Written by Wai Yan Phyo Naing.
Image credit: The White House/ Facebook.
The most important question arising from the latest Trump-Xi summit is not whether Taiwan was discussed. Beijing’s account confirms that it was. The more revealing question is why Taiwan disappeared from the public agenda while remaining central behind closed doors. The answer lies in the risks surrounding the issues.
For Xi Jinping, Taiwan is a ‘core interest’ linked to sovereignty, the legitimacy of his regime, and, most importantly, his personal legacy. For Donald Trump, it forms part of a wider set of negotiations covering trade, technology, arms sales, and strategic competition. If the two leaders had had to clarify their stances in public, they might have preferred to keep them flexible. The situation made it possible for Xi to reuse Beijing’s demands because of the ambiguity in private discussions, and it allowed Trump to avoid making a public commitment.
This dynamic raises the question of whether Taiwan is being treated as a bargaining chip. While there is potential for this characterisation, it is not absolute. Trump’s reference to the proposed USD 14 billion arms package as a ‘negotiating chip’ reinforces perceptions of a transactional approach to foreign policy. The ongoing delay of the package further substantiates these concerns. Additionally, Trump’s public questioning of whether the United States should engage in conflict “9,500 miles away” indicates that his commitment to Taiwan is conditional rather than based on sentiment.
Taiwan should therefore avoid romantic descriptions of the United States as an unconditional ally. Washington and Taipei have no formal defence treaty. The relationship is better understood as a strategic partnership shaped by overlapping interests. Taiwan purchases American weapons, but it is not merely a customer. Its location along the First Island Chain, democratic political system, advanced semiconductor industry, and role in regional supply chains give it strategic importance beyond arms sales.
Trump may view Taiwan more transactionally than previous US presidents, but American policy is larger than one individual. The Taiwan Relations Act, the Six Assurances, congressional support, and cooperation with Japan and South Korea continue to constrain any sudden abandonment of Taiwan. After the summit, US officials maintained that Washington’s policy had not changed and that it remained opposed to coercion in the Taiwan Strait. The United States, Japan, and South Korea also publicly reaffirmed the importance of peace and stability across the strait.
There is currently no convincing evidence of a grand bargain in which Trump traded Taiwan’s interests for Chinese economic concessions. Xi apparently pressed Trump to oppose Taiwan independence and exercise restraint over arms sales, but Washington did not publicly adopt Beijing’s preferred wording. Nor was any formal agreement announced. The silence may nevertheless conceal a smaller form of give-and-take such as delayed arms approval, restrained official contacts, or reduced public criticism in exchange for Chinese cooperation elsewhere. Such tactical accommodation would not change formal US policy, but it could gradually weaken deterrence.
The official statements should therefore be evaluated considering how policy is put into practice. A government might say that its position is unchanged while at the same time delaying the delivery of weapons, restricting political exchanges, or modifying its diplomatic wording. The fact that Taiwanese officials were encouraged to reduce some of their engagements with Washington shows how seemingly small decisions can convey strategic messages. Strategic ambiguity becomes hazardous when the uncertainty instead encourages Beijing rather than discouraging it.
Taiwan continues to depend significantly on the United States for weapons, intelligence, diplomatic support, and regional deterrence. However, public opinion in Taiwan remains divided regarding the reliability of this support. A recent survey indicated that 47% of respondents lacked confidence in continued US military assistance and arms sales, while only 44% expressed confidence. Although such concerns are understandable, the appropriate response lies between uncritical trust and fatalistic defeatism.
Instead, Taiwan should focus on making itself harder to pressure and less reliant on shifts in US policy. It needs to quickly develop asymmetric strengths like drones, mobile missiles, air defence, ways to block enemy ships, and secure command systems. Civil defence, energy security, reliable communications, and being ready for cyberattacks and disinformation should also be top priorities. More defence spending will only help if it creates real, usable abilities, not just large projects. Furthermore, Taiwan’s future should not depend solely on presidential assurances or summit statements. It must be assessed by concrete actions while continuing to strengthen its own resilience. These policies may enhance Taiwan’s self-defence capabilities and make it a more valuable partner for those seeking alternatives to Chinese supply chains.
Taiwan’s significance extends beyond its advanced semiconductor industry. As a democratic society, Taiwan limits China’s ability to project military power beyond the First Island Chain. This gives countries such as Japan, the Philippines, the United States, and other Pacific democracies strategic reasons to oppose any coercive annexation. Therefore, Taiwan should go ahead and enhance its cooperation with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, other countries in the region, Europe, and its democratic partners. It should also maintain practical communication with Beijing while at the same time refusing to take part in negotiations which are carried out under coercion. The approach of President Lai Ching-te of avoiding any provocation while preserving Taiwan’s sovereignty and democracy offers a firm foundation for this strategy.
Taiwan is not, however, acting on its own against China. The United States, Japan, and South Korea have together opposed unilateral alterations to the existing situation and have backed Taiwan’s substantial involvement in international organisations. Their statement also dealt with economic coercion, non-market practices, and disruptions to the supply chain. It is important to realise that peace in the Taiwan Strait is not just an issue between Beijing and Taipei, but it is vital to the economic and security structure of the Indo-Pacific. Taiwan’s security should not hinge on whether Trump views it as an ally. Instead, its future depends on ensuring that defending Taiwan aligns with the interests of the United States and its partners, while also strengthening its own capabilities and resilience. Lastly, Taiwan should never become a bargaining chip between major powers. The best way to prevent this is to become a capable, indispensable partner whose security is integral to regional peace.
Wai Yan Phyo Naing is a visiting scholar at the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, under the “Taiwan MoFA Fellowship” program. He is a Southeast Asianist with a PhD in History (International Affairs and International Studies) from the National Research University – Higher School of Economics, and his research interests include Myanmar studies, Asia-Pacific studies, Taiwan studies, regional and international affairs, and Myanmar migration in Southeast Asia.