Changes and Continuity in Support for Self-Defence Among Taiwanese Following the Russia-Ukraine War

Written by Kuan-chen Lee.

Image credit: 05.26 總統視導「憲兵指揮部」 by 總統府/ Flickr, license: CC BY 2.0.

Following Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine, many observers have pointed out that Kyiv’s ability to mobilise the entire population to resist the invasion is one of the main reasons why it has been able to prolong the war. Moreover, they suggest that Taiwan learn from Ukraine’s model of all-out resistance against a more powerful enemy. However, do the Taiwanese have the same determination to resist aggression as the Ukrainians have shown? Furthermore, how has the Russia-Ukraine War affected the willingness of the Taiwanese people to fight against aggression? To answer the above questions, this article analyses survey data from the Institute for National Defence and Security Research (INDSR) at two different time points before and after the Russian invasion to examine changes and continuity in support for self-defence among Taiwanese following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War. The article also analyses key factors affecting the citizens’ willingness to fight for Taiwan and discusses the possible implications of the findings.

1. The Taiwanese people’s determination to defend themselves has not wavered

Media reports on the Russia-Ukraine War have induced feelings of aversion toward war. Yet, at the same time, these reports revealed the brave and tenacious resistance of Ukraine against a much larger enemy. In the context of these reports, we are interested in whether support for self-defence among the Taiwanese people has been affected by the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War. According to the survey results, the determination of Taiwanese people to defend themselves has not wavered. Figure 1 shows that in September 2021, 75% of respondents stated that they would be willing to fight for Taiwan in the event of an invasion by China. In March this year (2022), 73% of respondents stated that they would be willing to fight for Taiwan, demonstrating that the Russia-Ukraine War has not shaken the determination of Taiwanese people to defend themselves.

2. Taiwanese people’s confidence in the ability of the nation’s military to defend Taiwan remains unchanged

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine triggered a discussion on Taiwan’s military readiness. In particular, the actual occurrence and vividness of the war in Ukraine have revived discussions about how to avoid war in the Taiwan Strait. It has been argued that Taiwan’s military capability is insufficient to fight against China, and political leaders should instead seek peace and avoid war at all costs. However, according to survey data, even after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War, the majority of the Taiwanese public still has confidence in the ability of its military to defend Taiwan. Figure 2 below shows that in September 2021, 58% of respondents expressed confidence in the ability of the nation’s military to defend Taiwan. After the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War, we asked respondents the same question. We found that more than half (54%) of the public still had confidence in the ability of the nation’s military to defend Taiwan. Although the percentage of those who expressed confidence fell slightly, the change fell within the sampling error. This finding shows that the Russia-Ukraine War has had a limited impact on public perceptions of the defence capabilities of the nation’s military.

3. Taiwanese people have become more conservative about whether the U.S. will send troops to help Taiwan

The Russia-Ukraine War greatly impacted whether the Taiwanese believed that the U.S. would send troops to assist Taiwan during a Chinese invasion. The September 2021 poll asked respondents, “If there was a war between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, do you think the United States would send troops to help Taiwan?” A total of 57% of respondents answered “definitely” or “probably.” However, the poll results in March this year (2022) showed that the percentage of those who thought the U.S. would send troops to assist Taiwan dropped to 40% (Figure 3). This indicates that after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War, the Taiwanese public has become more conservative about the prospect of its main ally intervening in a cross-Strait military conflict.

4. Taiwanese people’s future support for self-defence will increasingly depend on their confidence in Taiwan’s military

Previous studies have shown that the willingness of Taiwanese people to fight in a war is influenced by whether the U.S. decides to send troops to help defend Taiwan and their confidence in the defence capability of Taiwan’s military. In other words, the “support for self-defence,” “belief that the U.S. will send troops to help defend Taiwan,” and “confidence in the defence capabilities of Taiwan’s military” are linked. Below, we analyse the changes in the relationships between these three variables to understand how attitudes towards Taiwan’s defence have evolved among its citizens.

Table 1 below examines the relationship between confidence in the ability of the nation’s military to defend Taiwan and respondents’ willingness to fight in a war after controlling for whether respondents believe that the U.S. would send troops to assist Taiwan. Last year’s (2021) poll showed that when controlling for the belief that the U.S. would send troops to assist Taiwan, 92% of respondents who expressed confidence in Taiwan’s military defence capability would be willing to fight to defend Taiwan. However, among respondents who were not confident in Taiwan’s military defence capability, the proportion of respondents ready to fight to defend Taiwan declined to 79%. Still, the gap between the two groups was not large. This finding indicates that support for self-defence in Taiwan depended on the perceived willingness of the U.S. to send troops to defend the island. When respondents believed that the U.S. would not send forces to defend Taiwan, confidence in Taiwan’s military defence capability had a more pronounced effect on willingness to fight for Taiwan (85.8% vs 61.3%).

Table 1. Three-way table of public self-defence awareness in 2021

			September 2021
	The U.S. will send troops to help Taiwan			The U.S. will not send troops to help Taiwan
	Willing to fight	Unwilling to fight	Sample size	Willing to fight	Unwilling to fight	Sample size
Confidence in Taiwan’s military	92.2%	7.7%	440	85.8%	14.5%	109
No confidence Taiwan’s military	79.1%	20.9%	146	61.3%	38.7%	212

However, this year’s (2022) survey found that the effect of U.S. military assistance on support for self-defence has declined and has been replaced by confidence in the ability of the nation’s military to defend the island (Table 2). After controlling for the belief that the U.S. would send troops to assist Taiwan, 95% of respondents who expressed confidence in Taiwan’s military defence capability would be willing to fight to defend the island. In comparison, only 65% of respondents who did not express confidence in Taiwan’s military were ready to fight, a gap of 30%. After controlling for the belief that the U.S. would not send troops to assist Taiwan, nearly 90% (89.8%) of the respondents who expressed confidence in Taiwan’s military defence capability were still willing to fight to defend the island. Moreover, among those who did not express confidence in Taiwan’s military, the proportion willing to fight to protect the island fell to 60%. The above results indicate that, regardless of whether respondents believe that the U.S. would send troops to assist Taiwan, support for self-defence is related to confidence in the defence capabilities of Taiwan’s military. Accordingly, we believe that the future public confidence in the ability of Taiwan’s military to defend the island will surpass the prospect of U.S. military intervention on Taiwan’s behalf as the key factor in determining the willingness of the Taiwanese people to fight against Chinese aggression.

Table 2. Three-way table of public self-defence awareness in 2022

			March 2022
	The U.S. will send troops to help Taiwan			The U.S. will not send troops to help Taiwan
	Willing to fight	Unwilling to fight	Sample size	Willing to fight	Unwilling to fight	Sample size
Confidence in Taiwan’s military	95.6%	4.4%	299	89.8%	10.2%	189
No confidence Taiwan’s military	64.7%	35.3%	101	60.4%	39.6%	295

5. Citizens’ determination to defend themselves as a basis for defence reform and all-out defence

The first round of Taiwan’s new “refresher training” for reservists has recently ended. Although the new refresher training regime has been described as “the toughest refresher training in history,” most citizens still expressed a positive attitude to the training. In addition, recently, there have been increasing calls to extend compulsory military service beyond the current four months. Although extending the military service period will not necessarily increase Taiwan’s military capabilities, these calls are a concrete manifestation of the determination of Taiwanese citizens to defend themselves. Furthermore, in response to the Russia-Ukraine War, this year’s disaster prevention drills include a “war scenario” for the first time, simulating possible disaster situations during a war, such as unidentified missile strikes causing buildings to catch fire or collapse. Furthermore, the Ministry of National Defence has also issued the first version of a wartime survival handbook which will be revised and updated in the future. The handbook provides emergency response information and basic survival knowledge in the event of a disaster or war. Finally, this article argues that the public’s determination to defend Taiwan from invasion can serve as a basis for delivering defence reform and promoting all-out defence mobilisation.

Kuan-chen Lee is an assistant research fellow in the Division of Chinese Politics, Military and Warfighting Concepts at INDSR. His research interests include public opinion, political psychology, data analytics and cross-Strait relations. He has been a recipient of fellowships from Academia Sinica, National Taiwan University and the Ministry of Science and Technology, ROC. Dr Lee holds a PhD in political science from National Chengchi University in Taiwan.

This article was published as part of a special issue on “Military Conscription”.