Written by Jonathan Leung.
Image credit: 鄭麗文/ Facebook.
Preface: A United Green and A Divided Blue
Building on the previous article’s discussion of the current dynamics of the upcoming local elections, the DPP is better positioned to defeat the KMT. The latter faces more severe internal challenges, including not only the electoral campaigns of pan-blue candidates but also underlying leadership struggles.
Unlike the KMT, the DPP maintains a clear line of succession. Following the party’s defeat in 2008, Tsai Ing-wen assumed leadership of the green camp and remained at the helm for over a decade, with a brief interim period of Su Tseng-chang. As the DPP approaches Tsai’s departure, only William Lai and then-Taoyuan Mayor Cheng Wen-tsan emerged as viable successors. Following Cheng’s involvement in scandals, Lai swiftly solidified his leadership. Given that current conditions favour the Greens’ growth in the local elections, Lai faces minimal internal dissent. With other prominent figures pledging loyalty, Lai is unlikely to face the kind of internal challenges Tsai faced in 2019. Lai is undeniably positioned to remain the Green nominee in 2028.
Conversely, the upcoming November election will be critical in determining the KMT’s future leadership and its 2028 presidential nominee. Former legislator Cheng Li-wun has been leading the party since 2025. Characterised by an explicit pro-Beijing stance and Chinese nationalist sentiments, numerous KMT candidates have distanced themselves from Cheng, whom they perceive as an electoral liability. Furthermore, her controversial nomination processes in Changhua and Hsinchu County have cast doubt on her competence to lead the party through the 2028 general election. Consequently, several KMT candidates have sought endorsement and support from alternative Blue figures. This coalition includes incumbent mayors, legislators and retired politicians, who have intensified their cooperation by backing alternative candidates—effectively functioning as a shadow cabinet. This under-the-table anti-Cheng faction challenges her leadership, as members frequently disassociate themselves from her public platforms and back rival candidates. With the KMT quietly fracturing internally, the outcome of the impending local election is likely to deal a decisive blow to Cheng’s leadership. While this article does not dissect Cheng’s specific political line, it examines the pan-blue coalition’s future agenda, focusing primarily on the career trajectories of prominent figures in light of the local elections.
The Four Suns: Preemptive Primary for the KMT in 2028
Former New Taipei Mayor Eric Chu stepped down as leader in 2025 and publicly called for Taichung Mayor Lu Shiow-yen to take over. However, Lu declined to partake and instead endorsed former Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-pin. Ultimately, Cheng Li-wun won the contest.
The KMT politicians who dissent from Cheng have coalesced into a loosely structured yet para-organised faction to challenge her authority. Key figures in this grouping include Taichung Mayor Lu Shiow-yen, Taipei Mayor Chiang Wan-an, New Taipei Mayor Hou Yu-ih, Legislative Yuan President Han Kuo-yu, legislator Johnny Chiang and media personality Jaw Shaw-kang, among others. Their main ideological split centres on opposing an overly close relationship with China and the Chinese Communist Party, preferring instead to strengthen ties with the United States and Japan while safeguarding sovereignty and cross-strait peace. More importantly, these figures harbour deep concerns about the detrimental impact Cheng’s leadership might have on the party in upcoming elections, particularly given that the KMT has been out of central government for a decade. Among them, three are regarded as rising stars within the pan-blue camp and are widely characterised as the KMT’s “suns”, expected to play prominent roles in 2028. As Cheng’s political ambitions have grown, she is increasingly perceived as assertive in her pursuit of the presidency. Collectively, the media refer to these individuals as the KMT’s “Four Suns“, and they are poised to reshape the party in the post-Chu era: Cheng, Lu, Han and Chiang. This section examines their political characteristics and relationships, and analyses how the local elections will shape their trajectories toward 2028.
Many expect Lu Shiow-yen to run for President, a prospect discussed during the previous election cycle, when she ultimately declined to run. Lu rose to prominence after being elected Taichung’s Mayor in 2018 and was re-elected in 2022 in a landslide. Before her executive tenure, she served as a legislator for two decades. She previously worked as a reporter for the Chinese Television System. Lu is known for her cautious political style and rarely takes risks in her decision-making. While ambitious, she seldom advances without guaranteed security. She declined to run for President in 2024 to avoid accusations of abandoning her mayoral post—similar to the criticisms Han and Hou faced. Similarly, she opted not to run for the KMT leadership in 2025, despite widespread encouragement and a strong likelihood of winning easily, or even unopposed. She feared the DPP would exploit any perceived neglect of her mayoral duties to advance her personal career ambitions, jeopardising her future trajectory. Although Lu’s presidential dream is an open secret, she remains committed to presenting an impeccable political profile. Consequently, “Municipal Affairs First” has become her standard refrain whenever she is questioned about her presidential aspirations.
Another promising pan-blue figure is Chiang Wan-an. As the sole member of the Chiang lineage to inherit the family’s political legacy, Chiang has served two terms as a legislator and is currently seeking re-election as Taipei mayor. Bolstered by his unique family background, distinguished educational and professional credentials, political experience, and polished presentation, he is frequently regarded as a favoured figure within the younger generation of the KMT. Given this outstanding profile, many expect Chiang to run for the presidency in the 2030s, with some media outlets even speculating about a presidential bid or a run as Lu’s running mate in 2028. However, incumbent mayors running for the presidency have recently become a sensitive issue. The KMT has suffered three consecutive defeats led by sitting mayors: Chu in 2016, Han in 2020, and Hou in 2024. Chiang is unlikely to repeat these mistakes, as risking his future career in this way would be imprudent. Furthermore, given his youth, even a presidential run in the 2030s would find him only in his mid-fifties. Nevertheless, his timeline faces disruption by Puma Shen, the DPP mayoral candidate who has generated the “Puma-O’Shen-Wave”. Shen has challenged Chiang’s re-election strategy by narrowing the polling margin and exposing Chiang’s vulnerabilities. A marginal victory, or outright defeat, would severely impair Chiang’s prospects for higher political office in the future. Consequently, he is unlikely to run for the presidency in 2028.
The final prominent figure is Han Kuo-yu, the recalled Kaohsiung Mayor and KMT presidential nominee in 2020, who currently serves as the President of the Legislative Yuan. His political career did not end with the double blow of 2020; instead, he rebounded four years later by leading the KMT party list in the 2024 legislative election and was subsequently elected parliamentary speaker. His political resurrection demonstrates his enduring commitment to public life, as he maintains a strong presence in domestic politics and actively pursues parliamentary diplomacy. He frequently engages in parliamentary disputes, routinely receives foreign delegations, and comments on public issues to sustain his political profile. Hou Yu-ih, the New Taipei Mayor and 2024 presidential nominee, follows a contrasting trajectory and appears less politically ambitious than Han after his defeat in the presidential election. Having spent decades on the frontline of law enforcement, Hou served as Director-General of the National Police Agency before entering politics. Retiring after his tenure as New Taipei Mayor would provide a fitting conclusion to his public service. Nevertheless, for both men, any opportunity for upward mobility would undoubtedly enhance the twilight of their careers. Given that a direct presidential bid appears unfeasible at this stage, serving as Lu’s running mate or premier would be a significant bonus.
An analysis of the current political landscape indicates that Cheng is actively solidifying her leadership. Meanwhile, Lu has become increasingly active in reaching out to other municipalities by cooperating with pan-blue figures who have distanced themselves from Cheng—a significant departure from her previous practice of focusing exclusively on Taichung’s affairs. Lu likely perceives the threat Cheng poses and seeks to safeguard her position as the pre-eminent leader in the KMT’s post-Chu era, while lobbying for increased support from members who harbour reservations about Cheng’s political direction. As the preceding article notes, if the KMT loses in November, Cheng faces the prospect of an expedited exit. This consideration likely informed Lu’s decision to forgo a leadership bid last year, as she remains unwilling to risk the party’s electoral prospects, including the impending local elections. Lu continues to maintain strong relationships with the other “Blue Suns” apart from Cheng, incorporating them into her network to oppose Cheng and campaign independently for alternative pan-blue candidates. If the results show Cheng’s incompetence and lack of popular support, Lu is well positioned to assume control in early 2027, unencumbered by executive mayoral duties after stepping down. If Han chooses to continue his career as parliamentary speaker, Hou would emerge as Lu’s sole and optimal choice as a vice-presidential running mate or her inaugural premier in the event of a 2028 victory. Ultimately, the 2026 local elections transcend a conventional pan-blue versus pan-green contest, functioning instead as a primary battle for the KMT’s 2028 presidential nomination—a decisive political clash between two women.
Jonathan Leung is a history teacher in Hong Kong. He earned his Master’s degree in history at SOAS, University of London and his Bachelor’s degree in history at the University of Sheffield. He completed his Postgraduate Diploma in Education in History and Humanities at the Hong Kong Baptist University. His research focuses on Taiwan’s post-war political and social history. His research interests focus on the lives and decision-making of prominent Taiwanese figures at critical moments, from broad to micro perspectives. His research topics include the histories of power struggles, party politics, elections, democratisation, social movements and institutional changes.