Written by Dafydd J. Fell.
Image credit: 甘崇緯/ Facebook.
Taiwan’s movement parties, which emerged from the country’s vibrant civil society, enjoyed a golden era between 2014 and 2020. Before the 2014 Sunflower Movement, these parties had been quite marginal in Taiwan’s party system. The picture changed in 2014 when the Green Party Taiwan (GPT) broke through in local elections, winning its first city and county council seats. Then, in 2016, the New Power Party (NPP) won seats at the national level, becoming the third-largest party in the Legislative Yuan. These parties subsequently continued their growth pattern, winning over twenty local council seats in 2018 and expanding their national vote share in the 2020 parliamentary elections. A key feature of the movement party scene has been that, rather than a single progressive alternative party, four or five separate parties have competed against each other. For instance, in 2020 the NPP, GPT and Taiwan Statebuilding Party (TSP) were all competitive players in the Legislative Yuan election, with the NPP and SBP both winning national seats.
The heyday for Taiwan’s movement parties ended after 2020. The NPP was severely damaged by a series of scandals and suffered large-scale defections of its elected politicians. In the 2022 local elections, though the TSP won its first council seats, the combined total of movement party councillors fell from 22 to just 11. Things got worse in the next round of national elections in 2024 when four separate movement parties contested the party list, none of whom passed the five percent threshold for seats or even the three percent for state party subsidies. This meant that, for the first time since 2016, no movement parties are in the national parliament.
Several factors contributed to the gradual decline of the movement parties. Firstly, they faced stiff competition from the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) established in 2019 by then-independent Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je (柯文哲). With its abundant financial and human resources, the TPP has been successful at attracting the types of younger voters who are alienated from the two mainstream parties. The movement parties have also suffered large-scale defections of politicians to the mainstream parties. The founder of the SDP, Fan Yun (范雲), was poached by the DPP in 2020, and all four of the GPT’s previously elected local councillors have switched party affiliation to the DPP. One of the most damaging party-switching cases for the movement parties concerned the former NPP party leader Huang Kuo-chang (黃國昌), who defected to the TPP in the run-up to the 2024 national elections and is now the party’s chairperson.
The decline of small progressive parties cannot be blamed entirely on mainstream parties’ strategies. The movement parties have paid the price for not cooperating despite being ideologically quite similar. By standing candidates against fellow movement-party candidates, they have often diluted the once-growing public support for alternative parties. For instance, in 2018, it appeared that in many districts the NPP particularly targeted districts with GPT candidates. There have also been a number of elections with high levels of negative campaigning between some of the movement parties, particularly in the 2020 campaign. Although there were some limited last-minute discussions over cooperation in the run-up to the 2024 election, they were unable to reach any consensus. That year the combined vote share of the GPT, NPP, TSP and Taiwan Obasan Political Equality Party (OBA) exceeded 5 percent but by standing separately, none were elected.
The media focus for the 2026 local elections is unsurprisingly concentrated on the six special municipalities, particularly the race for Taipei and New Taipei mayors. However, one of the most noteworthy developments has been the establishment of the Taiwan Go Go Alliance (TGG) in December 2025. The alliance incorporates four movement parties: the NPP, GPT, SBP and OBA. In 2026, the alliance is supporting a total of 35 candidates from the four parties and a small number of independent candidates. This is far lower than the 105 candidates these four parties nominated four years earlier. Can this bold new initiative allow the movement parties to return to their earlier influential position in the party system?
The road to establishing the TGG Alliance was long and winding. After the peak hostility between the movement parties in the 2020 election, there were early attempts to rebuild bridges as early as spring 2020 between the GPT and NPP. However, serious attempts at movement-party reconciliation only began after their disastrous 2024 election. The cross-party meetings began informally and gradually expanded in terms of the parties involved and their frequency. The parties gradually healed old wounds and built mutual trust through cooperation. For instance, they worked together in both the 2024 Bluebird Movement and 2025 Great Recall campaigns.
Party election alliances are quite common in Taiwan’s electoral politics. Mainstream parties sometimes forsake certain districts and support allied small-party candidates there against their rival mainstream party. For instance, in 2012 the DPP supported a GPT candidate in Taipei City District 7, and in 2016 the DPP supported the NPP in three Legislative districts. In the latter case, all three NPP candidates were successfully elected. There have also been earlier cases of small party election alliances. In 2016, the GPT and SDP established the GPT-SDP Alliance, as a new registered political party that contested both the party list and districts. Then, in 2018, the Welfare State Alliance was established between the GPT, SDP, and Taiwan Radical Wings (forerunner of the TSP). However, party election alliances have generally been unsuccessful for smaller parties. Mainstream parties have often used them to absorb the best of smaller parties’ human resources. The GPT-SDP Alliance in 2016 had real potential, and early polls suggested it could win seats. However, the alliance featured high levels of mutual distrust and animosity that ultimately undermined the quality of their joint campaign. The 2018 Welfare State Alliance did not feature such tensions but was, to a large extent, an empty alliance without any substantive issue or campaign cooperation.
What makes the TGG such a unique experiment is that it has functioned in stark contrast to earlier party election alliances. Although the four TGG parties received different vote shares in 2024, they seem to operate under a relatively equal model. Unlike the GPT-SDP Alliance case, TGG party leaders have been able to reach internal consensus on the necessity and format of the alliance. The alliance has largely operated without the internal tensions seen in the GPT-SDP Alliance case. What is particularly important in the run-up to the 2026 local elections is that there is real substance to the alliance’s operation.
Although each of the four component parties has its own issue niches and differences in regional support bases, they have joined together on a range of advocacy topics in 2026. For instance, the four parties jointly came out in solidarity in response to a discriminatory and heavy-handed police raid on a gay bar in Wanhua district in October 2026. Furthermore, the leadership has been very active in coordinated campaigning throughout the build-up to the election. Following the social media pages for the 35 TGG candidates reveals how the four parties are going out of their way to support fellow alliance members at coordinated campaign events. The four party badges, as well as the TGG logo, are always visible at these joint campaign events and in their political communication materials. As voting day approaches, the parties are releasing joint election communications listing all supported candidates. A key message is that if the nominated candidates can receive the four parties’ combined 2024 party list votes, that should be enough to elect them.
Another encouraging feature for the TGG Alliance is the extensive endorsements they are receiving from figures in Taiwan’s civil society and alternative cultural scene. This was a practice seen quite extensively in both the 2014 and 2016 elections, and so its revival in 2026 is noteworthy. For instance, in September, screenwriter and film director Wu Nien-jen (吳念真), a key figure in Taiwan’s 1980s New Wave Cinema, produced a high-quality three-minute election advertisement for the alliance that features all its candidates in TGG uniform shirts. On November, 15, there was a coordinated campaign rally for the GPT’s Co-convenor Gan Chong-wei (甘崇緯), held in New Taipei City. This event showed cross-party support, with it being hosted by an OBA leader, Ho Yu-jung (何語蓉), and speakers from the other alliance partners. It also featured performances from award-winning musicians such as Lin Sheng-xiang (林生祥), Wu Chih-ning (吳志寧), Gaea Lee (蓋亞), the writer and media figure Neil Peng (馮光遠) and former political prisoner Lee Ming-che (李明哲).
Even with such unprecedented alliance mobilisation and celebrity endorsements, the TGG candidates face a challenging electoral environment. However, there does appear to be a window of opportunity for alternative candidates. Many Taiwanese voters feel deeply alienated from the mainstream parties. Although many of these voters drifted toward the TPP in recent elections, the TPP has seen its support seriously erode since 2024. This has been driven by its close alliance with the KMT, as well as a series of scandals, including former chairperson Ko Wen-je’s corruption cases.
Looking ahead, it will be interesting to see whether the alliance can continue into the 2028 national elections. If the alliance performs well in the November local elections, it is likely to build momentum. However, cooperating at the national level is much more complicated than at the local level, as having a party list will require the TGG to move from an informal cross-party alliance to registering as an actual political party, on a model similar to the GPT-SDP Alliance of 2016. It remains to be seen whether such an ambitious alliance can be competitive at the national level. However, the four TGG parties’ ability to first build mutual trust, then coordinate on policy advocacy and campaign cooperation, represents a new development in the history of Taiwan’s democracy.
Dafydd J. Fell is the Professor in Comparative Politics with particular reference to Taiwan at the Department of Political and International Studies of the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London. He is also the Director of the SOAS Centre of Taiwan Studies. His latest co-authored book (with Peng Yen-wen and Wang Yan-han), 綠黨在台灣:第一個三十年 (Green Party Taiwan: The First Thirty Years), was published in July 2026.
