Written by Meng Kit Tang.
Image credit: 鄭麗文/ Facebook.
Introduction: The Paradox in Plain Sight
In late 2025 and early 2026, Cheng Li-wun set out an ambitious goal: to make “all Taiwanese proudly and confidently say ‘I am Chinese.’” The statement, noted in both The Economist and Foreign Affairs, was meant as reclamation and not capitulation.
Yet the data tells a different story.
The December 2025 release of the long-running identity survey by National Chengchi University showed Taiwanese-only identification at 62.0 per cent. Those identifying as both Taiwanese and Chinese stood at 31.7 per cent. Chinese-only identification remained at 2.5 per cent. Among younger cohorts, early 2026 findings from Academia Sinica suggested rejection of exclusive Chinese identification approached 85 per cent.
The paradox became dramatically clearer on April 10, 2026, when Cheng met Xi Jinping in Beijing — the first formal summit between a sitting KMT chairperson and the Chinese leader in nearly a decade. While Cheng described the meeting as “humble and sincere” and a step toward peace, it triggered intense domestic backlash. Many interpreted the summit and handshake as confirmation that her version of “Chinese identity” is effectively aligned with Beijing’s worldview.
The numbers are not collapsing toward a Chinese revival. They are stable and structurally tilted toward Taiwanese consolidation.
What Cheng advances is not generic Chinese nationalism. It is a Chinese identity with Kuomintang (KMT) characteristics: constitutionally anchored in the Republic of China (ROC), culturally rooted in civilisational continuity, and strategically framed to enable dialogue with Beijing while rejecting the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
The paradox is sharp. This high-profile reclamation effort, rather than slowing de-Sinicisation, may be accelerating it. By turning “Chinese” into a partisan marker again, the strategy risks reinforcing Taiwanese-only identity as the neutral default.
As the 2026 local elections approach, the question is not merely philosophical. It is both electoral and structural.
Defining “Chinese Identity with KMT Characteristics”
Cheng’s formulation rests on three pillars.
First, constitutional anchoring. Her argument returns to the ROC Constitution as the sole legitimate framework of sovereignty. Within that historical and legal structure, the state’s identity is Chinese in origin. The claim is not that Taiwan belongs to the PRC. It is that the ROC remains the legitimate Chinese state in a historical sense. “We are not PRC Chinese” is a line she has repeated with clarity.
Second, civilisational continuity. References to writing Chinese characters, speaking the Chinese language, and being descendants of a shared cultural lineage frame identity as historical inheritance rather than political allegiance. This is an ethno-civilizational register, not a contemporary sovereignty claim.
Third, strategic purpose. In Foreign Affairs, Cheng argued that cultural affirmation allows Taiwan to “engage Beijing without insecurity and engage the world without defensiveness.” In this reading, Chinese identity is an asset. It lowers psychological barriers for cross-strait dialogue while preserving ROC sovereignty.
The April 10 summit with Xi Jinping provided a real-world test of this framework. Cheng invoked shared “Chinese people” language and the 1992 Consensus, while Xi responded in kind — reinforcing the very partisan branding the strategy sought to transcend.
This hybrid differs markedly from both the CCP’s sovereignty claim and Lee Teng-hui’s evolving “New Taiwanese” civic nationalism. It seeks to combine ROC constitutional legitimacy with cultural Chineseness. But such hybrids are fragile when public perception collapses nuance into symbolism.
The Backfire Mechanism: From Reclamation to Consolidation
Why might reclamation accelerate consolidation? The answer lies not in rhetoric alone, but in socialisation and threat perception.
Taiwan’s post-1996 democratic generations were educated under localised curricula, consumed Taiwan-centred media, voted in competitive elections, and experienced direct PRC military pressure. Their political identity is civic and territorial. It is shaped by lived democratic practice more than by ancestral narrative.
In parallel, cross-strait tensions have intensified. Regular air and maritime pressure from Beijing reinforces the perception of an external threat. In such an environment, identity signals are filtered through security logic.
When a high-profile political figure emphasises “Chinese” identity, however constitutionally qualified, many voters interpret it through the lens of cross-strait vulnerability. Nuance is compressed into symbolism.
The April 2026 Cheng-Xi summit illustrated this mechanism in real time. Despite Cheng’s careful qualifiers, the meeting was widely interpreted in Taiwan as a partisan embrace of Beijing’s worldview. Immediate public discourse and reactions showed heightened defensiveness rather than softening. The very act of high-level engagement, framed through KMT-specific “Chinese” identity, compressed nuance into powerful symbolism.
Polling in early 2026 suggested that a significant majority viewed Cheng’s rhetoric as leaning toward eventual unification. Whether that interpretation is fair is secondary. Politically, perception governs reaction.
The mechanism becomes structural:
- Long-term civic localisation consolidates Taiwanese identity.
- External coercion heightens territorial defensiveness.
- Elite reassertion of civilisational Chinese identity triggers suspicion.
- Defensive consolidation strengthens Taiwanese-only identification.
The February 2026 commemorations of the 228 Incident illustrate this tension. Cheng’s attempt to frame 228 as part of a broader democratic opening narrative did not resonate widely beyond core supporters. For many, 228 remains embedded in memory as trauma linked to authoritarian rule under a Chinese nationalist state structure. Reframing it through civilisational continuity struggled to bridge that emotional divide.
Digital discourse amplified generational scepticism. Younger voters increasingly interpret identity in civic-territorial terms. Platforms such as PTT and Dcard reflect a pattern: resistance not necessarily to dialogue with Beijing, but to identity framing that appears ancestral rather than experiential.
Importantly, the structural data have not shifted. The NCCU trendline shows no measurable rebound in dual identification since Cheng’s rise in prominence. If anything, the long-term trajectory remains resiliently Taiwanese-majority.
Identity consolidation, once normalised across cohorts, is resistant to top-down recalibration.
Internal KMT Fractures and Electoral Arithmetic
The strategy also generates internal tension within the KMT party itself. Taipei Mayor Chiang Wan-an emphasised in early 2026, “I am Taiwanese, an ROC citizen.” The phrasing was precise. Taiwanese identity first, constitutional identity second. Chinese identity unspoken.
This reflects electoral arithmetic. The KMT’s pathway to recovery in the 2026 local elections runs through urban moderates, younger independents, and southern municipalities where Taiwanese-only identification is strongest. Ideological consolidation among deep-blue voters may secure internal cohesion, but it narrows cross-spectrum appeal.
The party has encountered this tension before. In 2016, Hung Hsiu-chu advanced a more explicit Chinese-nationalist line during the presidential campaign. Public backlash was severe. The KMT replaced her before the election, and the party suffered a landslide defeat. The lesson was not that identity cannot be discussed, but that overt recalibration against prevailing social trends carries risk.
The summit further exposed these fractures. While deep-blue supporters celebrated the meeting, moderates and urban figures maintained noticeable distance, underscoring the electoral risk: the more Cheng’s approach is seen as “KMT-branded Chinese identity,” the narrower the party’s appeal becomes among the Taiwanese-only majority needed for meaningful 2026 gains. Organisationally, identity clarity strengthens party branding. Electorally, it can limit coalition breadth. Taiwan’s median voter is neither strongly pro-independence nor strongly pro-unification. Over-ideologisation creates space for alternatives, including the Taiwan People’s Party, who frame themselves as pragmatic and post-identity. In this sense, Cheng’s gambit may unify a faction while complicating expansion.
Broader Implications: Identity in the Shadow of Power
Beyond party strategy, this episode reveals a broader pattern in identity politics: when one camp aggressively and exclusively claims ownership of a civilisational label, other groups tend to withdraw from it. What begins as a shared cultural or historical marker can quickly become a partisan symbol associated with that single group.
By closely linking “Chinese” identity to core KMT narratives, including the Republic of China Constitution as the sole legitimate anchor, pre-1949 civilisational continuity, and the 1992 Consensus as the strategic framework, Cheng Li-wun may unintentionally accelerate the normalisation of exclusive Taiwanese-only identification as the neutral and cross-partisan default across Taiwan’s political spectrum.
This does not mean that the cultural Chinese heritage disappears. Rather, it reflects a growing separation between cultural roots and political identity.
Small states operating under a great-power shadow frequently experience similar dynamics. Overt cultural alignment with a powerful neighbour can trigger countervailing localisation impulses. Identity becomes a hedge.
Taiwan’s case appears increasingly bottom-up. Generational turnover, democratic participation, and security environment reinforce civic-territorial identification. Elite rhetoric can influence margins, but structural socialisation exerts greater weight.
Conclusion: Reclamation as Revelation
Cheng Li-wun’s project is coherent. It is constitutionally grounded. It explicitly rejects PRC sovereignty. It aims to restore strategic flexibility through cultural confidence.
But politics unfolds within context. In contemporary Taiwan, where civic identity has consolidated across three democratic decades and where external pressure is persistent, high-visibility reclamation of “Chinese” identity does not operate in neutral space. It operates in a field shaped by memory, threat perception, and generational experience.
The paradox is revealing. An effort to broaden identity space may be reinforcing its narrowing. A strategy designed to lower insecurity may heighten it.
The deeper question is not whether civilisational Chinese identity can coexist with Taiwanese democracy. It can, culturally. The question is whether it can be politically re-centred after three decades of localisation.
The deeper revelation is this: an effort designed to broaden identity space may instead be reinforcing its narrowing. In trying to reclaim “Chinese,” the KMT may be illuminating something more enduring — that Taiwan’s political identity is now shaped far more by lived democratic experience and collective threat perception than by elite constitutional rhetoric. And that experience has already defined its centre.
Meng Kit Tang is a Singaporean freelance analyst and commentator who works as an aerospace engineer. He graduated from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU, Singapore in 2025. He is also a regular contributor to Taiwan Insight.