Written by Nikhil Sharma.
Image credit: Front of Gate of Liberty Square, CKS Memorial Hall by Guanzhan Chen/ Wikimedia Commons, license: CC BY-SA 3.0.
Introduction
Taiwan’s transition to democracy has been unique in the way that it led to striking shifts in how the Taiwanese people saw themselves. There have been scores of transitions to democracy around the world from monarchies to authoritarian dictatorships, but in Taiwan’s case, there has been a collective change in self-identification. Prior to democratisation, the Kuomintang government adopted policies for decades to “reintegrate” Taiwanese into the Chinese nation. The first available survey data, from 1989, showed a majority of Taiwanese identifying as Chinese (52%), with only 16% identifying solely as Taiwanese. By the end of the 1990s, however, the Election Study Centre at National Chengchi University (NCCU)—which provides the most reliable longitudinal data on Taiwanese identity—recorded that those identifying as Chinese had dropped to 10%, while nearly 40% identified as Taiwanese. This essay will analyse why Taiwan’s democratic reforms were not merely political but also a bellwether of the desire for a new Taiwanese identity. This analysis will begin with historical contexts that provide a foundation for eventual reforms and a reimagining of Taiwanese identity, generational changes, and the ever-present spectre of China, which continues to affect Taiwan.
Authoritarian rule and the suppression of a Taiwanese identity
The retreat of the Kuomintang to Taiwan after its loss in the Chinese Civil War brought authoritarian rule and, with it, the systematic suppression of Taiwanese identity. Martial law (1949–1987) saw the banning of the Hokkien/Minnan language in schools, the imposition of Mandarin, and repression following the February 28 Massacre—an uprising against KMT rule that galvanised Taiwanese consciousness. Alongside suppression, the KMT promoted Chinese nationalism as a continuing link to the mainland and the legitimate heir to China’s dynastic legacy; the nationalists even transported imperial treasures from the Forbidden City to the Taipei Palace Museum to underscore this claim. Cultural policy reinforced this agenda: an anti-communist arts directive called fangong wenyi and a forced Sinification policy called the “Cultural Renaissance Movement” elevated Chinese culture as refined while dismissing Taiwanese folk traditions as crude and backward.
Despite this forced Chinese nationalism, undercurrents of Taiwanese identity persisted. Peng Ming-min, a prominent democracy activist, pointed to an identity movement in the 1960s closely tied to demands for democratisation. In the 1970s, a cultural phenomenon called Bentuhua (nativisation) emerged in literature and the arts as a reaction to the KMT’s policy of Chinese cultural dominance. These movements revealed a burgeoning underground Taiwanese identity coexisting with official Chinese nationalism. By the late 1970s, demographic and political realities forced the KMT itself to “Taiwanise.” In 1977, Chiang Ching-kuo incorporated culture into “national constructions.” In 1981, a Council for Cultural Affairs was established to promote indigenous culture alongside Chinese culture—a meaningful, if partial, shift away from a China-centric mentality.
End of Martial Law, Democratisation, and the Winds of Change
During the period of martial law, opposition parties were banned, and the rule was strictly enforced until the late 1980’s, when the Tangwai movement came to prominence. Members of this movement eventually played a part in the formation of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1987, and while it was illegal, the party was allowed to exist until 1988, when martial law was lifted, and the DPP and other opposition parties were fully legalised.
The KMT also realised by the early 1980s that democratisation would enhance the ROC’s image among Taiwanese and Americans, with American officials gently reminding Taiwanese officials of the benefits of this path. By 1986, 66 per cent of KMT members were ethnically Taiwanese, and Mainlander dominance of its Central Standing Committee had fallen below 50 per cent. This internal “Taiwanisation” preceded President Chiang Ching-kuo’s landmark decisions to legalise the DPP and lift martial law in 1987—ushering in a new democratic era. Even before these formal changes, electoral candidates were increasingly campaigning in Taiwanese rather than Mandarin, contributing to a growing sense of a distinct local identity. Taiwanese people also began distinguishing between Huaren (ethnic Chinese) and Zhongguoren (Chinese of the PRC), reflecting a growing awareness of a Taiwanese identity.
The election of Lee Teng-hui as the first Taiwan-born KMT president introduced a new challenge for the KMT: forging a distinct, collective Taiwanese identity while maintaining the KMT’s one-China and national unification principles. Lee introduced the concept of the “New Taiwanese”—defined as anyone who “lives in and loves Taiwan”—which bridged divisions among native Taiwanese (benshengren), mainland-descended residents (waishengren), and indigenous peoples, giving all a stake in the island’s emerging identity. Thus, the lifting of martial law, the legalisation of opposition parties, and Lee’s inclusive identity politics together constituted a profound political and cultural watershed, unleashing a Taiwanese identity that had long simmered beneath the surface of an oppressive regime.
The Island’s Future
The developments from the end of martial law, with the ushering in of democracy and the rise of a burgeoning Taiwanese identity, raise questions about the island’s future. With growing data showing an ever-increasing number of people identifying as Taiwanese rather than Chinese, what does this show, and how did it happen? Scholars have identified a few factors that have contributed to this change in identity, including democratisation, the ongoing threat from China, and generational replacement. Survey data traces this progression clearly: in 1992, only 17.6% of respondents identified as exclusively Taiwanese, compared with 25.5% exclusively Chinese. In 2008, 43.7% saw themselves as Taiwanese, and 4.1% saw themselves as Chinese, with the trend continuing upward. By 2023, only 3% of people in Taiwan identified as primarily Chinese. Nearly three-in-ten (28%) identified as both Taiwanese and Chinese, but the largest share by far (67%) identified as primarily Taiwanese. The DPP actively reinforced this shift at the state level, adding “Taiwan” to the ROC passport and presenting Taiwan as a multicultural society—moves that reflected, rather than manufactured, shifting public sentiment.
These changes in public sentiment raise the question of whether they indicate a shift toward independence or the status quo. As Chinese bellicosity has increased in response to real or perceived moves towards independence by Taiwanese leaders, public sentiment for formal separation from China has only grown. Pragmatic thinking among the populace will also favour the status quo, given the threat of a military attack from China, the ambiguity about the US intervening in Taiwan’s favour, and the economic ties between China and Taiwan, which many on the island fear could make those ties a liability. Unless Taiwan’s trade and investment policies are changed to avoid overdependence on China, Taiwan will become more vulnerable to Chinese political and economic leverage, thereby reducing its political autonomy. Apart from security concerns, economic factors shape the formation of the Taiwanese national identity and influence attitudes towards Taiwanese trade and investment in China. Rising Taiwanese identity and increasing investment in China have led to ruptures in society, with unskilled workers feeling negatively vis-à-vis China. Unskilled workers would be more likely to feel threatened by Chinese workers earning lower wages, and thus develop a stronger Taiwanese identity, which would lead them to hold negative attitudes toward China. Thus, deepening cross-straits economic ties has strengthened Taiwanese identity among a section of the population that has suffered job losses and wage stagnation, and added to the undercurrent of concerns of overdependence on China.
Conclusion
The end of martial law and the transition to democracy in Taiwan were not just political bellwethers but also a fundamental push to unleash a Taiwanese identity that had been bubbling under the surface for decades, despite repression by the ruling KMT. The transformation has been steady and not rooted in ethnicity but in a shared experience of authoritarian repression, the freedom to choose political representation, and the collective forging of a new national consciousness. As pressure from the PRC intensifies—whether through military posturing or economic leverage—Taiwanese identity continues to solidify. Generational change further cements this trend. In the end, Taiwan’s nationalism is unique, born not of ethnic differences but of shared struggle and a determination to chart a distinct path—one that will continue to be shaped by the ever-present shadow of China.
Nikhil Sharma is a veteran of the United States Marine Corps and an undergraduate student in Global Affairs, in his final semester at George Mason University. Nikhil grew up in 8 countries and identifies as a Third Culture Kid. He maintains an avid interest in history, geopolitics, and culture, and aspires to be a diplomat.
This article was published as part of the special issue on ‘George Mason Class 2026’.