Written by Huynh Tam Sang and Truong Tuan Kiet.
Image credit: 鄭麗文/ Facebook.
On March 3rd, Cheng Li-wun, Chairperson of the Kuomintang (KMT), penned an article titled “Taiwan Doesn’t Have to Choose” for Foreign Affairs. While many of her claims seem logical, they remain implausible or misaligned with the current geopolitical context.
Who is responsible for rising cross-strait tensions?
Cheng argues that Taiwan could contribute positively to regional stability if it manages its relations with China cautiously and responsibly. She posits that some actions and expressions in Taiwan’s official discourse “have raised tensions unnecessarily,” thus narrowing the space for dialogue.
Her argument is not necessarily wrong, but Cheng seems to be implicitly blaming Taiwan as the main cause, specifically the government led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Upon closer examination of developments over the past years, it can be concluded that the main driver of cross-strait tensions truly stems from the Chinese Communist Party, and if the DPP had acted differently, the situation in the region might still have remained far from pleasant.
During the period of improved cross-strait relations under Chinese President Hu Jintao and Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou since 2008, the two sides of the Strait signed a series of agreements on direct flights, economic cooperation, crime prevention, and tourism promotion. Yet even during that relatively cooperative period, China continued to deploy missiles targeting Taiwan. The United States Department of Defence’s 2010 annual report on Chinese military power estimated that Beijing had deployed between 1,050 and 1,150 short-range ballistic missiles. Beijing also added approximately 100 more cruise missiles compared to the previous year, bringing the total deployment to around 200 to 500. Even when Taiwan handled the cross-Strait relationship “responsibly,” tensions were never truly absent.
China’s intention to exert pressure over Taiwan has become apparent since Xi Jinping assumed the presidency of China in 2013. Xi aims to build the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into a world-class military by the middle of the 21st century, coinciding with the 2049 milestone (the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China). To realise this strategic vision, Beijing has identified several key milestones in its modernisation process, including the target of achieving basic modernisation by 2027, and being capable of winning regional wars. This scenario would render “a 2027 Taiwan invasion” by China’s military.
China under Xi has deployed a variety of tactics to coerce Taiwan, such as large-scale military exercises around the island, frequent economic coercion, along with influence operations and cognitive warfare. The Taiwanese government’s 2025 report revealed that there were about 2.63 million cyberattack attempts per day from China; they aimed at stealing data, shaping public perception, and influencing Taiwan’s sociological and political environment.
All the evidence suggests that even when Taiwan acts cautiously and responsibly, tensions across the Taiwan Strait remain high because China has been dogged in its ambition for “Taiwan unification.” The fate of Taiwan now does not hinge on maintaining good ties with China, but rather on the persistent threat posed by China’s inexorable unification ambitions.
How should the 1992 Consensus be understood?
Cheng postulates that the KMT’s consistent stance on cross-strait relations is that the “one China, different interpretations” formula allows both sides to acknowledge the existence of one China, with each side being free to interpret what “one China” means. Cheng is right to state that the crux of the 1992 Consensus lies in its “strategic ambiguity,” as this ambiguity enables both sides to temporarily set aside sovereignty disputes, maintain channels for exchange and manage disagreements, while still preserving their own constitutional positions.
But Beijing understands the 1992 Consensus differently. The Chinese government has never accepted the “different interpretations” approach. Chinese leaders firmly underline that “both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to one China” and “the fact that Taiwan is part of China will not change.” Beijing tends to equate the “1992 Consensus” with the “One-China Principle,” under which Taiwan must first acknowledge its subordinate status to China before any further negotiations on cross-strait relations can take place.
Though both Beijing and the KMT invoke the 1992 Consensus, they interpret the concept in very different ways. In fact, “Beijing has never publicly endorsed the KMT’s interpretation.” Cheng and the KMT insist that China will accept the long-term status quo across the Strait; however, what China truly wants is reunification – one that considers the country’s historical task.
In his 2026 New Year message, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that “both sides of the Taiwan Strait share a bond of blood and kinship,” calling cross-Strait reunification “unstoppable.” In February, Wang Huning, Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Chairman, called for national reunification based on the “One-China Principle” and the 1992 Consensus.
The KMT’s endorsement of the 1992 Consensus likely stems from its opinionated opposition to the DPP. The KMT’s consistent pursuit of the “one China, different interpretations” principle aims to bind the DPP administration, which prioritises Taiwan’s statehood identity and has remained cautious, if not sceptical, of the “one China” framework. If the DPP administration accepts the 1992 Consensus, it is highly probable that its reputation will be undermined, as such an endorsement of the 1992 Consensus would imply that Taiwan is part of China.
Is pride in Chinese heritage sensible?
Cheng argues that confidence in Chinese heritage carries “a cultural affirmation,” and “it acknowledges civilisational continuity.” From her perspective, cultural confidence can help Taiwan maintain dialogue with Beijing calmly and pragmatically, while retaining its ability to integrate with the international community without falling into a defensive or insecure position. In Cheng’s words, “cultural complementarity can reduce political friction.”
Nevertheless, pride in Chinese cultural identity is no longer appealing among the Taiwanese people. A survey conducted by National Chengchi University’s Election Study Centre found that, between 1992 and 2023, the percentage of respondents identifying as “Taiwanese” increased from nearly 20% in the initial year to over 60% in the concluding year. Meanwhile, the number of people choosing “Chinese” dropped sharply from about 25% to below 5%. A 2024 survey by the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation found that 76.1% of respondents identified as “Taiwanese”, but only 10.1% referred to themselves as “Chinese”.
But Cheng’s assertion that China and Taiwan share “deep cultural and linguistic roots” is unlikely to hold up as a sufficient foundation for a political reconciliation strategy. Taiwan’s political identity differs from China’s after decades of democratic growth; therefore, counting on cultural roots to promote engagement is hardly persuasive. People on the island prioritise defending their political system and liberal democratic values as they come to see Taiwan as a unique political environment with its “distinct identity.” In this regard, Taiwanese public mistrust of Beijing’s motives is unlikely to be alleviated by the KMT’s proposals for increased political cooperation with China.
Is military deterrence necessary?
Cheng argues that deterrence is crucial, but over-reliance on increased weaponry risks distorting other priorities and failing to create peace. Cheng further clarified that while the KMT still supports purchasing American weapons, she opposes overspending on them.
This reasoning is not wrong, but it does not fit Taiwan’s current positioning, given China’s constant and intense encirclement of Taiwan. As such, the Lai Ching-te administration’s openness to resume dialogue and engagement with Beijing under the tenets of “dialogue over confrontation, exchange over containment” is insufficient to avert future hostilities or reduce cross-Strait tensions. Instead, Taiwan must enhance its defence capabilities to persuade China that the cost of an amphibious landing or blockade is too high, increasing the likelihood that this “porcupine defence” strategy could deter a potential invasion by the People’s Republic of China. Therefore, the incumbent administration’s ongoing efforts to boost defence spending are essential and should receive support from political forces in Taiwan, including the KMT.
Since the Trump administration has made no secret of its preference for a transactional relationship, Taiwan will probably face diminished support from the U.S. if it does not increase military spending. Last year, Trump temporarily suspended military aid to Taiwan, and he has been reluctant to approve a multi-billion-dollar arms sale to Taiwan. Even more concerning, given his transactional instincts, Trump prioritises the interests of the U.S. over those of other countries, including partners, allies, and adversaries. In Trump’s eyes, goodwill comes first. Hence, an impasse over defence spending may hinder real progress in defence collaboration between Washington and Taipei.
It is true that neither the DPP nor the KMT would want to become dependent on any power. However, given Taiwan’s current situation, its officials must accept the painful reality that neutrality is an illusion; Taiwan does not have the luxury of absolute autonomy or neutrality to simply opt out of the geopolitical tug-of-war between the U.S. and China, as the KMT chairwoman believes. If Taiwan does not defend itself, the U.S. could leave the island in a lurch, while China would find it easier to squeeze Taiwan. Therefore, Taiwan today needs to adopt a brave and defensive posture, often referred to as a “porcupine strategy.”
In short, Cheng failed to fully grasp the current geopolitical volatility and the intricacy of the Taiwan-China-U.S. triangle. Cross-strait tensions stem not only from Taiwan’s policy decisions, but mainly from China’s obstinate interpretation of its sovereignty over Taiwan and its diplomatic and military measures against the island. At the same time, the controversial 1992 Consensus and “pride in Chinese heritage” have become less appealing in the face of Taiwanese society’s shifting political identities.
Huynh Tam Sang is the founder and editor-in-chief of the Vietnam Strategic Forum and a PhD student at the Taipei School of Economics and Political Science, National Tsing Hua University.
Truong Tuan Kiet is a master’s student at the Taipei School of Economics and Political Science, National Tsing Hua University, and a columnist at the Vietnam Strategic Forum.