Written by Dr Chieh-chi Hsieh. This article argues that the KMT will suffer more substantial political backlash than the TPP both in the short term and long term. The KMT legislators will face the nationwide recall motions, while the TPP will not lose any of their legislators. The KMT is also going to bear the electoral cost of the internalisation of the cross-Strait confrontation.
Written by Dafydd Fell. There have been a number of major changes in Taiwan’s party system since the November 2022 local elections. This article analyses the decline of Taiwan’s movement parties from the perspective of party system factors and suggests strategies these parties can adopt.
Written by Jasper Roctus. The polls have closed, and Lai Ching-te of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has won the Taiwanese presidency, beating Hou Yu-ih of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and Ko Wen-je of the upstart Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). With Lai’s victory, 2024 became the first (post-democratisation) Taiwanese presidential election, where the same party’s nominee was elected three times in succession. Different from its triumphs of 2016 and 2020, the DPP did not emerge from the elections scot-free. Lai ‘only’ obtained forty per cent of the vote compared to Tsai Ing-wen’s two majority landslides, and the DPP lost the legislative majority it had enjoyed since 2016. Although this result aligned with earlier predictions, there is still a lot that merits further discussion.
Written by Jonathan Sullivan. Taiwan has concluded its eighth direct election of the Republic of China (ROC) President. It was not a pivotal, watershed or critical election, and it was not a contest between war and peace or the embodiment of democracy vs authoritarianism; it was an entirely normal election. The main issues (China, the economy), turnout (71%), the communications environment (parochial and partisan), the candidates’ micro-scandals (this time round requiring knowledge of esoteric building code and land-use regulation), the boisterous rallies and hustings etc were all familiar and part of the routine functioning of Taiwanese democracy. The Central Election Commission once again organised a flawless election. The nuts and bolts of voting stations in temples and school gyms, accurate and fast analogue counts, volunteers getting people lined up and in and out smoothly, etc, are the little things that add up to a big sum.
Written by Chia-hung Tsai. Taiwan’s 2024 presidential and legislative elections, held on 13 January, concluded peacefully, revealing key insights into the electorate’s priorities. The results highlight that voters are influenced by both their sense of Taiwanese/Chinese identity, especially in the context of cross-strait relations, and their pragmatic concerns for personal, tangible interests, for instance, low income, high inflation, high unemployment rate and unaffordable housing prices for average middle class in Taiwan. These transcend ideological or identity boundaries. The dual factors set the stage for the critical governance issues and candidate personalities that defined the election.
Written by Brian Hioe. The TPP has proven that it is a force with staying power in Taiwanese politics, then–for at least the next four years. Questions about the long-term viability of the party still remain. This is particularly regarding the party’s relationship with its chair, Taipei mayor Ko Wen-je, and how the TPP will relate to the KMT as the larger party in the pan-Blue camp.
Written by Gerrit van der Wees. After a hard-fought campaign, the DPP candidate “William” Lai Ching-te and his running mate Hsiao Bikhim emerged victorious in Taiwan’s presidential election race with 40.1 % of the vote. They were elected Taiwan’s President and Vice-President respectively. The total turnout was 71.8% of the eligible voters, a bit lower than the 74.9% in the 2020 elections. The main opposition candidate in the three-way race, Messrs. Hou Yu-ih of the Chinese Nationalist Kuomintang Party, and his running mate, pro-China media personality Jaw Shaw-kang, received 33.5% of the vote, while Mr Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) and his running mate Cynthia Wang, came in a respectable third with 26.5% of the vote.
Written by Jasper Roctus. What then transpired in November went completely beyond general expectations. While a desponded Gou could have been expected to go independent or join forces with Ko Wen-je, the former mayor of Taipei (2014–2022) and founder of the third force, “white” (白) Taiwan People’s Party, an outright electoral pact between Hou and Ko seemed out of the question. The idea that Ko, who in the past has been perceived as greener than even the DPP as he, for instance, mingled with student protestors during the 2014 Sunflower Movement and later stumped for deep Green rockstar Freddy Lim, would join forces with the KMT representative of the establishment he claimed to loathe, seemed a contradiction in terms.
Written by Gerrit van der Wees. Mid-November has thus fundamentally changed the picture of the campaign. The addition of Hsiao Bi-khim as VP candidate has reinvigorated Lai Ching-te’s campaign, while on the Blue-White side, the move to attempt a merger of the tickets had backfired and set bad blood. With Hou Yu-ih and Ko Wen-je running separate campaigns, the differences are now becoming increasingly clear.
Written by Jonathan Sullivan. Although the main parties have nominated their Presidential candidates, the composition of the field remains fluid and unsettled. On the DPP side, current VP Lai Ching-te long ago locked down the nomination unopposed, and as a continuity candidate enjoying the benefits of incumbency, his campaigning thus far has been relatively smooth. However, Lai’s responsibility for answering any gripes with government policy over the last eight years and the stubborn ceiling to his poll numbers over the last few months suggest substantial challenges to come. But for now, the main uncertainties and drama are on the opposing side of the fence.
Written by Jasper Roctus. The results of the KMT’s ambiguous drafting (徵召) procedure of its presidential nominee, which commenced after its leadership took control of the process, should be announced by May 20. The KMT’s selection committee nevertheless already appears reluctant to accept Terry Gou’s eccentric rhetoric and, most prominently, fears electoral outfall over his close China ties. Gou himself also frequently alludes to his extensive bonds with the Chinese mainland by boasting about the leverage he holds in solving the hostile status quo across the Taiwan Strait. Considering that the KMT is still reeling from the landslide defeat of Han Kuo-yu in 2020, its last maverick businessman presidential nominee, the selection of the softer-spoken Mayor Hou as its candidate for 2024 appears to be a foregone conclusion. By early April, the KMT had allegedly already reached an internal consensus on its candidate – a clear reference to being ready to select Hou.
Written by Jonathan Leung and Chengyu Yang. For the TPP, there are two issues that have been most widely criticised by the Taiwanese public and politicians. The first is that the TPP’s political stance is too vague and often lacks clear views on cross-strait issues. The second is that the TPP itself relies too heavily on the popularity of former Taipei City Mayor Ko Wen-je, while relatively ignoring the views of other TPP politicians. Some politicians have recently argued that Ko and his TPP are likely to repeat the 2014 PFP and Song’s failure in 2024. Why is the TPP’s cross-strait stance receiving attention in the Taiwanese political arena and is the TPP’s political stance really ambiguous? What are the potential reasons for public and politicians’ perceptions about the ambiguity of the TPP’s position?
Taiwan Insight 