Written by Dr Daouda Cissé.
Image credit: Taipei Liaison Office in South Africa by Discott/ Wikimedia Commons, license: CC BY-SA 4.0.
While the One China principle stipulates that the People’s Republic of China is the only legitimate government representing China—and serves as a non-negotiable foundation of Beijing’s foreign policy, which requires partner countries to strictly abide by it—the One China policy allows other countries to maintain strategic ambiguity and engage with both Beijing and Taipei. The evolution of South Africa – Taiwan relations must be viewed within the context of this diplomatic realignment.
Under apartheid, Pretoria maintained close political and economic ties with Taipei, notably through Taiwanese investment in the South African industry. However, the end of apartheid and the transformation of the South African political system led to a reorientation of Pretoria’s foreign policy. After severing diplomatic relations with Taiwan, South Africa recognised China in 1998, making the One-China principle a cornerstone of its policy towards Taipei. This recognition did not, however, lead to the end of relations between South Africa and Taiwan. The two sides have maintained economic, trade, cultural and technological relations through their representative offices in Taipei and South Africa. Taiwan’s representative offices have enabled Taipei to maintain an institutional presence in South Africa and to sustain bilateral exchanges. Trade relations remain significant despite their informal nature. In 2024, trade between the two economies was estimated at around 1.5 billion US dollars, whilst several hundred Taiwanese companies were established in South Africa. Taiwan imports South African mineral resources and agricultural products, and exports its technological products, IT equipment, electronic components and automotive parts to South Africa.
The piece examines how Beijing exerts its influence over Pretoria and how the One China principle shapes South Africa’s international relations, particularly with Taiwan. It argues that, in an apparent contradiction in its foreign policy, Pretoria recognises Beijing diplomatically, adheres to the One China principle, and maintains substantial economic and institutional relations with Taipei. It is precisely Taiwan’s presence in South Africa that Beijing is seeking to reduce. The rivalry between China and Taiwan is therefore not limited to a contest for diplomatic recognition. It is also manifested through institutional presence, economic exchanges, political networks and the construction of competing narratives on international legitimacy.
China’s growing influence on South African foreign policy
China’s influence in South Africa forms part of a broader set of political, economic and institutional relations that have evolved considerably since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. China has become a major economic partner for Pretoria and plays a significant role in South Africa’s strategies to diversify its international partnerships. This relationship has also deepened within the framework of the BRICS and a shared vision of cooperation amongst the countries of the Global South.
Under Jacob Zuma’s presidency, South Africa has gradually shifted its diplomatic focus towards emerging powers. The reorientation of its look-East foreign policy has enabled Pretoria to consolidate its relations with Beijing and strengthen its position within the BRICS. China has thus become not only a key trading partner but also a contributor to shaping South Africa’s foreign policy. However, the economic and strategic interdependence between South Africa and China complicates the principle of non-interference traditionally championed by Beijing. China regularly asserts that it respects the sovereignty of its partner states and does not interfere in their internal affairs. Yet China’s growing investments, trade and strategic interests in South Africa give Beijing considerable means of influence. The defence of the One China principle illustrates this tension between the rhetoric of non-interference and the exercise of diplomatic influence aimed at protecting Beijing’s fundamental and strategic interests.
The One China principle is therefore not merely a position concerning the status of Taiwan. It also functions as a diplomatic norm that Beijing seeks to have its partners uphold. For South Africa, adherence to this norm forms part of a broader relationship with China, characterised by significant economic interests, close political cooperation and convergence on certain international issues.
Beijing, South African political parties and the changing political landscape
China’s influence is not limited to inter-state relations. It also extends to relations between political parties. During the long period in which the African National Congress (ANC) dominated the South African political landscape without any real competition, Beijing was able to prioritise its relations with the ruling party. However, with changes in the South African political system and the formation of a government of national unity, China is being compelled to diversify its contacts with the various political parties in order to safeguard its long-term interests. This strategy forms part of China’s party diplomacy developed by the Chinese Communist Party, notably through the International Department of the Central Committee. For Beijing, relations with foreign parties provide an additional means of developing political networks, promoting its model of governance and consolidating its economic and strategic interests.
This development is particularly significant in the South African context, as the ANC’s gradual loss of influence could make foreign policy an even more contentious issue amongst the main political parties. Pretoria’s foreign policy regarding its international relations could then become the topic of more significant debates within South Africa’s political arena.
Indeed, some South African parties continue to maintain relations with Taiwan, despite Pretoria’s official stance. This situation regularly draws opposition from the Chinese Embassy in South Africa, which encourages South African political parties to respect the One China principle and to avoid contact with Taipei. However, South African political parties remain autonomous actors and are not legally bound by Beijing’s requirements regarding relations with Taipei.
In this regard, the Democratic Alliance (DA) is one of Taiwan’s main political supporters in South Africa. The party regularly criticises the ANC’s policy towards Beijing and advocates maintaining relations with Taipei. In particular, it opposed the South African government’s decision to request the transfer of Taiwan’s representative office from Pretoria to Johannesburg, arguing that such a decision undermines the autonomy of South African foreign policy.
South Africa as an arena for competition between Beijing and Taipei
South Africa is therefore a particularly telling example of the diplomatic competition between China and Taiwan. Pretoria officially recognises the People’s Republic of China but continues to enjoy significant economic ties with Taipei.
The South African government’s decision to request the downgrading and renaming of Taiwan’s representative offices, as well as the transfer of the Pretoria office to Johannesburg, must be understood in this context. It reflects Pretoria’s desire to reduce Taiwan’s institutional visibility on its territory and to comply more closely with Beijing’s expectations regarding the One China principle. This development also reflects the shifting balance of power between Beijing and Taipei in South Africa.
The competition between China and Taiwan is also played out in the realm of rhetoric. Beijing presents its relationship with Pretoria as a strategic partnership based on multilateralism, South-South cooperation, solidarity amongst the countries of the Global South and respect for sovereignty. Taipei, for its part, seeks to maintain its visibility by emphasising economic, technological, educational and commercial cooperation.
These two narratives are based on different conceptions of international legitimacy. Beijing regards recognition of the One China principle as a fundamental condition for its diplomatic relations. Taipei, by contrast, seeks to preserve an international space that allows it to maintain its relations despite its diplomatic isolation. In the case of South Africa, this rivalry places Pretoria in a delicate position, as it must balance its strategic commitment to Beijing with the protection of its economic interests with Taiwan.
The One China principle as an instrument of power and influence
The One China principle thus appears to be a diplomatic principle relating to Taiwan’s status. It constitutes an instrument of power enabling Beijing to integrate the Taiwan issue into the broader context of its foreign relations. In the case of South Africa, its effectiveness rests on the significance of the economic, political and institutional relations between Pretoria and Beijing.
China’s influence does not, however, mean that South Africa relinquishes all autonomy in defining its foreign policy. Pretoria retains its own economic and strategic interests and seeks to maintain a degree of diversification in its partnerships. However, China’s importance to the South African economy, its role within the BRICS and the political convergence between the two governments are gradually reducing Pretoria’s room for manoeuvre regarding Taiwan. The South African case thus illustrates a form of asymmetric dependence in which economic and strategic relations gradually strengthen Beijing’s ability to advance its diplomatic priorities. The One China principle thereby becomes a mechanism for diplomatic normalisation: the recognition of this principle largely determines the nature of the relations that states may maintain with Taiwan.
Recent developments in relations between Pretoria and Taipei show that the rivalry between China and Taiwan is not limited to the issue of diplomatic recognition. It also concerns market access, investment, political networks, technology, institutional representation and the ability to influence the foreign policy choices of partner states. South Africa thus appears to be a prime example for observing how Beijing’s economic and political power is gradually transforming the space available to Taiwan on the African continent. Relations between South Africa, China and Taiwan highlight a fundamental dynamic in contemporary international relations: a state’s rising economic power can strengthen its ability to promote its diplomatic norms and influence the foreign policy choices of its partners. In this context, the One China principle constitutes both a cornerstone of China’s diplomacy, an instrument of power projection and a determining factor in the gradual marginalisation of Taiwan’s official presence in South Africa.
Dr Daouda Cissé is a researcher specialising in China studies and Africa–China relations. He is affiliated with LASPAD (Centre for the Analysis of Societies and Powers / African Diasporas) at Gaston Berger University in Senegal. He was a senior researcher at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) in Germany and an associate at Megatrends Afrika from April 2022 to March 2023. He was also a visiting scholar at National Chengchi University in Taiwan in 2021. Previously, he worked at the China Institute at the University of Alberta, Canada, and at the Centre for Chinese Studies (CCS) at the University of Stellenbosch, South Africa. He received his PhD in Economics from Zhongnan University of Economics and Law in Wuhan, China. His research focuses on China’s domestic and overseas political economy and Africa–China relations. He is the author of China in Africa: From Macro-Level Engagements to Grassroots Interactions (2021).