Written by Tommy Hall and Margaret Siu.
Image credit: 柯文哲/ Facebook.
The digital era has revolutionised political communication, with profound effects in Asian democracies, notably Japan and Taiwan. This exploration delves into the intricacies of how political entities in these countries harness digital platforms. It aims to unpack the varied strategies they employ, the challenges they confront, and the opportunities they seize within the digital realm. Our analysis will not only highlight the distinct tactics and responses shaped by each country’s unique cultural, legal, and historical contexts but also examine the broader implications these digital transformations hold for political engagement and democratic discourse in the region.
Japan and Taiwan showcase two different approaches to the adoption and integration of digital strategies within political communication. While Japan’s journey reflects a cautious balancing act between tradition and modernity, Taiwan’s approach is characterised by a bold embrace of digital possibilities, illustrating a broader paradigm shift in its political communication culture. Thus, Japan and Taiwan’s political landscapes highlight the challenges and opportunities of integrating the Internet into democratic processes. While Japan approaches digital campaigning cautiously, Taiwan rapidly adopts online platforms. Both countries grapple with balancing new technologies and traditional methods, confronting issues like disinformation and polarisation. These dynamics, evident in incidents like Japan’s ministerial resignation and Facebook’s actions against disinformation in Taiwan, underscore the need for careful navigation of technology in politics to preserve and enhance democratic values.
Before diving into the intricacies that make Japan and Taiwan unique case studies, it is important to acknowledge areas where both countries overlap. Japan and Taiwan face similar challenges in their digital political landscapes, such as disinformation, political polarisation, and foreign interference. Taiwan’s political news has been flooded with disinformation promoting “U.S. scepticism” narratives. This summer, Facebook’s parent company removed over 7,000 entities (groups, accounts, and pages) linked to spreading Chinese disinformation, some of which were aimed at influencing the upcoming election in Taiwan. Japan, on the other hand, deals with the influence of right-wing internet groups and external entities attempting to sway public opinion. Recently, Japan has also experienced the brunt of such attacks in recent months, related to its decision to discharge nuclear wastewater from the Fukushima plant. In both cases, China has been accused of being entangled with deliberate efforts to misinform netizens. In response, both countries have implemented strategies, including legislative reforms, public awareness initiatives, and collaborations with tech companies to combat misinformation. These actions highlight the importance of a comprehensive approach to managing digital political communication.
Japan’s Online Politics: Rising Opportunities, Despite Strict Regulations
Japan’s foray into integrating digital media with politics presents a blend of caution and progression, steeped in its post-war political history and the long-standing dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Traditionally characterised by a preference for consensus and gradual change, Japan’s political culture and legal frameworks, particularly the Public Office Election Law (POEL), have historically imposed strict regulations on digital campaigning. These restrictions were eased in 2013 when lawmakers voted to lift a prohibition on candidates using the Internet for campaigns. Discussions surrounding recent events, including the resignation of Japan’s state minister of justice over discussions of paid YouTube advertising for political campaigns, signal a changing attitude. This development highlights an increasing awareness and tension within Japan’s political circles regarding the need to adapt to the dynamic and expanding realm of digital campaigning. This shift points to a growing recognition of the indispensability and potential of digital platforms in the evolving landscape of political communication and strategy.
This gradual shift is further evidenced by local-level political figures, such as “Shin the Hiratsuka YouTuber.” He is pioneering new avenues of digital political communication. Shin is a local business owner himself, running a Pokémon card shop alongside his YouTube gig. His youth, online presence, and interconnectedness with the local community make him an ideal representation of how new modes of political participation and communication are transforming Japan’s traditional politics. Such initiatives represent a burgeoning trend towards the reconfiguration of Japan’s political communication strategies, where innovative digital approaches are increasingly complementing traditional methods.
At the same time, Shin’s heightened level of community engagement highlights that in Japan, many continuities in traditional modes of political communication culture will not be supplanted by the Internet’s emergence: the use of sound trucks in political movements and close links between politicians and journalists through press clubs. Press clubs are located in many government and corporate offices, providing free office space to journalists who wish to access streamlined information. Given the traditional role of the fourth estate to be critical of government policies, critics have often labelled such arrangements as “information cartels.” On the other hand, “non-voluntary associations” of rural farmers still form the core of LDP support through pork-barrel politics that benefit rural Japan. For these ageing farmers, a politician’s social media presence is often irrelevant to their voting behaviour.
Taiwan’s Online Politics: Rapid Adoption and Youth Co-Optation
In stark contrast to Japan’s caution, Taiwan demonstrates a dynamic and proactive approach to digital platforms in its political landscape. This energetic adoption is closely tied to the country’s relatively recent journey to democratisation, which coincides with the digital era’s rise. From the 2014 Taipei mayoral election campaign, Ko Wen-Je’s (the current TPP presidential candidate) online image has transformed from the Sunflower Movement championing “Professor Ko” (柯P) to a more pragmatic, familial figure. As Vincent Cheng of CommonWealth magazine points out, Ko has since taken advantage of his trailblazing online successes to cultivate the largest following amongst all of the island’s politicians on platforms favoured by the youth. On Instagram, he has leapt past the million mark, whereas current President Tsai Ing-Wen still falls just shy of seven digits. Nowadays, Ko is far from the only Taiwanese politician with a strong online presence, and one should not mistake his online persona for indicating that the TPP has a monopoly on digital youth culture. Brian Hioe, in his comprehensive and insightful article on the appropriation of youth aesthetics in contemporary Taiwanese political campaigns, highlighted how Taoyuan’s Legislator Cheng Yun-Peng has capitalised on intertwining his digital image with Japanese popular culture. Cheng’s meticulously tailored social media platform is far from performative. If one were given the opportunity to step into his office, Gundam figures would dominate their field of view.
The rise in the importance of an online presence is also mirrored in Taiwan’s broader media landscape. For example, print media has experienced a precipitous decline in Taiwan, with only 16% of its citizens currently using it to consume news, according to a Reuters Institute report. In contrast, at least 84% of Taiwanese citizens accessed online news as far back as 2017. Such changes extend beyond how politicians communicate; they fundamentally alter the way the public interacts with political content. This represents a significant cultural shift, indicating a society that is not only comfortable with rapid technological changes but also eager to embrace more direct and instantaneous methods of political engagement.
This embrace of online political communication does not mean that traditional modes have been supplanted in Taiwan. Like in Japan, the Internet’s emergence has not completely supplanted traditional modes of political communication. Vote buying and pork barrel politics are still embedded in many Taiwanese localities. As much as building an online presence may seem like an attractive avenue towards electoral victory in contemporary Taiwan, local connections have not lost their importance. There is a metaphor often used in Taiwan that separates a candidate’s ability to build online support and cultivate in-person connections. Camps that can build campaign momentum online through good branding are said to have launched a strong air battle (空戰), whereas camps better at building grassroots campaign support in person are said to have launched a strong ground battle (陸戰). The future of political communication in Taiwan will likely mean that candidates have to optimise the right balance between traditional and emerging trends, balancing their efforts to gain online and offline support.
In conclusion, Taiwan and Japan’s experiences in the digital age represent a microcosm of the broader trends rocking democracies in East Asia and across the globe. Japan is seeing a rise of young candidates at the local level, eager to utilise online spaces to their full potential. Their methods are disruptive to historically strict regulations and symbolise the way in which the public square’s gradual fusion with digital spaces often outpaces policy. Taiwan’s democratic political culture was quick to adapt to online spaces yet has shown no indication that its democratic process will completely migrate online. This series offers a critical lens on how these nations are adapting to the ethical and practical dilemmas posed by advancements in digital technologies. Their responses are not just regional narratives but also key lessons for interplays between democracy and technology across the globe.
Tommy Hall graduated from West Point with a B.Sc. in Foreign Languages: Chinese. He is a Marshall Scholar, currently reading for an M.St. in Diplomatic Studies at the University of Oxford. At Oxford, Tommy serves as the Book Review Editor and Opinion Editor for STAIR (St. Antony’s International Review). In 2023, he completed an M.A. in Chinese Studies at SOAS, University of London. Additionally, Tommy is the founder of the Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies’ Human Rights Initiative (HRI). His peer-reviewed work has previously been published in the Army Cyber Institute’s Cyber Defense Review.
Margaret Siu is a JD candidate at Harvard Law School with a focus on U.S.-East Asian economic statecraft and critical supply chains. She holds a Marshall Scholarship, having earned her M.Sc. at the University of Oxford and the London School of Economics and Political Science. Siu is actively involved in leadership positions with the Harvard International Law Journal and the advisory board of the Oxford Silk Road Society. She is also the founder of Apricity Magazine, an international arts journal. Her notable contributions include work for the UK National Committee on China, Oxford Political Review, and the China Project (SupChina). Siu has prior experience with the Human Rights Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and in the Trade and Investment team at Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company’s Corporate and Compliance Legal Division.
This article was published as part of a special issue on Digital Governance in Taiwan and Japan.
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