Written by Jasper Roctus.
Image credit: 侯友宜/ Facebook.
In May 2023, I wrote on the arduous quest of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) to “unite the pan-Blue camp and all non-Green forces” (團結泛藍、非綠) during the contentious presidential primaries for the 2024 general elections in Taiwan. As expected, Hou Yu-ih ultimately came out on top, and his opponent, Terry Gou, resisted by opting for an independent run, splitting the Blue vote until he dramatically abandoned his efforts in November. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)’s Lai Ching-te, meanwhile, has faced little opposition in the Green camp to his presidential aspirations.
What then transpired in November went completely beyond general expectations. While a desponded Gou could have been expected to go independent or join forces with Ko Wen-je, the former mayor of Taipei (2014–2022) and founder of the third force, “white” (白) Taiwan People’s Party, an outright electoral pact between Hou and Ko seemed out of the question. The idea that Ko, who in the past has been perceived as greener than even the DPP as he, for instance, mingled with student protestors during the 2014 Sunflower Movement and later stumped for deep Green rockstar Freddy Lim, would join forces with the KMT representative of the establishment he claimed to loathe, seemed a contradiction in terms.
The fact that it was former KMT president Ma Ying-jeou (2008–2016), targeted by the Ko-supported Sunflower protestors in 2014 over pro-Chinese policy initiatives and his untransparent negotiation style, who momentarily brokered a deal between Ko and Hou, seems emblematic of Ko’s Blue turn. While the deal fell apart and culminated in a public spat at the Grand Hyatt Taipei after disagreements over the margin of error of the presidential polls deciding who would be president (正) and who would be vice (副), a brief reflection on Ko’s mystifying Blue turn seems warranted.
Ko Wen-je: Another Surgeon with Blue Bones
Green stalwarts going Blue is not a novel phenomenon in Taiwan. As the Tangwai movement (黨外運動) that preceded the DPP was ideologically diverse, divisions appeared when the shared goal of democratisation had been achieved by the 1990s. Famous examples include Shih Ming-teh and Hsu Hsin-liang, founding members and former chairmen of the DPP, who became darlings of Chinese media when they opposed their successors. More recently, Annette Lu, the former vice-president of Chen Shui-bian (2000–2008), has gone Blue by seeking “cross-Strait integration” (兩岸統合) after a long spell of deep Green politics in the DPP. This November, Huang Kuo-chang, a former leader of the 2014 Sunflower Movement, abandoned the deep Green New Power Party (NPP) in favour of a place on the TPP’s legislative roster.
Some hints that Ko had Blue bones under Green skin (綠皮藍骨) have nonetheless been present from very early on. The “Taiwan People’s Party” (台灣民衆黨) that Ko founded in 2019 is a direct tribute to a party founded in 1927 by Chiang Wei-shui, a Taiwanese anti-Japanese activist who took considerable inspiration from KMT founder Sun Yat-sen’s ideology. Ko has paid tribute to the Taiwanese activist’s revolutionary spirit on multiple occasions. Furthermore, even Ko’s preferred slogan of “the revolution has not yet been completed” (革命尚未成功), which he used to remind the Sunflower students not to abandon their struggle, is a direct quote from Sun Yat-sen’s 1925 will.
For Ko, Chiang, and Sun, all surgeons, collaborating with ideologically conflicting forces in finding a domestic ‘cure’ to societal issues did not prove to be an ideological leap too far. Ko’s own pragmatic path in the face of Taiwan’s increasing ideological void as “maintaining the status quo indefinitely” (永遠維持現狀) has become the leading cross-Strait policy preference among Taiwanese is not unusual in this regard. If cross-Strait relations and Taiwanese identity are not to be dominant themes during this election cycle, Ko’s domestic-focused agenda can strike a chord with the electorate. However, trust in Ko’s ability as a potential negotiator abroad – and especially with Beijing – has likely dwindled after November. As Nathan Bando crudely but aptly put it when analysing the terms of the fleeting KMT-TPP agreement: “Ko got rolled.” Indeed, the spat over the margin of error was likely an excuse to escape a bad deal.
What about Rejected Blue?
After failing to reel in Ko and his TPP, the KMT has opted for another path to supplement the so far rather hapless Hou Yu-ih by selecting deep Blue media personality Jaw Shaw-kong – after a last-ditch effort to contact Ko – as Hou’s vice-president. Unlike Hou, Jaw is mediagenic and very combative, as his debate performance during his run for Taipei mayor in 1994 attested to. Jaw was ultimately deemed too radical by the Taipei electorate, however, and was defeated by future president Chen Shui-bian. While Jaw, who unlike Hou hails from a Mainlander background, will undoubtedly secure the deep Blue “Iron Vote” (鐵票) in the north – an area Jaw immediately claimed after his selection – and supplements Hou well in some ways, he will likely push moderate voters further in Lai and Ko’s hands.
The KMT’s prospects in Taiwan’s legislative Yuan seem much brighter – even if it fails to reach an outright majority. Despite the collapse of the electoral pact with Ko, one can expect de facto cooperation between the TPP and the KMT in case a non-Green majority takes shape. However, as the populist firebrand Han Kuo-yu, the KMT’s presidential candidate in 2020, heads the KMT’s party list, one might wonder if such cooperation would be smooth. While Han still maintains a solid ‘fan base’ (韓粉), he is unlikely to be someone who might bridge the gap between the TPP and the KMT. In case a (narrow) Blue-White majority would present itself in 2024, considerable legislative volatility is probable.
Green Presidential Hopes under Legislative Woes
The DPP has remained surprisingly steady during the abovementioned chaos. Its presidential ticket has been hovering around the 30-40 per cent mark in the polls – high enough to triumph a split field. The DPP’s membership seems satisfied by the selection of Lai Ching-te, as the lack of intraparty drama attests to. Despite Lai’s contentious challenge to President Tsai Ing-wen in 2019, bygones seem to be bygones as Tsai actively supports Lai as her successor. Said bygones also seem to extend to Hsiao Bi-khim, the DPP’s vice-presidential selection. Hsiao rose to fame during her tenure as Taiwanese Representative to the US (2020–2023) but was once disparagingly called “China’s Khim” (中國琴) by deep Green members of the DPP. Lai and Hsiao both recently have sought to (re)establish themselves as cross-Strait moderates.
Despite its local defeat in 2022, the DPP still holds the strongest presidential cards in 2024 as it will keep benefiting from the appreciation of the electorate for maintaining Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty – the status quo. However, their hand will be tougher than in 2016 and 2020, as a repeat of ‘helpful’ events like Ma Ying-jeou’s deeply unpopular meeting with Xi Jinping in 2015 and the Hong Kong protests of 2019 seem unlikely to occur this cycle. Equally, retention of a Green legislative majority seems improbable due to general fatigue with the incumbent party, the TPP’s rise, and the demise of the deep Green NPP, which is not likely to break the five per cent threshold after years of infighting.
The China Factor
Had White joined Blue, Green would be fighting an uphill presidential battle. As this has not happened, the DPP’s presidential ticket is still the clear favourite for 2024. The China factor remains something to watch, however. As Lai has a long history of pro-independence politics and Hsiao is even part of China’s lifelong-sanctioned ten “Die-hard Taiwanese independence elements” (台獨頑固分子), their recent moves toward moderation are unlikely to satisfy Beijing, which already deemed the ticket “adding independence on top of independence” (獨上加獨) while notably citing Ko’s criticism of the DPP. Beijing cannot do much beyond stating its disapproval, however, as any move toward direct interference has proven to be counterproductive to its aims (remember “1996”).
We are most likely to see a return to the situation during the first six or so years of Chen Shui-bian’s presidency (i.e., before Chen went deep Green during his final years), with a Green presidency striving for cross-Strait moderation vis-à-vis a disapproving Beijing and under a chaotic non-Green majority in the Legislative Yuan. As the international situation has changed considerably since then, with a more powerful and assertive Beijing but also a much warmer received Taipei in the West, the stakes are higher now. However, as Beijing is desperately searching for thaws with the West and the price of conflict is simply too high, escalation remains unlikely for now. Four more years of Taiwan stretching the boundaries of its de facto international space while staying clear of de jure pronouncements on independence seem likely.
Jasper Roctus is a PhD researcher affiliated with Ghent University, where he is presently working on evolutions in modern narratives surrounding Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925). His “PhD Fellowship fundamental research” is funded by the Research Foundation – Flanders (FWO). He is also an Associate Fellow at the Egmont Institute, where he works on domestic Chinese politics and cross-Strait relations.
This article was published as part of a special issue on Presidential Candidates.
Taiwan Insight 