Written by Chien-Ping Liu. This article examines how transnational marriage migration has reshaped Taiwan’s demographic and civic landscape since the 1990s. It traces the shift from stigmatisation to multicultural recognition through grassroots advocacy and state developmental agendas. While bottom-up movements advanced inclusion, state-led multiculturalism often instrumentalised difference, reproducing class, gender, and geopolitical hierarchies within Taiwan’s immigrant integration discourse.
Written by Dolma Tsering. Taiwan’s dilemma related to TDT reflects the structural challenges of its democratic system that continues to maintain many of the ROC’s political and administrative structures. Some scholars I interviewed argued that constitutional reform related to Tibet and Tibetans would significantly impact the current status quo of Taiwan and its relationship with China. Therefore, because of this complex nexus, Taiwan has failed to reform many of the early nationalist models, and the dilemma related to Tibet is one of them.
Written by Dolma Tsering. The government’s official website describes Taiwan as a multicultural society. It further stated that in addition to the dominant Han population, Taiwan is home to aboriginals, Malayo-Polynesian and new immigrants that hailed mainly from China and Southeast Asian countries. The Han population constitutes 95 per cent of the total population, followed by new immigrants that constitute 2.6 per cent and the indigenous population with 2.5 per cent. However, what is missing in this description, in particular and generally in the discourse of immigrants and ethnic diversity in Taiwan, is the Tibetan diaspora.
Written by Sheng-Chang Lin. As well as creating Matsu as a region, the Cold War also tied Matsu to Taiwan. Communication had been minimal between the two before the war—Taiwan was a colony of Japan, whereas Matsu was part of Fujian—but not both regions were part of a new post-war state. Especially due to the prosperity on Taiwan Island, migration from Matsu to Taiwan has become increasingly common. Nowadays, the Bade district of Taoyuan City（桃園市八德區） and Keelung City （基隆市）are known for their large Matsu population.
Written by Brian Hioe. It is not out of the question that such young people will eventually take the reins of power. Indeed, they will once older politicians depart the political scene. But all appearances to the contrary, this may be a premature assessment. It may not be, in fact, that young people have come of age in Taiwanese politics, and instead of that, they remain subject to the larger established forces that have remained dominant for decades in politics. Whether this changes is to be seen.
Taiwanese families look different than they did a couple of decades ago. Partnering behaviours have changed substantially, with young people increasingly choosing to postpone marriage and parenthood. The mean age of first marriage has risen to 32.6 for men and 30.4 for women as of 2019. Gains in opportunities outside of marriage – together with the increasing costs of raising children – mean that the traditional male-breadwinner family has lost its appeal to young women. This is especially the case for well-educated women. Even though the total fertility rate (TFR) has fallen at a rapid pace over the past few decades, childbirth remains strongly associated with marriage.
