Written by Gray Sergeant.
Image credit: Keir Starmer visit to Normandy, France – 06 June 2024 by Keir Starmer/ Flickr, license: CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.
In the spring of 1964, shortly before becoming a minister in the first Wilson government, Antony (later ‘Tony’) Benn went for dinner with the Chinese chargé d’affaires, Shen Ping. Beijing’s representative wanted to know whether the Labour Party believed in the ‘two Chinas’ policy, to which he was informed it ‘did not.’ Yet following a discussion about the future of Kashmir, during which the chargé d’affaires stated that the matter should be resolved by plebiscite, Benn put it to him that ‘there were people who thought that the future of Taiwan should also be decided by a plebiscite’. Ping stated that Taiwan ‘was an internal affair,’ to which Benn replied that the Indians said the same about Kashmir. The future Labour minister went on to explain that he only drew the parallel ‘in order to show that those who rejected the ‘two Chinas’ might still feel that the future of Taiwan permitted alternative solutions.
Before taking office, it seems unlikely that any member of Keir Starmer’s Cabinet has thought this radically about the future of cross-strait relations. Alternative thinking appears absent. Yet, while Labourites languished in opposition, Taiwan did not go unnoticed. Last year, the newly appointed Foreign Secretary, David Lammy, attended the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, where he heard Li Shangfu threaten anyone who ‘dares to separate Taiwan from China.’ ‘We will fear no opponents,’ the then defence minister went on to say, ‘and [will] resolutely safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity regardless of any cost.’ Lammy left concerned about the ‘dangerous times’ we live in. Now in office, how will he and his Labour colleagues respond?
Firstly, we can expect continuity when it comes to His Majesty’s (HM) Government’s core cross-strait positions. For starters, the UK will continue to recognise the People’s Republic of China and thus have no formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Yet it will, as per the 1972 UK-PRC communique, only acknowledge Beijing’s claim to Taiwan and will additionally maintain that cross-strait differences be resolved peacefully, without the use of force or coercion. Moreover, the UK will continue to develop bilateral ties (economic, cultural, or educational) through the British Office in Taipei and continue to support Taiwanese participation in certain international organisations. Lastly, the HM Government will continue to hold that it has the right to navigate freely through the Taiwan Strait (an important point given recent PRC claims to, and attempts to demonstrate, jurisdiction over these waters).
Within this framework, there is wide scope for the new Labour government to expand UK-Taiwan ties and support peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait by bolstering the US-led deterrence. Britain was already heading in this direction under the previous Conservative governments. Over the past few years, we have seen reports of London working with Washington on cross-strait contingencies, statements supportive of Taiwan from successive prime ministers, and a commitment to ‘supporting stability’ across the Taiwan Strait in HM Government’s Integrated Review Refresh. Most recently, Taiwan and the UK signed an Enhanced Trade Partnership arrangement.
Whether Labour is willing to and capable of building on these advances will become clearer after the current audit of relations with the PRC and the Strategic Defence Review.
On China, Lammy has promised to compete, challenge, and cooperate (three Cs which are remarkably similar to the previous governments: protect, align, engage – not that the Foreign Secretary would admit it). The first of these two would likely be welcomed in Taipei. Equally conducive to Taiwan’s security would be Lammy’s much-vaunted concept of ‘progressive realism,’ which promises to use British power to defend democracies. Yet weeks after articulating this doctrine, Lammy also spoke of the Foreign Office’s role being ‘above all else, delivering growth and jobs’. His final remarks on the PRC before the election emphasised engagement with Beijing and keenness for more ministerial visits there. While Labour will no doubt pursue a three Cs approach towards the PRC, will the last of these Cs cooperate take precedence? And will this be at the expense of Taiwan?
Uncertainty also hangs over the UK’s commitment to Indo-Pacific security. The ‘tilt’ to the region, outlined in the 2021 Integrated Review, was originally met with derision from the Labour benches. John Healey, now the Defence Secretary, labelled the move one of the review’s ‘fundamental flaws’. Yet the shadow defence team subsequently supported all the military measures taken as Britain tilted, including a Reciprocal Access Agreement and a Global Combat Air Programme Treaty with Japan, as well as the AUKUS deal with the United States and Australia. At last year’s party conference, Healey spoke enthusiastically about the latter, particularly the Pillar II element of the partnership (which covers developing and sharing advanced capabilities, such as cyber and AI). This enthusiasm has not died now in office. In fact, the new government has restated the UK’s support for AUKUS. However, the rhetoric from the new foreign and defence secretaries during their first few days in office only confirms that Labour’s heart lies in enhancing European security. The decision to appoint Catherine West, previously the party’s shadow minister for Asia and the Pacific, as a Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Office rather than a Minister of State is also a potential precursor for a Labour government less interested in the region.
That being said, a Royal Navy Carrier Strike Group is due to visit the Indo-Pacific again next year. This will, regardless of all else, reinforce the point that the UK, indeed Europeans as a whole, have an interest in the region’s future. It also affords an opportunity for a breakaway warship to transit the Taiwan Strait, as HMS Richmond did in September 2021.
In the coming months, following both the China audit and defence review, the UK’s approach to Taiwan under Labour should be clearer. However, the new government will also be subject to events and the actions of others, which may encourage Britain to be bolder. It was, for example, reported that US officials were in Taiwan last month discussing with foreign representatives there, including the UK’s, Beijing’s distortion of Resolution 2758 and how to boost Taiwan’s international participation. And, of course, Beijing’s grey-zone manoeuvres, which are gradually slicing away at the cross-strait status quo, could, in the coming years, escalate to a point which requires a unified rebuttal from the democratic world. Although nothing is preordained, such moves could spark a crisis, which may encourage an even stronger response from the US and its partners, perhaps even some alternative thinking. As Lammy has said, we live in dangerous times…
Gray Sergeant is a Research Fellow in Indo-Pacific Geopolitics at the Council on Geostrategy, where he focuses on the UK’s China policy, Taiwan, and cross-strait relations. He is also a PhD candidate in the Department of International History at the London School of Economics. His academic work explores British and American China policies during the early Cold War.
This article was published as part of a special issue on ‘Taiwan-UK relations: continuity or change?.’
Taiwan Insight 