Written by Tin Pak and Sam Lee.
Image credit: Cheng Li-wun at Dongjiao State Hotel, Nanjing-20260407 by 中国新闻社/ Wikimedia Commons, license: CC BY 4.0.
Cheng Li-wun remains highly unpopular in Taiwan as her party, the Kuomintang (KMT), gears up for the local elections in November. Her opposition, within and outside the KMT, continues to express frustration at what they perceive as her overly conciliatory attitudes towards the People’s Republic of China (PRC) despite broad Taiwanese consensus against it. Cheng’s rhetoric and actions on this front are straining the KMT’s unity and threatening their electoral prospects, making many wonder what she actually hopes to achieve. This article analyses the motives for Cheng’s political strategy of establishing closer ties with the PRC and whether the risks this strategy presents to the KMT and Taiwan at large are worth the gamble.
An Unwinnable Electoral Strategy
Cheng has quickly become one of the most polarising figures in Taiwan’s history after winning the chairmanship of the KMT last November, pushing the party towards a much more conciliatory position vis-à-vis the PRC. She led the KMT effort to stall President Lai’s Special Defence Budget when it was first introduced, aimed at strengthening deterrence against increased PRC military threats. She has supported a Taiwanese identity intrinsically tied to a pan-Chinese one, emphasising the shared “Chinese civilisation” between Taiwan and the PRC, in line with Beijing’s efforts to promote a united Sino-centric cross-strait national identity. She has broken from the mainstream understanding of the 1992 consensus by omitting the “respective interpretations” clause in her statements on the “one China” principle during her public remarks in Beijing with President Xi Jinping, paving the way for unification solely on the PRC’s terms.
All of these positions are highly unpopular among the broader Taiwanese populace and only serve to appeal to the deep-blue “Huang Fu-Shing” faction of the KMT, who seek unification with the mainland. The misalignment of Cheng’s policy positions with the general electorate’s stances on these issues is reflected in her very low approval rating, which currently stands at only 24 per cent.
Moreover, her attempts to frame herself as a mediator capable of managing relations with both the PRC and the US through her recent visits to these countries under her “Taiwan Doesn’t Have to Choose” framework continue to come off as overly close to the former and distant from the latter. The friendly remarks between Cheng and Xi during her formal reception in Beijing contrast starkly with her failure to make headway in the US, with officials from the National Security Council and members of Congress turning her away.
Such outcomes reflect Cheng’s own interpretation of Taiwan’s relationships with these two great powers. The inability to find strong allies in the US government validates her scepticism of the US, which she has suggested is using Taiwan as a geopolitical “pawn,” whereas her closeness with Beijing strengthens her belief that Taiwan is part of a unified Chinese nation. This stance is misaligned with the broader Taiwanese public whose perceptions of the PRC have only soured over the years while that of the US remains considerably strong.
Betting the KMT’s Electoral Future
Cheng’s commitment to her unpopular policies is threatening to rupture the KMT and lead to its decisive defeat in the upcoming general elections. Already facing years of low favourability ratings in the aftermath of Ma Ying-jeou’s administration, many prominent members of the KMT are attempting to reorient their positions to align with the broader public regarding increasing defence spending, fostering a local Taiwanese identity, and improving ties with the US.
For instance, the Taichung mayor and potential KMT 2028 presidential candidate Lu Shiow-Yen expressed support for President Lai’s initially proposed Special Defence Budget, diverging from Cheng’s efforts to block it. Taipei mayor Chiang Wan-an publicly affirmed his “Taiwanese” identity in an interview, as he governs over a younger electorate that diverges the most from Cheng’s Sino-centrism. Speaker of the Legislative Yuan, Han Kuo Yu, has become a prominent interlocutor with the US, encouraging closer ties, even as Cheng strains the KMT’s respectability in the US.
In contrast, Cheng’s policy positions diverge from the general consensus of Taiwanese, particularly young voters. Her rhetoric and actions have alienated many moderate KMT and independent voters, threatening the short-term viability of a national KMT ticket by polarising the party and sidelining attempts by the moderate KMT camp to adjust to emerging electoral trends.
The KMT’s disunity will favour the governing Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and other parties opposed to the pan-blue coalition in elections as KMT factions compete for control over the party narrative, which will redirect funding and energy to intraparty disputes. If Cheng continues to rein in members of the KMT behind her, she threatens the electoral success of candidates who take up or are associated with her brand of politics. Such a position could lead to the KMT losing big in the local elections later this month and both the Presidential and Legislative elections in 2028.
Elevating Herself as the “Peace” Candidate
Instead of elevating the electoral prospects of the pan-blue coalition, Cheng’s political strategy seems focused on establishing her personal credentials among the deep-blue base of the KMT.
Were Cheng to run for President, she would promote herself as the “peace” candidate who would seek to mend ties with the PRC after years of DPP rule, which she blames for provoking the PRC and threatening a disastrous conflict. Her eagerness to re-establish official channels and to make diplomatic concessions with Beijing hinges on an expansive view of the PRC’s military and economic ascent. In any long-term competition with the PRC, Cheng states that she does not “believe that time is on Taiwan’s side” as the PRC’s national strength continues to rise, necessitating concessions on Taiwan’s part.
Cheng’s emphasis on avoiding war is core to her political campaigning, betting that sooner or later the Taiwanese public will view a conciliatory position toward Beijing as the most politically viable option available to avoid a disastrous war. In interviews, she has expressed concerns that Taiwan could “become the next Ukraine” if they fail to achieve a rapprochement with the PRC. Her references to that devastating war aim at convincing the Taiwanese that the human costs of independence, even if achievable, are too high—a sentiment widely shared in Taiwan, with the status quo of non-official statehood being preferred by a majority of Taiwanese—and that all efforts should be made to seek a rapprochement with the PRC.
By building a personal relationship with Xi, she is positioning herself to be the only Taiwanese leader capable of reasoning with a belligerent Beijing. Should push come to shove and Taiwan faces an imminent military threat, Cheng seems to believe that the Taiwanese would reluctantly come about to support her efforts at appeasing the PRC. That said, her strategy hinges on a massive shift in public opinion in Taiwan, where people continue to express their resistance to unification and a willingness to fight a war to maintain their freedoms.
The Risk of Her Gamble
For Cheng, the immediate risk of her political gamble is being ousted from the KMT chairmanship. Cheng has clashed with establishment KMT members including former Chairman Eric Chu, Speaker Han Kuo-yu, and former President Ma Ying-jeou. Her polarising tenure could result in these figures supporting the moderate KMT factions in carrying out an intra-party coup should her support continue to fall among the electorate. That said, such a move before the local elections has no precedent and is unlikely, as former high-profile critics of Cheng, including Jaw Shao-kang and Eric Chu, reluctantly back her. However, a major defeat in the upcoming local elections would present the necessary justification and public pressure to force Cheng from office.
If Cheng holds onto leadership, the broader risk to the KMT is that her unpopularity will tank the party’s prospects in the 2028 general elections. Taiwan’s elections are notorious for their seismic shifts, swinging between the KMT and DPP following sharp declines in the popularity of their respective leaders. A landslide KMT loss is likely if Cheng continues to push many of the same highly unpopular policies that led to Ma’s decisive electoral defeat a decade ago.
A large KMT loss would likely result in significant gains by the DPP in the Legislative Yuan and hand President Lai a second term, giving the DPP’s deep-green factions a mandate to pursue more drastic political priorities. Some of which include deepening defence and diplomatic ties with the US and Japan, significantly expanding its military capabilities, and consolidating a non-Sino-centric national identity.
The PRC would use the DPP’s victory as a pretext to embrace ever more hardline rhetoric and military assertiveness against Taiwan. In this context, the KMT plays a vital role in reassuring the PRC that peaceful unification is still on the table through high-level contacts and the tempering of the DPP’s de-sinicisation policies. However, Cheng’s general unpopularity and alienation of light-blue factions will likely lead to a considerable KMT defeat in the 2028 general elections if she is not ousted as Chairwoman. Without a moderating influence from the KMT in government, Taiwan would quickly slide towards the fate that Cheng Li-wun so often cites: a disastrous conflict.
Conclusion
Cheng’s attempt to seek a rapprochement with the PRC to prevent what she believes is an imminent conflict may bring about exactly what she claims her policies are intended to pre-empt. By setting up the KMT for a massive electoral defeat, she will be handing unchecked power to the DPP’s pro-independence factions, giving the PRC the pretext to take increasingly aggressive actions against Taiwan.
Tin Pak is a Fulbright Scholar pursuing an MA degree in Asia Pacific Studies at Taiwan’s National Chengchi University. He served as the youngest-ever Visiting Scholar at Taiwan’s National Defence University, conducting joint research with military officers and government officials on the PRC’s electromagnetic warfare strategy and Taiwan’s drone initiatives. He is also a co-founder of the Rainier Institute for Foreign Affairs, a think tank based in Seattle.
Sam Lee is a Law Student at the University of Arizona with a focus on international law and politics. He has a BA in Political Science from the University of Washington. He also serves as a research fellow at the Rainier Institute for Foreign Affairs.
Disclaimer: *This is not an official Department of State publication, and the views and information presented are those of the authors alone and do not represent the Fulbright Program, ECA, the Post, Fulbright Commission, or any government and institution.