Written by Elena Yi-Ching Ho.
Image credit: 02.13 總統視察「中鋼公司再生水系統及節能措施」by 總統府/ Flickr, license: CC BY 2.0.
Taiwan’s energy security has once again been under the spotlight amid the current surge in energy risk stemming from the US–Israeli war with Iran. The Taiwanese government should treat it as a strategic opportunity to accelerate renewable energy and strengthen the information resilience needed to support Taiwan’s energy transition.
Following the large-scale attack launched by the United States and Israel against Iran on 28 February, the Strait of Hormuz, through which one-fifth of the world’s oil supply transits, has been closed for nearly a month. The Strait is a critical chokepoint in the global energy system. The results have been immediately reflected in international markets, driving up oil and gas prices and intensifying concerns over energy security, including in Taiwan.
Energy security has always been a critical issue for Taiwan. In recent years, the growing geopolitical volatility, the acceleration of energy transition, and the rapidly increasing demand for electricity driven by AI development have collectively elevated its strategic importance to new heights. In particular, following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the world witnessed how a geopolitical conflict could quickly escalate into a global energy crisis and how energy security could become a linchpin shaping the trajectory of war.
Taiwan has become increasingly aware of its heavy reliance on imported energy sources, attempting to strengthen its energy resilience beyond simply living up to its commitment to climate actions, but its current policy does not keep up with the speed.
The Taiwanese government has been pursuing an energy mix strategy, but Taiwan’s power generation remains heavily reliant on LNG under the existing energy transition plan. In pursuit of its “20-30-50” formula under the “nuclear-free homeland” policy, which aims to reduce coal-fired power generation to 20%, increase gas to 50%, and raise renewable energy generation to 30%, the government has faced mounting implementation challenges, as well as pressure following the results of the nuclear referendum last August, after which the current government initially pledged to reassess nuclear options. However, as of 21 March, Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te further announced that two decommissioned nuclear power plants, the Nuclear Power Plant 2 shut down in March 2023, and Nuclear Power Plant 3 in May 2025, have met the condition for restarting, and that Taiwan Power Company will submit the restart plan for review to Taiwan Nuclear Safety Council by the end of March.
Socially, the shift from coal to gas for power generation has been criticised by local communities for failing to adequately address air pollution and broader environmental concerns in different parts of Taiwan. From a climate perspective, positioning LNG for 50% of the power mix raises the legitimacy of the policy into question, as LNG has been found to be as bad (or worse) than coal for emissions.
Politically and economically, the implications extend far beyond environmental debates. As China’s threat of invading Taiwan has become increasingly pronounced, the prospect of a potential blockade has drawn serious attention. Such a scenario could disrupt Taiwan’s power supply and, in turn, interrupt global semiconductor production. Taiwan accounts for more than 90% of the world’s most advanced chips. This vulnerability is compounded by the fact that Taiwan’s current legally-mandated LNG capacity covers 11 days of the supply, meaning that any sustained blockade would almost certainly trigger immediate and severe supply chain disruptions. As such, while the government announced that the current urgent situation can be mitigated by diversifying energy import sources, for example, importing LNG from the United States instead of the Middle East, such measures do not fundamentally de-escalate Taiwan’s energy risks. It once again underscores the structural vulnerabilities embedded in fossil fuel reliance and the pressing need to strengthen long-term energy resilience.
Geopolitical conflicts such as the Russia–Ukraine war and the recent Middle East crisis, as well as a growing body of academic research, have repeatedly demonstrated how renewable energy can significantly reduce risks associated with both energy security and national security. For example, as Russia has targeted Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, including fossil fuel–powered power plants, transmission lines, and substations, Ukraine’s decentralised energy systems have shown how energy resilience can be strengthened through renewable energy and how such systems can mitigate severe energy shortages under extreme scenarios such as war. In addition, the significance of energy power and its intersection with political influence has become evident in the “global clean technology race,” which matters not only for Taiwan’s energy security but also for its national security.
However, the development of renewable energy has also proven complex, particularly as disinformation, misinformation, conspiracy theories, and rumours surrounding renewable energy weaken information resilience.
For example, although solar and wind energy have been identified as key areas for renewable development, scandals, fraud, and controversies surrounding project financing and installation processes have polarised online discussions and triggered backlash from local communities. In July 2025, when Typhoon Danas battered Southwestern Taiwan, severely damaging floating solar platforms, the longstanding misinformation and disinformation on how solar panels (broken or not) would contaminate the water and soil resurfaced again. In fact, a few months earlier, the Heshan solar project in Kaohsiung had also been reported to be operating illegally and causing serious soil erosion issues, further provoking distrust against the government’s overall solar energy policy.
Government renewable energy policies—many of which were expected to deliver immediate results—have drawn substantial criticism and scepticism from society. The term “green electricity cockroaches” has emerged not only as a central rhetorical tool in smear campaigns targeting renewable energy initiatives and the ruling party, but also, to some extent, as a reflection of regulatory gaps and insufficient safeguards in renewable energy governance. For example, the fishery and electricity symbiosis policy (漁電共生), one of the most critical renewable energy policies, has been controversial and attracted a barrage of criticisms due to the insufficient complementary measures.
Several other controversial cases, including the installation of solar panels and wind farm development without adequate public communication, clear policy planning, transparency, or thorough environmental assessment processes to secure local consensus, have further amplified negative sentiment in affected communities. These issues have increasingly become a target for opposition parties seeking to advance their political agendas, potentially weakening the social consensus needed for energy transition by significantly constraining the opportunities for constructive public debate while undermining institutional trust. These blunders represent own goals by the Taiwanese government, undermining its targets and efforts to expand renewable energy capacity.
Indeed, significant improvements are needed in the Taiwanese government’s current renewable energy plan, and many amendments must be made to existing policies. However, it is precisely under extreme scenarios that stakeholders are reminded that greater energy autonomy, reducing reliance on external energy supplies, is essential for the resilience Taiwan needs.
The Taiwanese government should therefore treat the current challenge as an opportunity to recalibrate its renewable energy policy, while also strengthening information resilience by initiating constructive dialogue with different stakeholders, including opposition parties and local communities. The Taiwanese government is in urgent need of comprehensive policies that support society to move faster together, so that Taiwan can strengthen its energy security as well as national security to escape the desperate vulnerability that the current situation is only beginning to expose.
Elena Yi-Ching Ho is the Co-founder and Taiwan Lead at Research + Action, an Australian-based NGO dedicated to countering climate disinformation. She is also pursuing her PhD in Communication and Media Studies at Queensland University of Technology. Her research interests include political communication, information integrity, and social media.