Written by Sadia Rahman.
Image credit: 鄭麗文/ Facebook.
Kuomintang (KMT)’s Chair Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) April 2026 visit to China led to unprecedented speculation beyond cross-strait dynamics. It reopened debates on a range of polemics – the Chinese Communist Party’s (CPC) core principles, the Cross-Strait issue and how Taiwan’s existential dispensations would stand. The Mainland has sketched this as CPC’s milestone and opened a basket of opportunities. It is unclear what’s in the making. The KMT portrayed it as a peace mission, and for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), it was not ice-breaking but a public relations victory for both sides. Given that the KMT and DPP have been playing around with posturing to accrue domestic political gains, ordinary Taiwanese seem to be experiencing a mix of turmoil, uncertainty and anguish. The underlying question is not as straightforward but involves – who is setting or will set the political tempo on the strait and on whose terms? This may potentially polarise sentiments across the Strait.
The KMT, as a party, has evolved from one that once claimed to represent all of China, to later using cross-strait engagement to preserve the ROC framework and remain electorally relevant in Taiwan. For the party, which contested its legitimacy against the mainland, things took a drastic turn once it lost power. Especially after Lien Chan’s “Peace Tour” in 2005, the KMT’s mainland policy gradually shifted toward inter-party communication and cross-strait exchanges based on the 1992 Consensus. The 2015 meeting between Ma Ying-jeou and Xi Jinping in Singapore marked a high point of engagement between the two sides. Thus, the trajectory from an uncomfortable history to an orchestrated, peace-driven, status-quoist political interaction demonstrated the tactical value that both the KMT and the CPC found in dealing with each other.
Engagement, once marred by suspicion, became an unusual catalyst and a tool to drive the larger one-China dynamics, the intra-party dynamics, and the foreign policies of both sides. For instance, in the case of CPC, engagement with Taiwanese compatriots produces political value in legitimising the party’s historical goals, even if it does not immediately alter Taiwan’s official position. At the same time, for some, it is enough to stoke nationalist sentiments. The sustained KMT-CPC dialogue momentum allows both sides a free hand to keep redefining the dialogue and its objectives, including the message to the public. Xi Jinping’s 2 January 2019 speech on the 40th anniversary to the compatriots in Taiwan narrowed the 1992 Consensus interpretation. It was redefined and connected to the One-China Principle, thereby linking it to national reunification. Consequently, it is China that controls the meaning to be used as per the situation, leaving the KMT with ambiguity and a half formula. Additionally, the continual dialogue by the KMT validates China’s narrow framing to convey globally on peaceful reunification.
Cheng’s visit was the first by a sitting KMT Chairperson leading a delegation to the mainland in a decade. Her winning as a party chair in October 2025 demonstrates the internal shift that the members favour active cross-strait engagement. This is unlike other KMT figures like Eric Chu, the KMT chair from 2021 to 2025, and Hou Yu-ih, the party’s 2024 presidential candidate, who preferred strategic ambiguity on One-China Policy. Cheng, on April 10, met President Xi Jinping in Beijing. Her itinerary also spanned Nanjing, Shanghai, and Beijing, interweaving economic pragmatism and political goals, and it was reinforced through a policy follow-up. On April 12, the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council promptly announced Ten Policy measures to promote cross-strait exchanges and cooperation, covering party-to-party communication, youth exchanges, the resumption of transportation links, facilitation of imports of agricultural, fishery, and food products, cultural and tourism cooperation, and the resumption of pilot programs for individual travel to Taiwan. On April 15, the Taiwan Affairs Office further stated that the next step would be to ensure these measures are “fully and meticulously implemented.” Officially, the visit was presented as the beginning of a structured extension into exchanges and livelihood follow-up.
This sequencing alone demonstrates that this is beyond bridging party-to-party history. It was a signal of intervention in Taiwan’s domestic politics and China’s wider strategy toward the island. The indication was that Taiwan’s elected DPP government would remain excluded from equivalent communication, and the KMT could unlock benefits. Apart from setting the tempo and engagement sound practical, CPC find this ensuring amidst its national rejuvenation goals. And for KMT, this recentered its weakening political importance after repeated electoral setbacks.
Correspondingly, for the KMT, this could work in two ways. First, it can deliver short-term political gains by presenting the party to reach the centre stage and helping to ease cross-strait tensions and reopen channels of communication. It opens the room to argue that it’s responsible risk management behaviour. Second, it can also spill over as a heavier electoral vulnerability. The KMT can be read as enabling China’s strategic objectives, and then it becomes harder to convince Taiwanese voters that it is merely a peace mission. However, this does not negate the importance of engaging in talks with China, indeed it has become an unavoidable option.
The 2024 elections have shifted the Legislative Yuan balance. President Lai Ching-te won with 40.05 per cent, but the DPP does not have a legislative majority. The Parliament now operates in a pluralised environment with the KMT and the Taiwan People’s Party’s (TPP) presence. While this may provide institutional leverage, it does not automatically translate into a mandate to reset cross-strait ties. This is where the asymmetry factor cannot be overlooked. Taiwanese voters, particularly the younger generation, view the cross-strait relations from the 2020 Hong Kong precedent. The survey data conducted by the National Cheng Chi University (NCCU), Taipei, affirm that the identification exclusively of Taiwanese has risen from 17.6% in 1992 to 61.6% in 2023, notably in between those years was also the Sunflower movement. The figure increased to 63.4% in 2024, and then slightly decreased to 62.0% in 2025. The overall trend still demonstrates that the Taiwanese only identity remains high. Additionally, the 2020 election was fought under the premise of the National Security Law in Hong Kong, which resulted in a landslide victory for Tsai Ing-wen.
The KMT-CPC’s substantial visibility can backfire; instead of softening identity politics, it may trigger the reactivation of the Sunflower movement spirit and Hong Kong’s optic. Since Xi Jinping referred to the 1992 consensus as national reunification, it leaves very little room for the KMT to manoeuvre different interpretations. During his 2024 Presidential inaugural, Lai Ching-te called for dialogue under parity and dignity and framed peace through the “Four Pillars of Peace” to strengthen national defence, improve economic security, stable and principled cross-strait leadership, and values-based diplomacy. This gives DPP the pathway to mobilise Taiwanese questioning KMT’s credibility.
Thus, whether strategic timing bears fruit or not rests not on whether the Taiwan question is resolved, but on whether changes appear in the terms on which cross-strait engagement is understood by Taiwanese voters. To that end, immediate policy outcomes are not a negated subject, but future contestation will also be about legitimacy, perception and control over political timing across the strait.
Sadia Rahman is a Lecturer at the Department of International and Strategic Studies, Universiti Malaya.
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