Written by Aleksandrs Gross.
Image credit: 鄭麗文/ Facebook.
Cheng Li-wun’s chairmanship of the KMT is a significant moment not just for the party, but potentially for Taiwanese politics. Cheng is the second woman to hold such a high position in the party, and, compared to the other candidates for the chairmanship, she appeals more to younger generations of KMT supporters.
According to recent polls, the KMT has been losing its grip on Taiwan’s electorate with declining support among Taiwanese aged 20 to 40. With around 15% backing in this group, the KMT trails far behind both the DPP, which garners about one-third support, and the TPP, which attracts roughly a quarter. Despite efforts to the contrary, the KMT has continually failed to regain the support of younger Taiwanese.
The question is, how do these voters perceive Cheng? How she rules the party will determine whether or not it will continue to be sidelined by younger generations of Taiwanese – leading to its eventual downfall, or whether it will rise again.
On Taiwanese vs Chinese Identity
Taiwanese who are 20-40 years old make up around one-fourth of Taiwan’s electorate. Their voting patterns are what brought the DPP victory in the presidential elections of 2020 and 2024, and also saw the rise of the TPP – the party that broke the green-blue hold over Taiwanese politics.
This age group has a much stronger sense of national identity and has been described as the naturally independent generation (自然獨 or 天然獨). For them, being Taiwanese is incompatible with being Chinese.
Recent statements by Cheng have shown that she conceives of Taiwanese identity in a way that is at great odds with such attitudes. Cheng has publicly stated that she is Chinese (我是中國人). She implies that conceiving of Taiwanese identity as somehow separate from a Chinese identity is incorrect and something she intends to change (的確現在越來越多的台灣人不認為自己是中國人 (..) 這也是我們要改變的), going so far as vowing to make all Taiwanese proud to be Chinese (未來所有台灣人都會自豪自信地說「我是中國人」).
She has also emphasised that according to the constitution, all Taiwanese are Chinese (as well as Taiwanese) (在中華民國憲法的『憲法一中』底下，我們就是中國人，當然我們也都是台灣人.)
Additionally, she speaks of Taiwanese history in a China-centred manner, saying that culturally speaking, all Taiwanese are also Chinese (在文化上、在歷史上，我們也都是中國人). She also said that people across the strait are descendants of Yan and Huang, part of the same Chinese nation (兩岸同為炎黃子孫、同屬中華民族).
Such views have been one of the reasons the party has failed to resonate with younger people – if anything, Cheng has been reinforcing the KMT party’s image as one that espouses a mainland-centred version of Taiwanese identity.
On Independence vs Unification
Given China’s efforts to portray Taiwan as part of China and Taiwanese identity as a subcategory of Chinese identity, one might expect that this generation of voters would seek independence. Surprisingly, this has not proven to be the case. Instead, recent surveys have shown that most young Taiwanese support maintaining the status quo rather than seeking an outright declaration of independence. The least popular option is unification with China.
Cheng desires to establish closer ties with China, not just culturally (as evident from the above-stated) but also politically. To this effect, she desires to restart cross-strait exchanges and a resumption of institutional dialogue. She intends to do so on the basis of the 1992 consensus (interpret) and a firm opposition to independence.
She has said that she would be willing to meet with Xi Jinping 100 times if necessary (不要說見一次，見一百次都願意), that China is not an enemy but an asset Taiwan naturally inherits (如果我們不再把中國視為我們的仇敵…我們反而把中國認為是我們本來就承繼的資產) and that two strong countries working as one are stronger than two (強強聯手，一加一大於二).
Cheng’s statements, while not outright supporting unification with China, are also not exactly pro-status quo. She has said that ‘if Taiwan can have freedom of speech advocating independence, why can’t we have freedom of speech advocating unification?’ (如果台灣可以擁有倡導台灣獨立的言論自由，為何我們不能擁有倡導統一的言論自由?) Given China’s reunification ambitions, it is difficult to see how China would be willing to establish closer ties if not for the purpose of eventual unification. Lowering cross-straits tensions while maintaining the status quo might be a difficult tight-rope to walk.
The Sunflower Movement and the Great Recall Movements were both instances in which the KMT was perceived as drifting too close to China at the expense of Taiwan’s democracy. Both movements were led by Taiwanese youth, and they serve to indicate that while young people might not pursue independence, they are antagonistic towards closer ties with China.
Livelihood versus Identity
While Cheng’s views on cross-straits issues are what have attracted most attention in the press, for younger Taiwanese, such issues are secondary. Livelihood issues, such as high housing prices, inflation, and employment pressure, are of more immediate importance to this group of Taiwanese.
Approximately 40% of Taiwanese younger than 40 report financial deficit; on a monthly basis, their expenses exceed their income. This has been a growing trend for six consecutive years. Only around a quarter report earning more than they spend. Additionally, around 75% report having some form of debt – of these, around 45% say that this causes significant financial stress.
Such a trend makes it clear how existential livelihood issues are becoming important for many younger Taiwanese. This also affects their voting choices, which became evident in the last legislative elections, when for the first time, the TPP, an anti-establishment party focusing on youth issues and livelihood policies, broke the green-blue mould of Taiwanese politics by receiving 3.7 million votes (26% of total votes cast). Given that both the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) were seen as unable to properly address these issues, the TPP became the obvious choice.
Even though Cheng has been outspoken regarding her desire to bring more young people into politics – through internal KMT reforms, by re-engaging young members and involving a new generation in decision-making – her statements have not gone so far as to address any one of the major livelihood concerns mentioned above. While empowering youth in politics may appeal to younger members of the KMT, this is a small subgroup of Taiwanese youth. Such comments may do little to resonate with the majority of younger Taiwanese beyond the KMT party structure.
Cheng’s focus on issues of identity and cross-straits tensions only strengthens the perception that, under Cheng, the KMT will continue to be unable to address the issues younger Taiwanese care most about.
Besides livelihood and cross-strait issues, younger generations also care about social rights-related issues, such as gender equality, LGBTQ rights, and environmental rights. Cheng has also said very little about these issues.
An Image Problem
Another obstacle Cheng might face in regaining youth support for the party regards her own personal image. Popular discussions on threads – the social media app popular among Taiwanese youth – have already brought up her past pro-independence stance and her comments about the war in Ukraine.
As regards her past political activity, in her youth, Cheng Li-wun was part of the “fundamentalist Taiwan independence” camp, participating in the Wild Lily Protest, joining the DPP and being known for her vehemently anti-KMT, pro-Taiwan rhetoric. Since then, she has made a 180-degree turn and is now a deeply conservative KMT member who blames Taiwan’s precarious geopolitical situation on the DPP.
Such a shift puts her in a similar camp to Holger Chen, also known as Gym Boss, who, like Cheng, was a former DPP supporter who later became a vocal proponent of much closer ties with China. Many young Taiwanese are deeply suspicious of such dramatic ideological turns and often suspect Chinese interference.
Secondly, Cheng’s views on the Ukraine war – with Russia being cast as a democratic country acting in an effort to keep the peace in the region and NATO being the chief instigator of the war – are seen as highly problematic and as aligning too closely with Chinese narratives. Besides her views on the Ukraine war, Cheng’s attendance at a white terror memorial ceremony, which, among others, honoured a CCP spy, has been perceived as behaviour implying pro-CCP sympathies.
Losing a traditional supporter base
Also worth mentioning is that the KMT is losing support among one of its traditional voter bases. Chinese who immigrated to Taiwan and their descendants (known as waishenren 外省人) traditionally voted for the KMT because it was the only party that represented a mainland-centred Chinese identity. They now represent around 12% of Taiwan’s population.
While there are no clear figures on the number of waishenren that are currently 20-40 years old, research has shown that the third generation of waishenren do not vote only on the basis of family background, choosing other parties as well, are more affected by life experience, and feel more Taiwanese than their parents.
Deep Blue
Cheng’s views towards Taiwanese identity and cross-straits issues place her firmly within the deep-blue camp of the KMT – one which is known for receiving the most support within the KMT, but being the most unpopular faction among the general Taiwanese public. Such a trend is particularly true when it comes to understanding how younger Taiwanese view Cheng and the party.
Unless Cheng tones down her mainland-centred view of Taiwanese identity and cross-straits rhetoric and focuses instead on livelihood issues, it is likely that she will meet the same fate as Hung Hsiu-Chu: receiving an increasing amount of support within the KMT echo-chamber, but facing greater distrust among the general public.
For younger Taiwanese, Cheng’s leadership currently reinforces everything they already distrust about the KMT: a China-centred identity, ideological rigidity, and a failure to address current youth livelihood struggles. Without a dramatic shift, her chairmanship is likely to accelerate rather than reverse the KMT’s generational decline.
Aleksandrs Gross is a freelance journalist focusing on the grassroots development of Taiwanese identity. He is particularly interested in the development of Taiwanese civic society, especially social movements, and how younger generations of Taiwanese respond to the unique political, identity-related and economic challenges of Taiwan. Find more of his writing on New Bloom and his Substack Identity Island.
This article was published as part of a special issue on ‘KMT leadership election: Can Cheng Li-wun save the party?‘.
Taiwan Insight 