Written by Daniel Jia. This is the second part of a two-part Taiwan-China comparison and perspectives analysis. In Part One, differences between the two societies’ governance principles are discussed. In this part, fundamental differences between Taiwan and China are examined.
Written by Daniel Jia. The question, then, is why the CCP’s “reunification” agenda faces increasing resistance from Taiwan? The answers are in Xi’s Report and will be even more obvious compared to another speech given by Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen a week earlier at a National Day ceremony on October 10. The following are six takeaways from Xi’s Report that merit a close examination.
Written by Chieh-chi Hsieh. Yes, I get it. Not many can resist a bold and eye-catching title. However, if you supplement this with an articulated argument underpinned with a fair amount of empirical evidence, one can expect the article to reach a broader readership. Yet, the underlying issue of placing a bold statement at the forefront is that it is frequently misleading. This is precisely why I am sceptical about the recent article published by The Economist, which states Taiwan as ‘the most dangerous place on Earth.’
Written by Arthur Ding. In April, the London based Economist carried several in-depth analyses on Taiwan and US-China relations in the context of China’s increasing assertive policy toward Taiwan. Among them, the one titled “Taiwan: the most dangerous place on Earth” elicited heated debates in Taiwan. Assuming that these analyses are correct, what do these analyses entail?
Written by Simona A. Grano & Helena Y.W. Wu. On January 2, 2019, Xi Jinping held a speech to commemorate the famous “Letter to Compatriots in Taiwan” of 1979. In this letter, he defined unification across the Taiwan Strait as “the great trend of history.” He also warned that attempts to facilitate Taiwan’s independence would be met by force. Not only this, but he also called for “unification under the ‘one country, two systems’ formula.”
Written by Nicholas Welch. Approaching the January 2020 Taiwan elections, many Taiwanese and international spectators broadly feared PRC-based disinformation operations weakening Taiwan’s democratic institutions. In particular, many feared Russian-style “covert social influence via the use of bots and fake persona accounts,” which would sway public opinion en masse. Nevertheless, when the dust settled, it remained unclear whether the PRC propagated that form of disinformation at all. Before the election, and although no substantial evidence for such claims exists, the international community pre-emptively accused the PRC of spreading disinformation.
