Written by Will Foster.
Image credit: Taipei, Taiwan: Presidential Office Building by CEphoto, Uwe Aranas/ Wikimedia Commons, license: CC BY-SA 3.0.
Taiwan’s transition to democracy in the late 1980s and early 1990s changed not only its government, but also how many people in Taiwan understood themselves. Under Kuomintang rule, Taiwan was presented as the Republic of China, a government that still claimed to represent all of China. The state promoted a Chinese nationalist identity, controlled education, suppressed dissent, and discouraged discussion of Taiwan’s separate historical experience. Identity was shaped under an authoritarian system that told people what their country was supposed to be.
That changed after martial law was lifted in 1987 and opposition politics became legal, giving Taiwanese society more space to discuss its own history, identity, and political future. As elections became more competitive and civil society grew stronger, more people began to see Taiwan not as a temporary base for the Republic of China, but as a distinct democratic society with its own institutions and future. Taiwan’s transition to democracy helped produce a major shift in self-perception, reflected in the growth of a distinct Taiwanese political identity. This political identity has made unification with China less appealing, strengthened support for preserving Taiwan’s autonomy, and reframed debates about Taiwan’s future around democratic self-determination rather than competing claims to represent China.
After the KMT retreated to Taiwan in 1949, it continued to present the Republic of China as the legitimate government of all China. Through education, language policy, political symbols, and martial law, the state promoted a Chinese nationalist identity while limiting open discussion of Taiwan’s separate historical experience. This meant identity was not simply a personal matter; it was shaped by institutions that treated Taiwan as part of a broader ROC claim over China rather than as a distinct political community. Democratisation challenged this framework. The lifting of martial law in 1987, the legalisation of opposition politics, and the first direct presidential election in 1996 moved Taiwan away from the emergency political system that had justified authoritarian rule for decades. These changes opened space for freer media, civil society, and public debate, allowing people to discuss Taiwan’s history, identity, and future in ways that had previously been restricted.
The first direct presidential election in 1996 was both a political milestone and a symbolic moment in Taiwan’s identity formation. Political legitimacy increasingly came from Taiwan’s own citizens rather than from the ROC’s claim to represent all of China. Democracy made the people of Taiwan the source of political authority, strengthening a distinct political identity. The clearest evidence of this identity shift comes from polling. The Election Study Centre at National Chengchi University has tracked Taiwanese and Chinese identity since 1992. Its surveys show a major rise in people identifying as “Taiwanese,” while the share identifying only as “Chinese” has sharply declined. This is one of the clearest indicators of Taiwan’s political transformation because it shows that a measurable change in self-identification accompanied democratisation.
This shift does not mean Taiwanese society rejects all Chinese cultural influence. Many people in Taiwan continue to recognise Chinese cultural influences alongside Japanese, Indigenous, and local traditions. The more notable change has occurred in Taiwan’s political identity. Increasingly, people view Taiwan as their primary political community and democracy as a defining feature of that community. The timing matters: the rise of Taiwanese identity followed political liberalisation, suggesting democracy gave people the freedom to express that identity more openly.
Taiwanese identity today is increasingly rooted in shared political experience. People in Taiwan vote in their own elections, use their own currency, and live under a democratic system separate from the People’s Republic of China. These realities make Taiwan feel politically distinct even if its formal international status remains contested. Democratisation reshaped self-perception by making Taiwan itself the centre of political life. Elections, parties, civil rights, and social movements increasingly drew legitimacy from the people living on the island rather than from the ROC’s claim to represent China.
Democracy also sharpened the contrast between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China. As Taiwan became freer, China remained authoritarian. This made unification less attractive because the issue was no longer only national identity, but also political systems. For many people in Taiwan, the question became less about shared cultural roots and more about whether they wanted to live under the Chinese Communist Party’s system. Taiwanese identity, therefore, became closely tied to democracy itself. People were identifying not only with a place, but with a system of government and way of life they did not believe existed under the PRC.
This does not mean most Taiwanese support an immediate declaration of independence. Many still prefer maintaining some version of the status quo because of the risk of provoking a military response from China. Taiwan already functions with its own government, military, currency, and passport, while Beijing still claims the island and opposes any move toward formal independence. Many Taiwanese, therefore, see Taiwan as already separate, but avoid supporting formal independence because of the risks involved.
Polling reflects this complexity. A 2025 poll found that only 11.9 per cent of respondents viewed China favourably, while around 90 percent viewed it unfavourably. The same poll found that 44.3 per cent leaned toward independence, while only 10.7 per cent leaned toward unification. If the status quo could not be maintained, 61 per cent would lean toward independence compared to 21.8 percent toward unification.
These numbers show that unification is deeply unpopular but also explain why the status quo remains politically important. Many Taiwanese identify strongly with Taiwan and reject unification, while still avoiding immediate formal independence because of the threat of Chinese military retaliation. Identity and strategy do not always align perfectly. Someone can see Taiwan as separate from China while still supporting the status quo as the safest way to preserve Taiwan’s autonomy.
The status quo has become central to Taiwan’s future debate because it allows Taiwan to preserve its democratic way of life without forcing an immediate final decision on independence or unification. For many people, this is not confusion but a practical response to danger. Democratisation strengthened the belief that Taiwan’s future should be decided by the people living there, but China’s military pressure limits how freely that choice can be exercised.
This makes Taiwan’s future more difficult for Beijing. The PRC’s argument often treats Taiwan as naturally Chinese in a cultural or historical sense, but Taiwan’s democratic experience has strengthened a separate political identity. Many people in Taiwan may recognise Chinese cultural influences while still seeing Taiwan as a self-governing democracy whose future should not be decided by Beijing.
Generational change has reinforced this shift. Younger Taiwanese grew up after democratisation and have weaker connections to the ROC’s old mission of representing China. Their political memories are shaped more by Taiwan’s elections, social movements, and Chinese pressure than by the Chinese Civil War. For many younger Taiwanese, democracy is not a recent achievement but a normal part of life. That makes unification with an authoritarian China even less appealing.
Events such as the Sunflower Movement in 2014 further demonstrated the connection between democracy and political identity. Many young people opposed the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement not only because of economic concerns, but because they feared deeper dependence on China could weaken Taiwan’s democratic autonomy. The movement showed that Taiwanese identity was increasingly being expressed through the defence of democratic institutions and self-government rather than through cultural distinctions alone.
Taiwan’s democratisation did more than change its institutions. It helped create a distinct Taiwanese political identity rooted in elections, democratic participation, and self-government. While cultural identities in Taiwan remain diverse and complex, democratic experience has increasingly given people a shared political identity centred on Taiwan itself. As a result, debates over Taiwan’s future are no longer primarily about competing claims to represent China. They are increasingly about who has the right to decide Taiwan’s future and how Taiwan can preserve its democratic way of life.
Will Foster is from Potomac, Maryland and is currently an undergraduate student at George Mason University majoring in Economics with a minor in Global Systems.
This article was published as part of the special issue on ‘George Mason Class 2026’.