Written by Ping-Yang Chao.
Image credit: 12.01 總統主持「空軍飛行訓練指揮部編成典禮」 by 總統府/ Flickr, license: CC BY 2.0.
The Grey Zone Conflict incursion by China has emerged as one of the most severe threats to Taiwan in recent years. Since Tsai Ing-Wen, the former President of Taiwan assumed office, the frequency of Grey Zone activities has progressively increased due to the Tsai administration’s refusal to accept the “1992 Consensus,” which serves as the legitimate basis for the Chinese government’s claim that Taiwan is part of China. Observations throughout this period indicate that China’s Grey Zone conflict strategy has not only increased in frequency but also intensity, particularly during Tsai Ing-Wen’s second term. This trend has continued to escalate since President Lai Ching-Te succeeded Tsai Ing-Wen in May. The aggressiveness of Grey Zone Conflict activities has approached the brink of war, complicating cross-strait relations. Any miscalculations or misunderstandings could heighten the risk of military conflict between Taiwan and China. Consequently, the Lai administration will face a more intense and challenging situation regarding Taiwan’s national security in response to the Grey Zone Conflict threat.
The concept of Grey Zone Conflict represents a novel strategic approach wherein a state employs non-military coercive measures, remaining below the threshold of war, to achieve political objectives. This strategy utilises tactics that navigate the space between peace and war through a combination of military and non-military means, thereby altering the status quo without provoking decisive military responses from adversaries. According to the RAND Corporation, the key characteristics of Grey Zone Conflict include the implementation of tactics that do not violate international norms, avoid threatening the defender’s core interests, and employ unconventional means such as cyberattacks and territorial incursions. Crucially, Grey Zone Conflict is based on the concept of “salami-slicing tactics,” where coercive operations are scalable and can incrementally escalate over time. Specifically, the strategy aims to accumulate a series of small changes to ultimately achieve significant alterations to the status quo. Unlike traditional warfare strategies, Grey Zone Conflict is diverse and multifaceted, encompassing actions from the dissemination of fake news to military coercion. Consequently, this strategy complicates attribution and challenges conventional responses and solutions. In summary, Grey Zone Conflict is an innovative approach that eschews direct military confrontation, instead using a combination of non-military and paramilitary tactics to alter the status quo and achieve political objectives.
In the case of Taiwan, China’s Grey Zone Conflict strategy is notably intricate, encompassing a variety of operations. The most significant of these operations involve air and sea incursions aimed at altering the status quo between Taiwan and China. Since 2016, the frequency of Grey Zone activities has increased markedly. Data collected from Taiwan’s Ministry of Defence indicates that the number of air sorties by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) surged from 30 in 2016 to 1,703 in 2023 during the second term of President Tsai Ing-Wen. Notably, there was a dramatic 79 per cent increase in sorties from 2021 to 2022. Similarly, PLA naval ships have intensified their operations in the waters surrounding Taiwan.
Moreover, China’s Grey Zone Conflict strategy has grown increasingly intensive, characterised by various aggressive operations. Since 2016, the PLA Air Force has consistently intruded into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), establishing this as a primary Grey Zone tactic. Starting in 2019, Chinese aircraft began crossing the median line, the unofficial border between Taiwan and China, further escalating tensions. In 2020, the PRC government officially denied the existence of the median line in the Taiwan Strait, leading to even more frequent crossings by PLA aircraft.
Following Nancy Pelosi’s visit to the former US House Speaker, the intensity of these incursions further increased significantly, with an average of 79 aircraft crossing the median line each month from 2022 to 2024, as reported by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). During this period, Chinese aircraft also penetrated deeper into the airspace-restricted area controlled by the ROC government. The rise in both the number and intensity of these Grey Zone activities heightens the risk of miscalculations and potential military confrontations in the region.
The actions of the PLA are highly provocative, edging closer to the threshold of war. The restricted airspace within the ADIZ of Taiwan is considered a military-controlled territory by the ROC Air Force, and the PLA’s intrusions into this area are viewed as direct threats. The Chinese government’s attempts to normalise control over this airspace are likely to provoke decisive military responses from Taiwan. As China escalates from military incursions to invasive operations, these Grey Zone activities risk igniting a full-scale conflict between Taiwan and China.
The escalation of Grey Zone activities suggests that China is attempting to establish a “new normal” in the Taiwan Strait by employing these tactics. The PLA aims to normalise its presence in the region, thereby gradually shifting the status quo to exert greater control over territories around Taiwan. These operations have imposed significant pressure on Taiwan’s military and coast guard, forcing them to respond to the high frequency of incursions. The Chinese government appears to be using these activities to intimidate Taiwan without triggering outright war.
This strategy has also created substantial pressure on the Taiwanese government, akin to the situation faced by Ukraine before Russian forces formally invaded Ukraine. In fact, the Russian army was deploying military troops for small-scale military exercises frequently around the border. Likewise, the Chinese Navy and Air Force have also conducted similar approaches, deploying a series of military exercises and training around Taiwan. These Grey Zone activities are not crossing the threshold of war. However, it has burdened the defence capabilities of these states. The main difference is that in the case of Taiwan, the Chinese government did not provoke decisive international intervention as it did not transform into a military invasion. However, unlike Russia’s actions in Ukraine, China’s Grey Zone operations have not overtly violated international laws and norms. Thus, this strategy allows China to manoeuvre towards its goals without undermining its core national interests.
Consequently, it is unlikely that the implementation of Grey Zone Conflict activities will decrease. Instead, this approach will likely remain the primary method for the Chinese government to pursue its political objectives concerning Taiwan, which forces the Taiwanese government and people to accept the principle of “1992 consensus.” China claimed that peaceful unification was the main principle for progress regarding the issue of Taiwan; however, the trend has shown that China seeks to force Taiwan to accept unfavourable deals such as the “one country, two systems” underscored by the “1992 consensus” by China through coercive Grey Zone military actions.
In conclusion, China’s Grey Zone Conflict strategy has intensified and become more frequent. These activities are often integrated with military operations, such as drills, which are highly provocative and could precipitate military conflict. Throughout Tsai Ing-Wen’s presidency, the trend of these activities has become increasingly intimidating, posing an existential threat to Taiwan’s national security, and this challenge will persist under the Lai administration.
While China’s Grey Zone strategy has escalated in various aspects, its effectiveness remains limited. Despite the high intensity of Grey Zone activities, the Chinese government has not achieved its political objectives. In fact, such coercion has bolstered support for Taiwan from Western allies and the international community. Notably, the US government has provided substantial military assistance through the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) to enhance Taiwan’s defensive capabilities against Chinese threats. Western countries have also shown their support for Taiwan.
Conversely, China’s Grey Zone tactics have made the “1992 Consensus” and the idea of unification less appealing to the Taiwanese people. This mainstream resistance is likely to prompt the Chinese government to further intensify and increase the frequency of Grey Zone conflict tactics to suppress Taiwan and deter other countries from establishing political connections with the Taiwanese government.
In this sense, the Grey Zone conflict activities will not be eliminated but potentially become more intense and frequent, which means that Taiwan and China will be closer to the brink of war. Indeed, the principle of the Grey Zone Conflict Strategy is to achieve political objectives below the threshold of war. However, the PRC government has been extending its Grey Zone operations to the extent of paramilitary actions. The most significant example is launching missiles around Taiwan after the visit of Nancy Pelosi. Any potential miscalculations will provoke a military confrontation between Taiwan and China. Thus, the cross-strait relations will be hard to manage, not only during the period of Tsai Ing-Wen but also during the presidency of Lai Ching-Te. In short, Chinese aggression will remain a severe challenge for Taiwan. The ROC government will be required to formulate comprehensive defensive policies and be prepared to respond decisively to China’s threat of the Grey Zone Conflict to protect the national security and the sovereignty of Taiwan.
Ping-Yang Chao is currently a master’s student of the Msc International Politics at SOAS University of London. His main research fields are Cross-Strait Relations and East Asian Politics.
This article was published as part of a special issue on ‘SOAS Taiwan Studies Summer School’.
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