Written by Frédéric Krumbein
Image credit: Generated by Gemini
In my articles for IJTS (2023) and Taiwan Insight (2021), I introduced four theories to explain cross-strait relations. I would add another theory, structural realism, to provide us with a more complete toolbox. Furthermore, these five theories can also help us imagine scenarios for the future of relations between Taiwan and China.
Theories for explaining cross-strait relations.
Historical institutionalism explores how early institutional choices, e.g., the “One China policy” by the PRC and Chiang Kai-shek’s ROC, have structured and influenced the trajectory of cross-strait relations. Institutions are formal and informal rules, e.g., laws, treaties, agreements, or cultural norms. Path dependence provides incentives and constraints for political actors to continue institutional and policy choices inherited from the past. A path-dependent development is difficult to change, especially if it continues for a long time.
Critical junctures can still explain such change, often in crises, when path-dependent incentives and constraints are significantly relaxed for a short time. A critical juncture was Taiwan’s democratisation in the 1990s. Since then, the island’s identity and values have been based on the will of the Taiwanese.
Neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism can explain the process of economic and social integration between both sides, which began in the 1980s, and the modest steps toward closer political cooperation under the Ma Ying-jeou administration (KMT, 2008-2016).
Neofunctionalism claims that sub-national actors, such as businesspeople, and supranational institutions play a key role in integration processes. Integration is mainly driven by economic and rational interests and starts in areas that are considered less controversial, i.e., so-called low politics. Economic cooperation, trade, tourism, and transportation are part of low politics, while political areas considered core to a state’s sovereignty, such as foreign and military affairs or the police and judiciary, fall under so-called high politics.
Neofunctionalism focuses on the spillover effect. Integration leads to mutual interdependence and can also result in unintended effects, such as crises. New steps of integration are often the most effective way to respond to a crisis. For example, the history of European integration can be seen as a continuation of crises or challenges that have been resolved through deeper integration, such as the Eurozone crisis or Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine.
Neofunctionalism can explain how growing economic interdependence between Taiwan and China starting in the 1980s created stakeholders in Taiwan who pushed for closer cross-strait ties. Cross-strait integration focused on low politics, as neofunctionalism would predict. There was a certain spillover effect from mainly informal economic exchange and investment in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s to the formalisation of the economic relationship with the ratification of 21 cross-strait agreements under President Ma. Moreover, spillover into other policy areas, such as limited police and judicial cooperation, also took place.
Liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) also focuses on economic interests but views governments as the key actors. According to LI, states seek to achieve their goals through intergovernmental negotiation and bargaining. The bargaining power of a state depends mainly on asymmetrical interdependence. Asymmetrical interdependence means that the benefits of an agreement are unevenly distributed. An actor that needs an agreement least, relative to the status quo, is best able to threaten others with non-cooperation. Asymmetrical interdependence can explain why the Taiwanese government, even if it has been less powerful than China, could extract concessions during the negotiations for cross-strait agreements. Taiwan has been more satisfied with the status quo than China.
While both neofunctionalism and LI focus primarily on (economic) cooperation and integration, social constructivism analyses the role of perceptions, identity, and norms.
Social constructivism conceptualises the relationship between European and national identities in terms of inclusive and exclusive identities. Some Europeans identify exclusively with their own nation and can therefore be described as exclusive nationalists. Others identify with both their nation and the European Union, making them inclusive nationalists. In Taiwan, exclusive nationalists identify only with Taiwan, whereas inclusive nationalists identify with both Taiwan and China. The stronger an individual’s exclusive identification with an in-group—in this case, Taiwan—the less likely that individual is to support a political jurisdiction that also includes other groups, such as mainland Chinese. About two-thirds of Taiwanese identify exclusively as Taiwanese.
Since about 2012-2014, the role of identity has taken centre stage in cross-strait relations. In Taiwan, the Sunflower Movement has aimed to protect Taiwan’s democratic identity and values against China’s authoritarianism. At the same time, Xi Jinping has strengthened the nationalistic narrative that includes unification with Taiwan. The identities and values on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have moved in opposite directions, creating a growing divide between Taiwan and China.
To complete our toolbox for analysing cross-strait relations, structural realism can explain the Chinese threat to Taiwan. Structural realism rests on three core assumptions. First, states are the dominant actors in world politics. Second, survival and security are the central goals of states. In response to threats, actors may balance by strengthening their own capabilities or forming alliances, or they may bandwagon by aligning with a stronger power. Third, international politics is defined by competition for power. Military power, usually supported by economic resources, is the most important form of power, although other forms may also be used to pursue interests. States therefore aim to preserve or improve their relative power position within the international system. China’s policy towards Taiwan and other countries can be well explained by realism. China has rapidly built up its military over the last decades, has used military, political and economic coercion towards Taiwan, and aims at increasing the economic dependence of other countries on China, e.g., the EU’s dependence, while making the Chinese economy more self-reliant. Meanwhile, Taiwan has also increased its military capabilities, while Taiwan’s partners, particularly the US and Japan, are strengthening their military posture in East Asia.
Table 1: Overview of theories explaining cross-strait relations
| Time | Theories | Core concepts |
| since 1949 | Historical institutionalism | Path dependence and critical junctures |
| since 1949 | Structural realism | Military and economic power competition |
| since 1980s | Neofunctionalism | Spillover effect |
| 2008-2014 | Liberal intergovernmentalism | Bargaining under asymmetrical interdependence |
| since 2014 | Social constructivism | Perceptions, identity, values |
Trajectories of cross-strait relations.
The above-mentioned theories can also be applied to develop scenarios for the future trajectory of cross-strait relations. Two dimensions are particularly relevant. The first is the salience of Taiwan’s status: the lower the salience, the more stable the status quo is likely to be. The second is the distinction between low and high politics. Low-politics issues, such as economic cooperation, are easier to address than high-politics questions concerning identity, values, and sovereignty.
Regarding low politics, neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism could best explain trajectories of closer integration under conditions of low salience. If economic interests dominate and Taiwan’s future status remains less salient, pragmatic cooperation in less controversial policy areas could re-emerge. The KMT under chairperson Cheng Li-wun would probably favour this approach. If the KMT returns to power and China reduces the salience of unification in favour of a more pragmatic approach towards Taiwan, a new neofunctionalist dynamic could develop.
If China further increases the salience and pushes for unification sooner rather than later, integration in areas of high politics would become more relevant. However, rational interests could still shape the process, especially if political integration were presented as economically beneficial to both sides. Under conditions of low politics and high salience, mutual willingness to compromise on Taiwan’s future status could lead to negotiations over Taiwan’s political position, as liberal intergovernmentalism would suggest. Such negotiations could produce new agreements that deepen cross-strait integration and, possibly as a final step, a peaceful settlement involving major concessions by both sides. This could include creating a new entity, such as a confederation, or a special international legal status for Taiwan, such as de facto suzerainty. Suzerainty means that a country retains sovereignty over domestic affairs while transferring some or all authority over foreign and security policy to another country. Greenland, Monaco, Palau, or formerly Bhutan provide examples.
In high politics under low salience, the most likely trajectory would be continued separation. The status quo could remain stable if both sides avoid crossing each other’s red lines and accept that the conflict cannot be resolved in the near future. If identity and values dominate cross-strait relations, deeper integration would require either converging values or a more inclusive understanding of identity. For example, China would need to incorporate democracy and human rights into its conception of Chinese identity.
If salience is high, however, deeply entrenched path dependence on both sides would likely change only through a critical juncture. In the worst case, a Chinese war of annexation would constitute such a juncture. Structural realism can explain both the conditions for stability in the Taiwan Strait, such as a balance of power, and the conditions for a critical juncture, such as the emergence of dominance by one side.
Notes: For more on future trajectories of cross-strait relations and an innovative approach to solving the cross-strait conflict, see the following chapter by the author: “Tiger and dragon searching for phoenix feathers and unicorn horns: Imagining and mapping plausible trajectories of Cross-strait relations through integration theories and thought experiments”, in: Keyser-Verreault, Amélie; Perkuhn, Josie-Marie; Brender, Felix (eds.), Taiwan Studies Reconfigured: Islands of Inquiry (forthcoming in November 2026).
Figure 2: Potential trajectories of cross-strait relations
| Low politics | High politics | ||
| High salience | New agreements and/or new entities (LI) | Unification or annexation (historical institutionalism, realism) | Two states (historical institutionalism, realism) |
| Low salience | Status quo moving towards closer cross-strait integration (neofunctionalism) | Status quo moving towards two separate (Chinese/Taiwanese) or one common (Chinese) identity (social constructivism, realism) | |
In sum, the five theories offer a comprehensive, though not exhaustive, toolkit for analysing cross-strait relations, including cooperation and conflict as well as political, economic, and cultural dynamics. They also help explain the relationship’s past and present while informing possible future trajectories.
Frédéric Krumbein is a Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute of East Asian Studies, University of Duisburg-Essen. His research focuses on human rights, democracy and autocratisation, EU–East Asia relations, and cross-strait politics. From 2020 to 2025, he was a DAAD Heinrich Heine Visiting Professor at Tel Aviv University. From 2009 to 2019, he was a Research Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin. He holds a PhD from the Free University of Berlin. His articles have appeared in the International Journal of Taiwan Studies, Journal of East Asian Studies, and The Pacific Review.
This article was published as part of the special issue on IJTS Research Article Competition Winners.