Written by Wu Chieh-Hsiang.
Image credit: Chiang Chi-chen, Shen Po-yang & Tung Tzu-wei campaigns.
Cultural capital, a concept developed by French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, refers to the knowledge, cultural competencies, values, and forms of recognition that enable individuals and groups to establish legitimacy and exert influence within a particular social field. While cultural capital is often discussed in relation to social distinction and the reproduction of existing hierarchies, it may also be mobilised to challenge established power relations. Its effects depend not only on who possesses cultural capital, but also on where and how it is mobilised.
A recent incident involving Taiwan’s “naming controversy” at the Gwangju Biennale invites reflection on how cultural capital is understood and mobilised in Taiwan’s 2026 local elections.
The Gwangju Biennale, established in 1995 after South Korea’s 1980 Gwangju Uprising, illuminates how a political legacy can be transformed into cultural capital. Over the past three decades, the Biennale has helped institutionalise the memory of Gwangju’s democratic struggle, turning it into a source of cultural legitimacy and collective identity that extends beyond the local context.
This cultural capital has sustained international attention to Gwangju’s democratic legacy and artistic development. Yet, the Taiwan Pavilion at the 2026 Gwangju Biennale attracted even broader international attention through a controversy over its name. After the Biennale Foundation changed the designation from “Taiwan Pavilion” to “NTMoFA Pavilion,” an abbreviation of the National Taiwan Museum of Fine Arts, the Taiwanese curatorial team and artists protested the decision, regarding it as a form of censorship. Numerous individual artists, artists’ groups, and cultural organisations in Gwangju played a crucial role in reinforcing the Taiwanese team’s protest. They stood in solidarity because they regarded freedom of expression as non-negotiable in a city whose democratic movement played a defining role in South Korea’s democratisation. Their support demonstrated how Gwangju’s democratic legacy, institutionalised through decades of cultural and artistic practice, could be mobilised by its artistic communities to resist political pressure and defend freedom of expression. The Taiwanese team eventually succeeded in reclaiming the name “Taiwan Pavilion.” Following the name restoration, the China Pavilion withdrew from the Biennale.
The episode thus served as yet another reminder to Taiwanese that the political stakes of naming and representation persist in international exchanges, including cultural exchanges. More importantly, it demonstrated how historical memory and artistic networks can be strengthened as forms of cultural capital beyond economic value through collective action to resist political pressure and defend artistic autonomy and freedom of expression.
The negotiations between the Taiwanese art communities and the Biennale Foundation were supported by Taiwan’s Ministry of Culture (MOC), which stands on the front line of cultural diplomacy. However, the MOC’s overseas promotion of Taiwanese culture, along with that of its affiliated institutions, has been curtailed by budget cuts imposed by the Legislative Yuan. As cultural diplomacy and international exchanges have relied primarily on MOC initiatives and funding, these cuts have posed considerable challenges to the sustained promotion of Taiwanese culture internationally.
Meanwhile, efforts by many legislators to amend the Act Governing the Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures (財政收支劃分法) to reduce the concentration of tax revenue in the central government and reallocate a greater share to local governments have raised further concerns about cultural policy. Taiwan’s overseas cultural promotion has relied primarily on the central government, with local governments playing a comparatively limited role. The proposed redistribution of fiscal resources therefore raises questions about how these responsibilities and funding will be allocated between central and local governments, and whether local governments will have the capacity to assume a greater role in supporting cultural development and international exchanges.
Against this backdrop, the 2026 mayoral campaigns offer an opportunity to examine how candidates envision local cultural capital. However, with the exceptions of DPP mayoral candidate Shen Pao-yang (Puma Shen, 沈伯洋) in Taipei City, KMT mayoral candidate Chiang Chi-chen (江啟臣) in Taichung City, and DPP mayoral candidate Tung Tzu-wei (童子瑋) in Keelung City, who have addressed cultural policy in more comprehensive or explicit terms in their campaigns, most candidates treat culture as little more than extensions of economic and entertainment policies.
Taichung’s incumbent mayor, Lu Shiow-yen (盧秀燕) (KMT), for example, promotes a “concert economy” by building a domed stadium (Taichung Super Arena) to accommodate various entertainment activities. Her fellow KMT politician Chiang Chi-chen (江啟臣), who is running to succeed her as mayor, proposes building a music centre to attract audiences to performances by star performers. Kaohsiung mayoral candidate Ko Chih-en (柯志恩) (KMT), meanwhile, proposes making Kaohsiung the “Capital of Asian Festivals” (亞洲慶典之都) to increase foreign tourism by 50%. From the perspective of cultural policy scholarship, these approaches reduce citizens to consumers rather than recognising them as active participants in cultural life and exchange.
Cultural policies that rely on importing packaged blockbuster events, such as K-pop concerts, or licensing intellectual property (IP) from foreign rights holders to reproduce famous images—as seen in the recent use of Vincent van Gogh’s imagery in Taipei City and the presentation of Florentijn Hofman’s Rubber Duck in Kaohsiung City—further point to an imbalance between cultural imports and exports in Taiwan. Unlike Gwangju, where international cultural recognition has grown out of local history and artistic communities, these approaches emphasise attracting external cultural resources over cultivating local cultural capital, thus raising questions about politicians’ awareness of and confidence in Taiwan’s own cultural resources.
A related phenomenon of cultural capital, extending beyond policy proposals, appears in how some candidates present their own cultural capital through the use of English. Amid increasingly antagonistic exchanges during the 2026 election campaigns, many candidates display their “cultural capital” by demonstrating their English proficiency rather than their ability to engage with the world through cultural exchange. Foreign-language proficiency is often presented in Taiwan as a sign of a broad worldview and used for self-promotion. For politicians, it can serve as a marker of superior cultural capital without necessarily demonstrating adequate capacity for international cultural engagement. An exception is Huang Po-yu (黃柏瑜), the youngest mayoral candidate in the 2026 election, running for Changhua City. Educated in New Zealand and the UK, Huang stands out for his emphasis on cultural policy. His campaign pledges focus on the city’s historical and cultural highlights, which he presents fluently in both Mandarin and English.
Nevertheless, this phenomenon rests primarily on a misconception. English proficiency, once a symbol of political capital, can be understood as a Cold War legacy, when the United States supported the KMT regime and its politicians’ pursuit of higher education in the US. At the time, English proficiency was rare and also became a symbol of social status. Overseas educational credentials featured in politicians’ profiles would later mark a stark contrast with DPP politicians, who were primarily characterised as grassroots figures. Taiwanese politicians with such backgrounds have benefited from this image for decades. However, the perceived value of such cultural capital has gradually shifted from the pan-Blue to the pan-Green camp. Campaigning on English proficiency reinforces the stereotype that English speakers are more qualified to serve as political leaders. It also misses the point that electoral promises encompass issues far beyond language ability.
In this regard, language policies are particularly relevant because they reflect how different languages are valued as forms of cultural capital. The “Bilingual Nation 2030” initiative (2030 雙語國家政策發展藍圖), launched in 2018, aimed primarily to enhance Taiwan’s competitiveness in the global market. By 2024, however, concerns had emerged over teacher shortages and gaps in students’ capacity to learn through English. These concerns suggest that prioritising English for the sake of economic competitiveness may reinforce its status as a form of unequally distributed cultural capital. In response, President Lai Ching-te reaffirmed his commitment to the policy while signalling that it would undergo major revisions. By contrast, the Development of National Languages Act (國家語言發展法), which came into effect in 2019, recognises Taiwan Indigenous languages, Taiwan Hokkien and Taiwan Hakka as national languages. It also stipulates that the natural languages and sign languages used by different groups in Taiwan are all considered national languages and deserve to be maintained. Together, these policies raise the question of how language policy can promote international competitiveness while ensuring equal recognition of Taiwan’s linguistic diversity.
Election campaigns should likewise promise to strengthen equal access to diverse cultural resources rather than emphasise cultural distinctions. Taichung mayoral candidate Chiang Chi-chen has challenged his rival, Ho Hsin-chun (何欣純) (DPP), to an English-language campaign debate, prompting public curiosity about his vision of cultural capital at both the individual and city levels. His cultural policy proposals include the construction of the music centre and the “Cultural Gateway Plan,” which aims to revitalise the historic city centre and transform it into a “breathing urban museum.” His “Starlight Project” would also activate a cluster of warehouses by establishing live houses and organising “Railway Tracks Rock” (鐵支路開唱). These policies may be understood as an extension of urban renewal and are consistent with the MOC’s “Regeneration of Historic Sites 2.0” policy (再造歷史現場 2.0), scheduled for implementation from 2026 to 2030.
With funding from the same MOC program, Keelung mayoral candidate Tung Tzu-wei has pledged to build on existing projects by connecting historical sites with transportation, tourism, and cultural venues, while also integrating cultural heritage into ongoing urban renewal efforts. To highlight the city’s cultural capital and historical development, Tung also initiated the publication of Keelung 400: Where the World Came Ashore (基隆400:世界循海而來), tracing the city’s four-century history through the themes of sea, island, and people.
Among the candidates, Taipei mayoral candidate Shen Pao-yang offers a different approach to cultural policy. Rather than emphasising the economic potential of culture or construction projects, he proposes highlighting Taipei’s cultural diversity through four thematic cultural routes (四大主題文化路徑): “Industrial Heritage,” connecting tea gardens, factories, and historic tea shops to trace the development of the tea, coal-mining, and sugar industries; “Urban Historical Memory,” covering routes through the inner city to preserve cultural heritage and document urban transformation; “Multicultural Narratives,” tracing Hakka settlement, Indigenous peoples’ migration, military dependents’ villages, and public housing; and “Human Rights and Democratic Memory,” encompassing memorial sites related to the 228 Incident and the White Terror to commemorate Taiwan’s struggle for freedom and human rights.
These proposals offer a useful point of comparison with Gwangju, where historical memory has become collective cultural capital. In contrast to most cultural campaigns in the 2026 elections, which favour profit-oriented policies, Shen’s diverse cultural routes offer some cause for optimism. Encompassing Taipei’s historical and economic development, memories of different communities, and Taiwan’s hard-won democracy, the proposal offers hope that cultural capital grounded in the defence of humanitarian values, as exemplified by Gwangju, can be further maintained and cultivated.
As Taiwan approaches the 2026 elections, the focus should shift from how politicians promote culture to how cultural policies can sustain and enhance local cultural capital, rather than merely serving political or economic interests.
Dr. Wu Chieh-Hsiang is a Professor in the Department of Arts at the National Changhua University of Education in Taiwan. She earned both her master’s and doctoral degrees in sociology and art history from Carl von Ossietzky University in Oldenburg, Germany. Dr. Wu previously served as the chairperson of Taiwan’s Association of Visual Arts, a national organization advocating for the interests of visual artists. From 2021 to 2024, she held the position of chairperson of the Taiwan Association of Cultural Policy Studies. Her recent research focuses on the culture of memory, art projects addressing past injustices, and the relationship between state power and exhibition institutions.
