their vote. The article ends with recommendations for how the Lai Ching-te administration can serve and win back its disillusioned youth.
Money Over Ideology
Numerous surveys indicate that one major reason why Taiwan’s young voters are backing away from the DPP is their focus on Taiwanese independence over domestic issues.
Most Taiwanese youth already view Taiwan as de facto independent, and thus, cross-Strait relations feel irrelevant to their day-to-day lives. Dr Liu Wen (劉文), Associate Research Professor at Academia Sinica, adds that frequent use of TikTok and interest in Chinese pop culture may also make young people more averse to the DPP’s frequent criticism of the People’s Republic of China. Unfortunately, the DPP has failed to shift their messaging appropriately. Wei Mei-Chuan (魏玫娟), Associate Professor at National Chengchi University, criticised the DPP for running an unpopular pro-independence campaign during the 2022 local elections, arguing that local elections should focus on local issues like employment and housing. One young Taiwanese told me, “The youth today care more about money than ideology. They want to earn a living as quickly as possible, and if your party cannot promise that anytime soon, they are not interested.”
Wei explained that rather than Taiwan’s political status, Taiwan’s youth are more concerned with buying a home, a cultural marker of success, which paves the way for starting a family. However, this goal is increasingly impossible, with Taiwan’s young adults dubbed by some as the “rent forever generation”. Wei pointed out that job opportunities are concentrated in a select handful of major cities like Taipei and Hsinchu, where the housing demand has skyrocketed. Michael Fonte, Senior Advisor to the DPP Mission in the U.S., shared that landowners and realtors who own multiple properties further exacerbate the housing crisis.
Under former President Tsai Ing-wen, the DPP did pass policies to help youth with home ownership, but unfortunately, they were largely ineffective. According to Wei Mei-chuan, the Preferential Housing Loans for Youth program (新青安貸款) was “misused by investors and…boosted the real estate market, making it even harder for young people to buy a house.” Wei opined that the DPP has hesitated to really curb property investment because “real estate developers are important donors to both main political parties.” Moreover, DPP rent subsidy programs were unsuccessful because “landlords…refuse to accept tenants who apply for the subsidies…over 90% of renters in Taiwan [have to] rent their houses through ‘illicit or clandestine arrangements’.”
Dr Liu Wen adds that frustration around housing is exacerbated by the stark income inequality between those working in Taiwan’s technology sector and those who work elsewhere. Although Taiwan’s GDP growth and national security both rely on its semiconductor industry, she cautions that the Taiwanese government cannot overlook stagnating wages in the manufacturing, service, and agricultural industries, which account for the majority of Taiwan’s workforce. Overall, failure to adequately address the financial stagnation of young people led many former DPP voters to switch their vote.
DPP Factionalism
Another major source of dissatisfaction with the DPP is increasing factionalism among DPP party members and the voter base.
Within the DPP, the division surrounds President Lai Ching-te himself. Some DPP supporters resent that Lai ran against Tsai during the 2019 DPP presidential primaries with a relatively conservative position on labour and gay rights. As a result, he lost to Tsai, especially amongst young voters and women. Even today, Lai appears to still favour older, conservative New Tide (新潮流系統) politicians who supported his presidential bid in 2019, giving them the majority of Executive Yuan seats. He has been accused of perpetuating internal division within his cabinet and local primaries in places like Kaohsiung.
Additionally, some voters are worried about Lai’s forceful use of executive power. Dr Liu Wen explained that some voters worry that Lai’s new national security amendments and laws may overstep the jurisdiction of the executive branch. To unite his party, Lai must overcome his reputation as conservative and heavy-handed.
Another significant division amongst the DPP’s voter base is gender. Mike Fonte reported that many male DPP voters are unhappy with the DPP’s liberal social policies, such as their support of working women or the legalisation of gay marriage. While older men are primarily concerned with preserving tradition, younger men are resentful for economic reasons: stuck in low-wage jobs, they have begun blaming women in the workforce for “taking their jobs”, an increasingly common rhetoric around the world. Young men were also unhappy with the DPP’s decision to extend mandatory military service. Instead, they preferred the TPP’s focus on domestic “bread-and-butter” issues and, as Dr. Liu put it, the TPP’s message that “you can say whatever you want even if it’s not politically correct.”
Both divisions surrounding the president and gender have weakened party unity and pushed some young DPP voters away.
From Challenger to Establishment
A third important reason why young people are disillusioned with the DPP is their increasingly tainted image as elitist and corrupt.
Many young voters are upset that the DPP seems to cater to the wealthy and urban. Dr. Liu Wen pointed out that the DPP has historically focused its resources on winning central government elections but has neglected local-level races for city council or village chief. She also noted the DPP has not been highly successful in reaching out to Taiwan’s agricultural and fishery workers. Mike Fonte mused that the DPP has failed to pass more progressive taxing to fund social welfare programs, and that some voters believe it is because of their big business donors.
A large majority of voters believe corruption is another serious issue in Taiwanese politics, with many disappointed by the DPP in particular. “The DPP promised it would not take ‘black gold’ like the KMT,” Mike Fonte explained, but lately, Wei Mei-chuan says, “the DPP in the public view is getting more and more like the KMT as far as the issue of corruption is concerned.” The DPP’s first president, Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), was jailed in 2009 for money laundering, and recently, DPP legislators were found faking university degrees.
As the DPP appears to lose touch with the ideals it was founded upon, one article writes, “the appeal of the TPP reflects young people’s desire for change, particularly as the Democratic Progressive Party is increasingly viewed as part of the establishment and not the revolutionary challenger it was in the 2014 Sunflower Movement.”
Policy Recommendations
For the young voters who have lost faith in the DPP, the question remains whether the TPP can survive long enough to represent their concerns. Nevertheless, as Taiwan’s current ruling party, it remains the responsibility of the DPP to address the needs of Taiwan’s young adults.
Economically, the DPP could enact heavier taxes on secondary properties and high-income earners while subsidising essential but low-wage jobs like farmwork and non-tech manufacturing. Moreover, they could fund comprehensive financial literacy and business classes in high schools and colleges to teach Taiwan’s youth practical skills like budgeting, saving for a house, basic investing, and entrepreneurship.
Beyond economic concerns, the DPP must also adjust its messaging to win back the youth vote. Taiwan’s youth are blamed for some of Taiwan’s most serious issues, including a falling birthrate and CCP infiltration via heavy TikTok usage. However, instead of lashing out at them, Dr Liu Wen believes Taiwan’s government needs to dig deeper, “Why do they turn to social media for comfort? What do they really want?” Liu says another factor drawing the youth away from the DPP is their aversion to being “pigeonholed” by being labelled as “blue” or “green”: she suggests the DPP reflect on how they can create a more inclusive and diverse platform.
Lastly, Fonte recommended that the DPP reform its image by nominating younger candidates with clean reputations to legislative and city council positions. To attract the right talent and rebuild a youth-centred party, the DPP could pay higher entry-level wages and enforce age limits on legislators.
Ultimately, by passing economic policies focused on income inequality and affordable housing, adjusting campaign messaging to empathise with Taiwan’s youth, and inviting younger members serving at all levels of the party, the DPP could once again champion Taiwan’s youngest voters.
The author would like to thank: Michael Fonte, Senior Advisor to the DPP Mission in the U.S.; Wei Mei-Chuan (魏玫娟), Associate Professor at National Chengchi University (國立政治大學); Dr Liu Wen (劉文), Associate Research Professor at Academia Sinica (中央研究院); and anonymous contributors.
Carissa Cheng is the 2025 Ya-Hui Chiu Summer Fellow for the Global Taiwan Institute, a Washington, DC-based think tank dedicated to insightful research on Taiwan. She recently graduated from Stanford University with a BA in International Relations. Her research interests include youth-led political movements, Taiwan and the Taiwanese American diaspora, intergenerational/intercultural exchange, and soft power.
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